The larger the cause,the larger the effect: evidence of speed judgment biases in causal scenarios

ABSTRACT

When two motions appear to be causally related, the spatiotemporal features of motions are sometimes distorted in order to increase the consistency with causal impressions. Here, in four experiments, we tested if varying the speed of an object A could affect the judged speed of an object B that appeared to be causally related to A. Participants were presented with classic launching stimuli (Experiment 1), a variant of launching stimuli in which A could move with uniformly accelerated or decelerated motion (Experiment 2), non-launching stimuli that elicited a causal impression (Experiment 3), and stimuli showing a three-object launching event (Experiment 4). Main results showed that the judged speed of B was systematically biased towards the speed of A, and moreover that the judged speed of B depended on the average speed of A, rather than on the speed of A at the moment of collision as it would be predicted by Newtonian mechanics. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that internal representations of causal events based on property transmission (for instance, impetus) can affect judgments of the low-level properties of causal scenarios.     

Coherence versus fragmentation in the development of the concept of force

This article aims to contribute to the literature on conceptual change by engaging in direct theoretical and empirical comparison of contrasting views. We take up the question of whether naïve physical ideas are coherent or fragmented, building specifically on recent work supporting claims of coherence with respect to the concept of force by Ioannides and Vosniadou [Ioannides, C., & Vosniadou, C. (2002). The changing meanings of force. Cognitive Science Quarterly 2, 5-61]. We first engage in a theoretical inquiry on the nature of coherence and fragmentation, concluding that these terms are not well-defined, and proposing a set of issues that may be better specified. The issues have to do with contextuality, which concerns the range of contexts in which a concept (meaning, model, theory) applies, and relational structure, which is how elements of a concept (meaning, model, or theory) relate to one another. We further propose an enhanced theoretical and empirical accountability for what and how much one needs to say in order to have specified a concept. Vague specification of the meaning of a concept can lead to many kinds of difficulties.Empirically, we conducted two studies. A study patterned closely on Ioannides and Vosniadou's work (which we call a quasi-replication) failed to confirm their operationalizations of “coherent.” An extension study, based on a more encompassing specification of the concept of force, showed three kinds of results: (1) Subjects attend to more features than mentioned by Ioannides and Vosniadou, and they changed answers systematically based on these features; (2) We found substantial differences in the way subjects thought about the new contexts we asked about, which undermined claims for homogeneity within even the category of subjects (having one particular meaning associated with “force”) that best survived our quasi-replication; (3) We found much reasoning of subjects about forces that cannot be accounted for by the meanings specified by Ioannides and Vosniadou. All in all, we argue that, with a greater attention to contextuality and with an appropriately broad specification of the meaning of a concept like force, Ioannides and Vosniadou's claims to have demonstrated coherence seem strongly undermined. Students’ ideas are not random and chaotic; but neither are they simply described and strongly systematic.     

Children's conceptions of physical events: Explicit and tacit understanding of horizontal motion

The conceptual understanding that children display when predicting physical events has been shown to be inferior to the understanding they display when recognizing whether events proceed naturally. This has often been attributed to differences between the explicit engagement with conceptual knowledge required for prediction and the tacit engagement that suffices for recognition, and contrasting theories have been formulated to characterize the differences. Focusing on a theory that emphasizes omission at the explicit level of conceptual elements that are tacitly understood, the paper reports two studies that attempt clarification. The studies are concerned with 6‐ to 10‐year‐old children's understanding of, respectively, the direction (141 children) and speed (132 children) of motion in a horizontal direction. Using computer‐presented billiards scenarios, the children predicted how balls would move (prediction task) and judged whether or not simulated motion was correct (recognition task). Results indicate that the conceptions underpinning prediction are sometimes interpretable as partial versions of the conceptions underpinning recognition, as the omission hypothesis would imply. However, there are also qualitative differences, which suggest partial dissociation between explicit and tacit understanding. It is suggested that a theoretical perspective that acknowledges this dissociation would provide the optimal framework for future research.     

Affective responses to non-sexual imagery depicting gay men and lesbian women

ABSTRACT

When examining negative attitudes and behaviors directed toward gay men and lesbian women (i.e., homonegativity), researchers tend to use measures that require participants to respond to belief statements. This methodology is problematic for two reasons: 1) it focuses on the social categories “gay men” and “lesbian women” and ignores the practices of relational intimacy engaged in by gay and lesbian persons (practices that, arguably, are at the crux of homonegativity); and 2) it overlooks the affective responses that sexual minorities evoke in heterosexual people. These issues were tackled in the current study. Specifically, heterosexual participants (N = 241) were asked to report their affective state using six basic emotions while viewing photos depicting male-male, female-female, and heterosexual couples. Findings demonstrated that participants, regardless of gender, reacted most negatively to images of female-female couples engaging in everyday intimacies. Theoretical explanations for these findings are explored.