Perceptual consciousness plays no epistemic role

It is often assumed that perceptual experience provides evidence about the external world. But much perception can occur unconsciously, as in cases of masked priming or blindsight. Does unconscious perception provide evidence as well? Many theorists maintain that it cannot, holding that perceptual experience provides evidence in virtue of its conscious character. Against such views, I challenge here both the necessity and, perhaps more controversially, the sufficiency of consciousness for perception to provide evidence about the external world. In addition to motivating and defending the idea that unconscious perception can and does often provide evidence, I observe that whether or not perceptual phenomenology is relevant to the evidentiary status of perception depends on the nature of consciousness. And I argue that a well‐supported theory of consciousness—higher‐order thought theory—invites a striking conclusion: that perceptual phenomenology is not on its own sufficient to provide for evidence of the external world.     

Rethinking the Fallacy of Hasty Generalization

This paper makes a case for a refined look at the so- called fallacy of hasty generalization by arguing that this expression is an umbrella term for two fallacies already distinguished by Aristotle. One is the fallacy of generalizing in an inappropriate way from a particular instance to a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification. The other is the secundum quid (in a certain respect) fallacy of moving to a conclusion that is supposed to be a universal generalization containing a for all x quantification while overlooking qualifications that have to be added to the more limited kind of generalization expressed in the premise. It is shown that these two fallacies relate to two different kinds of generalization.The classification of fallacious generalizations is based on a new theory of generalization that distinguishes three kinds of generalizations – the universal generalization of the for all x type, used in classical deductive logic, the inductive generalization, based on probability, and the presumptive generalization, which is defeasible, and allows for exceptions to a general rule. The resulting classification goes beyond a logic-oriented analysis by taking into account how a respondent may oppose a potentially fallacious generalizing move by falsifying it. Using a dialectical interpretation of premise-conclusion complexes, the paper outline a richer concept of generalizing argument moves embedded in a communicational reconstruction of the strategic uses of such moves in which two parties take part in an orderly dialectical exchange of viewpoints.     

A processing model for the analysis of one-way arguments in discourse

This paper describes a computational model for analyzing arguments in discourse. In particular, the model describes processes necessary for interpreting one uninterrupted argument from a speaker. The resulting output is a representation for the underlying claim and evidence relations between propositions of the argument. For our processing model we present: (i) a characterization of coherent orderings of propositions, used to limit search for interpretation of each new proposition (ii) a working definition of the evidence relation, used to recognize connections between propositions (iii) a theory of the function and use of clue words — special words and phrases indicating the structure of the argument — then used in the analysis to control search for interpretation and verification of evidence relations.     

A reappraisal of the relationship between span memory and intelligence via “best evidence synthesis”

This paper examines the relationship between span memory [e.g., immediate memory, short-term memory (STM), simple span] and general ability (g) though a reanalysis of two data sets [Christal, R. E. (1959). Factor analytic study of visual memory. Psychological Monographs: General and Applied, 72 (13, Whole No. 466); Kelley, H.P. (1964). Memory abilities: A factor analysis. Psychometric Monographs, No. 11]. Because of their large sample sizes and the multiple measures used to identify each construct, the Christal and Kelley studies were examined within a “best evidence synthesis” framework. Modern structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques were used to examine the relationship between immediate memory and g. Results indicated that in both studies, the relationship between immediate memory and g was quite substantial (.71 and .83), and that this relationship was essentially reduced by half when the common content variance of the tests was accounted for (e.g., verbal, spatial, numerical). Results are discussed within the context of recent research examining the relationship between working memory (WM) and g.     

Weighting information from outside sources: a biased process

How do people utilize information from outside sources in their decisions? Participants observed a signal‐plus‐noise or noise‐alone event and then made a yes–no decision about whether a signal had occurred. Participants were provided with two information sources to aid decision making. Each source consisted of four components that provided estimates of signal likelihood. In Experiment 1, the two sources had equal overall accuracy but differed in the expertise and internal correlation of their components. A regression analysis indicated that participants overweighed the high‐expertise‐high‐correlation source. This bias occurred on trials when the aggregate opinions of the sources disagreed. In Experiment 2, both the overall accuracy of the source and its components were manipulated. Participants overweighed information from the higher accuracy source. These biases reflect people's sensitivity to across‐trial and within‐trial differences in the accuracy and internal consistency of information sources. Experiment 3 provided additional evidence supporting these conclusions. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evidence coverage and argument skills: cognitive factors in a juror's verdict choice

Juror reasoning and verdict choice have been explored variously as functions of argument skill and the overall story representation of the evidence on which verdict choices are based. This study investigates the proportion of testimony covered in the justification of a verdict choice and its relationship with argument skill, narrative explanation or evidence‐based argument, and certainty about verdict choice. Each of these variables was also compared with the verdict choice. People serving jury duty justified verdict choices in two abridged jury trials. Individuals were consistent in the relative amount of evidence used in both trials. Argument skills, evidence evaluation type, and evidence synthesis type all accounted for variance in the amount of evidence covered. Evidence coverage, along with argument skills, predicted verdict choice. As expected, those most certain about verdict choice did not use the most evidence. Implications regarding mediating factors in story construction and juror decision making are discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关于三大神学问题的哲学思考

灵魂是否不灭?上帝是否存在?上帝意志是否具有超必然的自由?这三个问题涉及宗教的根本基础。宗教神学家一直把上述三个问题视为神学的基本问题。一方面把它们奉为神圣的信条,不许信仰者怀疑;另一方面,也不断利用哲学和理性的形式,对之作出各式各样的证明。但是历史上的启蒙哲学家和自然科学家对之发出了公开的挑战,从哲学世界观的高度,从自然科学新成就出发,证明统一的自然界不可能有任何超自然存在。围绕三大神学问题的争论,一直是哲学与神学关系史上的中心问题,它也成了宗教哲学必须解答的重要理论问题。     

Empirically Supported Complexity

Abstract— Over the last 10 years, evidence-based practice in psychology has become synonymous with a particular operationalization of it aimed at developing a list of empirically supported therapies. Although much has been learned since the emergence of the empirically supported therapies movement, its restrictive definition of evidence (excluding, for example, basic science as a source of evidence to be used by clinicians) is problematic, and the assumptions inherent in its nearly exclusive focus on brief, focal treatments for specific disorders are themselves not generally supported by the available data. Recent meta-analytic data support a more nuanced view of treatment efficacy than one that makes dichotomous judgments of empirically supported or unsupported, suggesting the need for a more refined concept of evidence-based practice in psychology.