心理治疗循证实践中“证据”的四个基本问题

循证实践正在成为西方心理治疗发展的主流方向。但如何理解循证实践的"证据"仍是见仁见智。部分社会大众甚至心理学专家仅将"循证"当作一种"修辞"或"时尚",顾名思义地界定"证据",或按主观信仰随意地选择与应用"证据"。文章以"证据"为研究焦点,试图建构系统理解"证据"的全面图景,探讨了心理治疗循证实践中关于"证据"的4个基本问题:(1)从历史考察与理论分析的视角出发,探讨了"心理治疗为什么需要证据";(2)从证据的类型范围、生产者及存在形式三个视角,描述了"心理治疗存在哪些证据";(3)从证据的科学程度、研究设计的严谨程度及解决实践问题的契合程度出发,阐述了"哪些证据才是好的证据";(4)从6个步骤推广证据及创新研究设计两个方面展开,分析了"在现实世界中如何推广与应用证据"。     

One’s own reasoning

Abstract

Responding to Cappelen and Dever’s claim that there is no distinctive role for perspectivality in epistemology, I argue that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others’.     

Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism

Evidentialism says that a subject S’s justification is entirely determined by S’s evidence. The plausibility of evidentialism depends on (1) what kind of entities constitute a subject S’s evidence and (2) what one takes the support relation to consist in. Conee and Feldman’s mainstream evidentialism (ME) incorporates a psychologist answer to (1) and an explanationist answer to (2). ME naturally accommodates perceptual justification. However, it does not accommodate intuitive cases of inferential justification. In the second part of the paper, I consider and reject a reply based on a refined explanationist theory of the support relation proposed by K McCain.     

非小细胞肺癌术后化疗循证医学证据引发的思考

肺癌是目前对人类生命威胁最大的恶性肿瘤之一.对非小细胞肺癌术后化疗的循证医学证据及由此引发的思考:对循证医学的局限性及认识真理的曲折性进行了阐述.     

走出循证医学的误区——关于证据的反思

循证医学在临床实践中起着越来越重要的作用,证据的可靠性是循证医学赖以生存的基石。循证医学遵循的证据来自随机对照试验,这些证据并非完美。临床医师在采纳这些证据时须注意以下几个方面的问题证据的适用人群,干预措施是否存在均一性,对照是否存在片面性,试验的研究终点是否与临床脱节,证据的时效性,以及随机试验提供的证据不足等。只有结合医生的专业技能和临床经验,考虑病人的价值和愿望,对证据进行正确评估和采纳,才能使证据发挥最大的效能,促进循证医学的发展。     

“比较治疗学”与“循证医学”之比较

对比较治疗学与循证医学兴起的历史背景、基本内涵的差异以及在临床决策方法方面的关系进行了较为细致的比较。循证医学与比较治疗学分属于临床决策的两个不同的阶段,比较治疗学的内涵范围要大于循证医学,同时循证医学为比较治疗学提供主要的基础性决策依据,比较治疗学的决策方法是循证医学在临床决策方法上的新发展。两者对促进临床科学决策都具有重要意义。     

Development and evaluation of the evidence‐based practice classroom observation measure (EBP‐COM)

Due to the increased emphasis on evidence‐based practices (EBPs) in recent education initiatives, classroom observers need an objective way to measure teacher use of EBPs. Although some measures for this purpose exist, these measures are limited by their reliance on self‐report. Therefore, we created a direct observation tool titled the Evidence‐Based Practice Classroom Observation Measure (EBP‐COM) for observers to assess the use of EBPs by teachers of students with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). We evaluated reliability and validity of the EBP‐COM, as well as whether the assessment tool could detect change in teacher behavior. A measurement refinement process involving six raters collecting 65 data points revealed the EPB‐COM to have sound psychometric properties. With this tool, researchers can conduct comprehensive and objective assessments of teacher EBP use.     

Intuitions as Evidence Facilitators

There is currently an important debate about whether philosophical intuitions are intended as evidence for the theories philosophers promote. On one side are those who argue that philosophers do rely on intuitions as evidence; on the other side are those who deny any such role for philosophical intuitions. This paper argues that both sides of this debate are partially right and partially wrong. Intuitive judgments do not, as psychological states, function as evidence in most well‐known philosophical thought experiments. Philosophers nevertheless strongly depend upon these intuitive judgments. Where both sides go awry is in assuming that the importance of intuitive judgments rests solely upon their role as evidence. We need to distinguish between evidence, as such, from various nonevidential psychological states that are needed for something else to serve as evidence. The paper calls these latter conditions “evidence facilitators” and argues that intuitive judgments belong in this category.