SIMONE WEIL'S SPIRITUAL CRITIQUE OF MODERN SCIENCE: AN HISTORICAL‐CRITICAL ASSESSMENT

Simone Weil is widely recognized today as one of the profound religious thinkers of the twentieth century. Yet while her interpretation of natural science is critical to Weil's overall understanding of religious faith, her writings on science have received little attention compared with her more overtly theological writings. The present essay, which builds on Vance Morgan's Weaving the World: Simone Weil on Science, Necessity, and Love (2005), critically examines Weil's interpretation of the history of science. Weil believed that mathematical science, for the ancient Pythagoreans a mystical expression of the love of God, had in the modern period degenerated into a kind of reification of method that confuses the means of representing nature with nature itself. Beginning with classical (Newtonian) science's representation of nature as a machine, and even more so with the subsequent assimilation of symbolic algebra as the principal language of mathematical physics, modern science according to Weil trades genuine insight into the order of the world for symbolic manipulation yielding mere predictive success and technological domination of nature. I show that Weil's expressed desire to revive a Pythagorean scientific approach, inspired by the “mysterious complicity” in nature between brute necessity and love, must be recast in view of the intrinsically symbolic character of modern mathematical science. I argue further that a genuinely mystical attitude toward nature is nascent within symbolic mathematical science itself.     

Comments on Where the Creativity Research Has Been and Where Is It Going

This Commentary examines where the creativity research has been and where it is going. They key points include evolving definitions of creativity, interdisciplinarity in the creativity research, divergent thinking as a reliable index of creative potential, improvements in testing, the impact of technology, the inclusion of political, moral, and everyday creativity in the research, the use of semantic networks and conceptual maps, the creative economy, and the need to extricate personal creativity from social recognition.     

A NEW LOOK AT THE SCIENCE‐AND‐RELIGION DIALOGUE

Abstract. Cognitive science is beginning to make a contribution to the science‐and‐religion dialogue by its claims about the nature of both scientific and religious knowledge and the practices such knowledge informs. Of particular importance is the distinction between folk knowledge and abstract theoretical knowledge leading to a distinction between folk science and folk religion on the one hand and the reflective, theoretical, abstract form of thought that characterizes both advanced scientific thought and sophisticated theological reasoning on the other. Both folk science and folk religion emerge from commonsense reasoning about the world, a form of reasoning bequeathed to us by the processes of natural selection. Suggestions are made about what scientists and theologians can do if they accept these claims.     

Infants' use of material properties to guide their actions with differently weighted objects

Two studies with 9‐, 11‐ and 13‐month‐old infants were conducted to investigate infants' ability to use an object's material properties to guide their object‐directed actions. In study 1, 9‐ and 11‐month‐old infants played in an exploration phase with two objects made of different materials, one very heavy and the other one light and playable. Subsequently, when given the choice between both objects in a preferential reaching task, only the 11‐month‐olds' used the object's material information to remember and choose the lighter object. In study 2, 11‐ and 13‐month‐old infants underwent the same exploration phase. In the test phase, novel objects made of the same materials were offered. The 13‐ but not the 11‐month‐olds chose the objects made from the same material as the lighter object in the exploration phase. Additionally, infants' performances in the reaching task were positively correlated with their exploratory behaviour during the exploration phase. Altogether, the studies show a developmental progression in the use of an object's material information to guide infants' action. The results are discussed in respect to infants' perception of object properties and their implications for the development of physical knowledge. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

De‐Centering and Re‐Centering: Rethinking Concepts and Methods in the Sociological Study of Religion

Four conceptual and methodological edges or areas of study are outlined. They are located near what have been the boundaries between the sociology of religion and other subfields, where we believe a potential exists to encourage a wide range of scholars to revisit some central concepts. Paying attention to these edges—as a means to de‐center to re‐center our debates in new ways—not only broadens and deepens our knowledge of the “religious,” it encourages us to reexamine long‐standing conceptual tools, unquestioned assumptions, and accepted methods in the sociology of religion. We illustrate these edges through a review of recent literature and examples drawn from our current empirical projects.     

Tracing the Development of Thought Experiments in the Philosophy of Natural Sciences

Summary  An overview is provided of how the concept of the thought experiment has developed and changed for the natural sciences in the course of the 20th century. First, we discuss the existing definitions of the term ‘thought experiment’ and the origin of the thought experimentation method, identifying it in Greek Presocratics epoch. Second, only in the end of the 19th century showed up the first systematic enquiry on thought experiments by Ernst Mach’s work. After the Mach’s work, a negative attitude towards thought experiments came in the beginning of the 20th century, which went on until the Thomas Kuhn’s and Karl Popper’s work on thought experiments. Only from the mid-1980s did thought experiments begin to be considered relevant to scientific enterprise. Finally, we show the existing empirical and ‘functional’ theories which have developed about the nature and purpose of thought experiments.     

“It’s Scary but It’s Also Exciting”: Evidence of Meta-Affective Learning in Science

We study the case of Marya, a freshman engineering major who showed and spoke of a drastic shift in her feelings and approach to learning physics during an introductory course. For the first several weeks, she was anxiously manipulating equations without considering physical meaning, and she was terribly worried about being correct. By the end of the semester, however, she was sense-making and taking pleasure in it, showing and expressing an enjoyment of challenges and uncertainty. In this paper, we illustrate Marya’s transformation using data from her interview and coursework, and we propose it as an example of meta-affective learning. We argue that meta-affective learning was an important part of Marya’s physics learning and that it was deeply entangled with her developing epistemology.     

Is Science Neurotic?

Neurosis can be interpreted as a methodological condition from which any aim-pursuing entity can suffer. If such an entity pursues a problematic aim B but represents to itself that it is pursuing a different aim C and, as a result, fails to solve the problems associated with B which, if solved, would lead to the pursuit of aim A, then the entity may be said to be "rationalistically neurotic." Natural science is neurotic in this sense insofar as its basic aim is represented as improving knowledge of factual truth as such (aim C), when actually the aim of science is to improve knowledge of explanatory truth (aim B). Science itself does not suffer significantly from this neurosis, but philosophy of science does. Much more serious is the rationalistic neurosis of the social sciences and academic inquiry more generally. freeing social science and academic inquiry from neurosis would have far-reaching beneficial, intellectual, institutional and cultural consequences.