What’s the matter with Huck Finn?

This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent’s total evidence determines both the beliefs and the intentions it is rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent’s evidence does so in a way such that it is never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ.     

Knowledge central: A central role for knowledge attributions in social evaluations

Five experiments (N?=?1710) demonstrate the central role of knowledge attributions in social evaluations. In Experiments 1–3, we manipulated whether an agent believes, is certain of, or knows a true proposition and asked people to rate whether the agent should perform a variety of actions. We found that knowledge, more so than belief or certainty, leads people to judge that the agent should act. In Experiments 4–5, we investigated whether attributions of knowledge or certainty can explain an important finding on how people act based on statistical evidence, known as “the Wells effect”. We found that knowledge attributions, but not certainty attributions, mediate this effect on decision making.     

Epistemic Contextualism: An Idle Hypothesis

Epistemic contextualism is one of the most hotly debated topics in contemporary epistemology. Contextualists claim that ‘know’ is a context-sensitive verb associated with different evidential standards in different contexts. Contextualists motivate their view based on a set of behavioural claims. In this paper, I show that several of these behavioural claims are false. I also show that contextualist test cases suffer from a critical confound, which derives from people's tendency to defer to speakers’ statements about their own mental states. My evidence consists in results from several behavioural experiments. I conclude that contextualism is an idle hypothesis and I propose some general methodological lessons.     

The narcissism-overclaiming link revisited

The present research investigated how different dimensions of narcissism (i.e., assertive, antagonistic, and vulnerable) and content-specific forms of assertive narcissism (i.e., intellectual ability, physical attractiveness, social dominance) are related to overclaiming bias (i.e., the tendency to illegitimately claim knowledge). In the data from a large-scale online study (N = 1,658), the associations between overclaiming bias and any kind of narcissism were smaller than in many previous studies. Furthermore, assertive narcissism was more positively related to overclaiming bias than antagonistic and vulnerable narcissism were. Intellectual-ability-specific and social-dominance-specific assertive narcissism were more positively related to overclaiming bias than physical-attractiveness-specific assertive narcissism was. Finally, multiple regression analyses suggested that the narcissism-overclaiming link is most robust for social-dominance-specific assertive narcissism.     

Motor expertise and performance in spatial tasks: A meta-analysis

The present study aimed to provide a summary of findings relevant to the influence of motor expertise on performance in spatial tasks and to examine potential moderators of this effect. Studies of relevance were those in which individuals involved in activities presumed to require motor expertise were compared to non-experts in such activities. A final set of 62 effect sizes from 33 samples was included in a multilevel meta-analysis. The results showed an overall advantage in favor of motor experts in spatial tasks (d = 0.38). However, the magnitude of that effect was moderated by expert type (athlete, open skills/ball sports, runner/cyclist, gymnast/dancers, musicians), stimulus type (2D, blocks, bodies, others), test category (mental rotation, spatial perception, spatial visualization), specific test (Mental Rotations Test, generic mental rotation, disembedding, rod-and-frame test, other), and publication status. These findings are discussed in the context of embodied cognition and the potential role of activities requiring motor expertise in promoting good spatial performance.     

我会在谁面前舍弃利益?——博弈对象的能力与社会距离对名利博弈倾向的影响

通过构造虚拟的捐献情境及贸易情境,结合博弈任务,以大学生为被试探讨了名利博弈对象的能力和社会距离对名利博弈中博弈者的博弈行为倾向的影响。结果表明,在捐献情境下,被试在高能力的名利博弈对象面前比在低能力的名利博弈对象面前更倾向于做出接近自己半数报酬的捐献行为,牺牲利益以获取好名声。在贸易情境下存在名利博弈对象的能力与社会距离的交互作用,被试仅在面对低能力的名利博弈对象时会考虑社会距离因素,在社会距离近的名利博弈对象面前比在社会距离远的名利博弈对象面前提出更低的售价,牺牲自己的利益以获得好名声。研究结果初步证实名利博弈对象能力与社会距离对名利博弈具有重要影响以及个体在名利博弈中具有策略性。     

父母对幼儿消极情绪的反应方式与幼儿情绪调节能力的关系

以西安市280名幼儿及其家长为被试,采用问卷法考察母亲、父亲对幼儿消极情绪的反应方式对幼儿情绪调节能力的单独效应和联合效应。结果发现：（1）母亲对幼儿消极情绪的支持反应正向预测幼儿的情绪调节能力,非支持反应负向预测幼儿的情绪调节能力;（2）父亲对幼儿消极情绪的支持反应和非支持反应显著预测女孩的情绪不稳;（3）在女孩的情绪调节能力上,母亲和父亲非支持反应的交互作用显著,部分支持了分歧模型。     

亲子关系与青少年冒险行为的关系:一个有调节的中介模型

该研究探讨了亲子关系与青少年冒险行为的关系,并提出一个有调节的中介模型,考察自控力的中介效应和不良同伴交往对该效应的调节效应。对1263名青少年采用问卷调查,研究工具包括关系网络问卷、中学生自我控制能力量表、同伴群体特征问卷、青少年冒险行为问卷。结果表明：（1）自控力在亲子关系与青少年冒险行为之间起中介作用,即亲子关系通过自控力间接影响青少年的冒险行为。（2）亲子关系通过自控力的间接效应受到不良同伴交往的调节,交往较多的不良同伴使低自控力青少年的冒险行为增多。因此,自控力在亲子关系与冒险行为之间存在中介效应,且该效应受到不良同伴交往的调节。