Coronavirus: does its activation of archetypes of evil cause added psychological suffering?

Fear and grief caused by the pandemic have produced a powerful unconscious narrative in the collective psyche that the coronavirus is driven by an innately evil, and possibly divine, force. The resulting archetypal dimension of fear causes an extra layer of psychological suffering in individuals. This paper discusses how and why this narrative was created and why it is so compelling by looking at 1) the myth-making nature of the human psyche, 2) the psychodynamics of fear that drive the narrative, 3) the properties of the coronavirus and the pandemic that activate negative poles of some archetypes, in particular, archetypes of evil, and 4) asking how analytical psychology can help ease psychological suffering caused by these negative narratives, where one possibility is to invoke the transcendent function. The author’s personal experiences as both biochemist and analytical psychologist elucidate how the transcendent function can promote healing.     

A VIROCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE ON EVIL

Abstract. The coronavirus pandemic has stirred interest in viruses. This has been accompanied by a proliferation of popular works trying to explain how viruses fit into the Christian worldview. In an anthropocentric perspective, viruses are easily regarded as malicious entities. This article, however, shows that a proper understanding of the biology of viruses actually adds another level of complexity to our perception of good and evil. Interestingly, this additional layer of complexity might help us solve some of the most urgent difficulties in the discussion about good and evil, if we recognize the subjective nature of what we call natural evil. We need to be more nuanced not merely in our theological discussion about good and evil, but also in the way we talk about viruses.     

Paul Tillich's Realistic Stance Toward the Vital Trends of Nature

Many scientists have argued forcefully for the pointlessness of nature, something that challenges any doctrine of Creation. However, apparent design and comprehensibility are also to be found in nature; it is ambivalent. This trait is nowhere more evident than in the natural inclinations that lead to concupiscence and the "seven deadly sins" in human beings. These inclinations are dealt with as pertaining to the "pre-fallen" condition of nature and human beings. As a framework to make sense of the goodness of creation in this context, Paul Tillich's notion of the "vital trends of nature" is called to the fore. Being at the intersection of a philosophy of religion and a philosophy of nature, this notion hints at the goodness of Creation in fragment and anticipation.     

The Problem of Evil: A Solution From Science

In this essay, I attempt to solve the problem of the existence of evil in a world created by an omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent God. I conclude that evil exists because God wanted to create moral creatures. Because choice is necessary for morality, God created creatures with enormous capacities for choice—and therefore enormous capacities for evil. Material creatures are subject to pain and death because, for such creatures, moral choices are deeply serious. The laws that underlie the material world and from which material life arises are such that, from their workings out on a planet that can support life, natural evils happen.     

Theory construction and existential description in Schelling’s treatise on freedom

Despite considerable recent attention, important features of Schelling’s famous work, the 1809 treatise On the Essence of Human Freedom, remain under-explored. One of these is the methodological dualism which Schelling advocates at the very start of the text. Schelling aims to weld together into a coherent position a first-person phenomenology of freedom and an explanation achieved by locating freedom within a conceptual system articulating the basic structure of the world. Most interpretations of the Freiheitsschrift, however, concentrate on only one of these approaches, thus foreshortening their understanding of Schelling’s enterprise. The article explores this tendency towards one-sidedness by considering two sophisticated recent interpretations of the work, taking opposite tacks. One, by Markus Gabriel, focuses on the distinctive, self-reflexive metaphysics which Schelling proposes, while the other, by Sebastian Gardner, claims that Schelling’s ontology is extrapolated entirely from his account of our moral consciousness, a procedure pioneered by Kant. The article argues that neither of these interpretations can do full justice to Schelling’s project. Furthermore, although the Freiheitsschrift is not entirely successful, and hence points towards later developments in Schelling’s thinking, its treatment of freedom is superior to the ‘soft naturalism’ pioneered by Peter Strawson, and currently influential across various philosophical traditions.     

Ibn ʿArabī (1165–1240) and Rūmī (1207–1273) on the Question of Evil: Discontinuities in Sufi Metaphysics

This article compares and contrasts Ibn ?Arabī’s and Rūmī’s accounts of evil. Ibn ?Arabī explains the existence of evil as a consequence of both metaphysical necessity and God’s volitional act. Evil is the inevitable ‘shadow’ of existence implied by the Infinity of God, and God’s mercy existentiates the possibilities ‘hidden’ in the Infinite, allowing this metaphysical necessity to emerge. In contrast to Ibn ?Arabī’s necessitarian-cum-volitional theodicy, Rūmī presents an almost exclusively volitional theodicy. He traces the roots of evil to the Divine Will. To preserve God’s moral perfection, he frequently points to the positive compensating functions of the existence of evil in the world. Ibn ?Arabī’s theodicy enables him to accentuate the necessity of evil in order to save the act of will, and hence God’s perfection, from being directly related to the emergence of evil. Rūmī’s volitional theodicy, however, relates the Divine Will directly to evil, and subsequently attempts to preserve the purity of the Divine intention by accentuating all the positive compensations.     

Compatibilism,Evil, and the Free-Will Defense

It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism.

Crime: Self and Society: Psychoanalytical Perspectives on Taking Responsibility and Moving Forward

The occurrence of a tragic and unnecessary act of evil (crime) induces in us a need to search for blame, to find who or what is responsible. Often this search amounts in a Kleinian splitting between personal and social responsibility – we either blame the person or blame the society, or oscillate between the two. In fact, even movement into a more integrated, depressive position does not solve the problem—the evil of the event is too hot to be contained anywhere. True healing from crime will not result by perfecting the “assigning blame” mechanism in ourselves or our criminal justice system, but rather when we recognize the futility of that search. To use Lowe’s concept of creative limits, only by recognizing our own limitedness will creative and healing spaces that allow the return to innocence occur. Jessica Van Denend serving as an intern chaplain at Bedford Hills Correctional Facility for the past 2 years, became increasingly interested in the complexity of societal and personal complexes wrapped up in the criminal justice processes, and their manifestation in the prison system. While studying under Prof. Ann Ulanov (in the Psychiatry and Religion program at Union Theological Seminary), the author had time to examine what some psychoanalytical tools might have to say about crime and its repercussions.     

The Economy of the Gift: Paul Ricoeur's Significance for Theological Ethics

Paul Ricoeur's understanding of the relations of faith, love, and hope suggests a unique approach to theological ethics, one that holds fresh promise for bringing together considerations of the good (teleology) and the right (deontology) around the notion of an “economy of the gift.” The economy of the gift articulates Ricoeur's distinctively dialectical understanding of the relation of the human and the divine, and the resulting dialectical moral relation of the self and the other. Despite our fallen condition, Ricoeur suggests, we are called by the divine to embrace the radical possibility of the reconciliation of human goods under the requirement of accountability to human diversity and otherness.     

康德论述根本恶的三重维度及其矛盾

康德在《单纯理性限度内的宗教》一书中对根本恶的论述贯穿了三种维度,即先验维度、自由维度和进步维度。但这三种维度之间并不是自恰的,而是存在着矛盾。通过对这些矛盾及康德对矛盾的解决的成败的分析可以看出,这些矛盾是内在于康德的哲学的。对（善）恶的理解只有与人的生存处境和价值追求相联系才有可能。