Integrating Cognitive Process and Descriptive Models of Attitudes and Preferences

Discrete choice experiments—selecting the best and/or worst from a set of options—are increasingly used to provide more efficient and valid measurement of attitudes or preferences than conventional methods such as Likert scales. Discrete choice data have traditionally been analyzed with random utility models that have good measurement properties but provide limited insight into cognitive processes. We extend a well‐established cognitive model, which has successfully explained both choices and response times for simple decision tasks, to complex, multi‐attribute discrete choice data. The fits, and parameters, of the extended model for two sets of choice data (involving patient preferences for dermatology appointments, and consumer attitudes toward mobile phones) agree with those of standard choice models. The extended model also accounts for choice and response time data in a perceptual judgment task designed in a manner analogous to best–worst discrete choice experiments. We conclude that several research fields might benefit from discrete choice experiments, and that the particular accumulator‐based models of decision making used in response time research can also provide process‐level instantiations for random utility models.     

Situationally Equivocal Eyewitness Evidence and the Violence of Crimes

Eyewitness evidence is amongst the most important types of evidence in investigative and juridical proceedings. Yet, eyewitness evidence frequently derives from observations made under situationally equivocal conditions, including such factors as darkness and physical obstruction of view. The effect of the violence of a given crime on potential jurors' evaluation of such equivocal evidence was addressed. A witness's identification of a suspect in a violent crime was generated in three versions, varying only in the level of violence of the crime. Respondents were more likely to accept this identification as accurate under more violent conditions and were also less likely to report noticing or considering equivocal aspects (darkness and physical obstruction) in situations of greater violence. Predisposing factors to judgement of guilt lay significantly in the acceptance of punishment as a viable deterrent to crime and of societal guilt for the criminal's behaviour, although political or religious orientations were not shown to influence these results, and none of these factors interacted with the violence of the crime to influence judgement of guilt or innocence. These findings indicate the importance of affective factors in judgements of guilt or innocence, especially when these judgements are based on situationally equivocal eyewitness evidence. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Barriers to Learning Motivational Interviewing: A Survey of Motivational Interviewing Trainers' Perceptions

Trainers reported that motivational interviewing (MI)–inconsistent behaviors were frequently perceived during training and believed to create barriers to learning. More barriers were perceived in corrections than in mental health training audiences. Strategies to facilitate unlearning MI‐inconsistent behaviors may accelerate acquisition of MI.     

Blindness to alternative scenarios in evidence evaluation

In order to prevent miscarriages of justice, police, prosecution, and judges must remain open to alternative scenarios in which the suspect is in fact innocent. In recent years, however, several studies have delivered results suggesting that open‐mindedness is not always standard in criminal procedures. For example, Ask and Granhag (2005) found that police officers' estimation of the incriminating power of investigation findings was not affected by knowledge of an alternative suspect. The current first study replicated these findings in a mixed sample of police officers, district attorneys, and judges. In Study 2, this blindness to alternative scenarios did not emerge in a sample of university students. However, the estimation of the incriminating power of the evidence and the willingness to convict the primary suspect were predicted with the participants' confirmation proneness. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of corroborative evidence in child sexual abuse evaluations

Published studies of forensic child sexual abuse (CSA) evaluations by mental health and medical professionals and paraprofessionals (MHPs) were analysed in order to evaluate two widely held assumptions. These related assumptions are (1) evidence that corroborates children's reports of sexual abuse is rare in forensic CSA evaluations; and (2) in the vast majority of evaluations, MHPs base their judgements about whether or not sexual abuse allegations are true on their assessments of children's reports of sexual abuse and other psychosocial data. Data from five chart review studies of a combined total of 894 forensic CSA evaluations provided sufficient information to assess the validity of these assumptions. Corroborative evidence was present in 36% of the 894 evaluations and in 54% of evaluations in which MHPs judged the allegations likely to be true, contradicting the first assumption. In the evaluations in which corroborative evidence was present, the presence or absence of a child's report of sexual abuse was only weakly associated with MHPs' judgements about the validity of the allegations (allegations in almost all corroborated cases were judged likely to be true, even in the absence of a child's report), partially contradicting the second assumption. Implications of this analysis for research and policy are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Conversational perspective of therapeutic outcomes: The importance of preference in the development of discourse

Major theme: Evaluation of therapeutic outcome. Logical development of the theme: We suggest a way for practitioners and researchers to assess if they are on track in conversing towards client preferred goals. We offer a critique of more conventional approaches to studying therapeutic progress, suggesting how a discursive (i.e. focused on interaction and language use) lens can address these limitations. Through this lens we examine therapeutic progress evident in ‘preference work’, where clients demonstrably indicate, imply, agree and disagree with where the therapeutic conversation is heading. Such ‘preference work’ offers a form of evidence of within‐session outcomes in a process of reaching larger client preferred outcomes. Authors’ point of view: We present the results of conversation analysis – a qualitative approach to the study of therapy – to illustrate our discursive perspective on therapy progress and change. Implications: we suggest a way for practitioners to assess if they are on track in conversing towards client preferred goals. We propose that our interactional perspective may significantly contribute to bridging practice and research in therapy.     

The CORE‐10: A short measure of psychological distress for routine use in the psychological therapies

Background: There is a need for a generic, short, and easy‐to‐use assessment measure for common presentations of psychological distress in UK primary care mental health settings. This paper sets out the development of the CORE‐10 in response to this need. Method: Items were drawn from the CORE‐OM and 10 items were selected according to a combination of usefulness, coverage of item clusters, and statistical procedures. Three CORE‐OM datasets were employed in the development phase: (1) a primary care sample, (2) a sample from an MRC platform trial of enhanced collaborative care of depression in primary care, and (3) a general population sample derived from the Office of National Statistics Psychiatric Morbidity Follow‐up survey. A fourth dataset comprising a sample from an occupational health setting was used to evaluate the CORE‐10 in its standalone format. Results: The internal reliability (alpha) of the CORE‐10 was .90 and the score for the CORE‐10 correlated with the CORE‐OM at .94 in a clinical sample and .92 in a non‐clinical sample. The clinical cut‐off score for general psychological distress was 11.0 with a reliable change index (90% CI) of 6. For depression, the cut‐off score for the CORE‐10 was 13 and yielded sensitivity and specificity values of .92 (CI=.83–1.0) and 0.72 (CI=.60–.83) respectively. Conclusion: The CORE‐10 is an acceptable and feasible instrument that has good psychometric properties and is practical to use with people presenting with common mental health problems in primary care settings.     

Making a case for case studies in psychotherapy training: A small step towards establishing an empirical basis for psychotherapy training

The evidence debate in psychotherapy pays little attention to developing an evidence base for training practices. Understanding effective training requires an examination of what makes training work. This article examines the role of case studies in psychotherapy training. This has not been articulated explicitly or researched systematically in spite of its cardinal importance. An analysis of the role of case studies in psychotherapy training is presented. Reading, watching, or hearing about cases can offer novice psychotherapists access to a closed world; access to psychological theory in action; access to whole courses of therapy; access to different approaches; access to significant moments; access to the therapeutic relationship; access to a wide range of client types; access to working in different contexts; and the opportunity of identifying with therapists and clients. Writing or presenting cases offer students the opportunity of: learning to integrate information into a relevant whole; being in the ‘hot seat’; learning to give appropriate feedback; assessing the validity of interpretations, inferences, and interventions; adapting methods to suit the client; and learning to collaborate with other professionals. The paper presents directions for future research into psychotherapy training, specifically proposing an international survey of training practices at psychotherapy training institutions.     

Quine's Argument from Despair

Quine's argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is historically inaccurate and that Quine's argument against first philosophy is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. For Quine, the first philosopher's quest for foundations is inherently incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language is a mistake, there is no science-independent perspective from which to validate science. I will argue that a great deal of the confusion surrounding Quine's argument is prompted by certain phrases in his seminal ‘Epistemology Naturalized’. Scrutinizing Quine's work both before and after the latter paper provides a better key to understanding his remarkable views about the epistemological relation between theory and evidence.     

Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism

Entitlement is conceived as a kind of positive epistemic status, attaching to certain propositions, that involves no cognitive or intellectual accomplishment on the part of the beneficiary—a status that is in place by default. In this paper I will argue that the notion of entitlement—or something very like it—falls out of an idea that may at first blush seem rather disparate: that the evidential support relation can be understood as a kind of variably strict conditional (in the sense of Lewis 1973). Lewis provided a general recipe for deriving what he termed inner modalities from any variably strict conditional governed by a logic meeting certain constraints. On my proposal, entitlement need be nothing more exotic than the inner necessity associated with evidential support. Understanding entitlement in this way helps to answer some common concerns—in particular, the concern that entitlement could only be a pragmatic, and not genuinely epistemic, status.