The Development of the Pragma-dialectical Approach to Argumentation

This paper describes the development of pragma-dialectics as a theory of argumentative discourse. First the development of the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion is explained, with the rules that are to be complied with in order to avoid fallacies from occurring. Then the integration is discussed of rhetorical insight in the dialectical framework. In this endeavour, the concept of strategic manoeuvring is explained that allows for a more refined and more profoundly justified analysis of argumentative discourse and a better identification of fallacies. The paper ends with a brief overview of current research projects.     

Expanding the traditional user versus non‐user dichotomy amongst ecstasy users

Differences in the drug use characteristics and psychosocial variables in the use and non‐use of ecstasy within 845 16–25 year‐olds in the UK was examined. Based on levels of ecstasy use and intentions, two groups of non‐users (resistant and vulnerable), three groups of users (light, moderate and heavy) and an ex‐user group were identified. It was found that there is predictive utility in this way of expanding the widely employed ‘user versus non‐user’ dichotomy. Resistant non‐users were more likely to be younger, female, and were characterized by lower levels of use of four other drugs (amphetamine, cannabis, cocaine and LSD). Those ‘at risk’ of using ecstasy reported more frequent use of amphetamine, LSD, and cannabis than resistant non‐users. Heavy user groups reported using amphetamine, cocaine and LSD more frequently than all the other groups. Having ecstasy using friends increased the odds of being an ‘at risk’ non‐user or an ecstasy user. Normative influence also differentiated between the three user groups (light, moderate, and heavy). Beliefs about ecstasy use being immoral, ecstasy offers being difficult to resist, ecstasy use making one feel guilty and ecstasy being readily available differentiated between user and non‐user groups. These factors could usefully inform the content of health education materials designed to change ecstasy use. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The ‘mad scientists’: Psychoanalysis,dream and virtual reality2

The author explores the concept of reality‐testing as a means of assessing the relationship with reality that prevails in dream and in virtual reality. Based on a model developed by Jean Laplanche, she compares these activities in detail in order to determine their respective independence from the function of reality‐testing. By carefully examining the concept of hallucination in the writings of Freud and Daniel Dennett, the author seeks to pinpoint the specific modalities of interaction between perceptions, ideas, wishes and actions that converge in the ‘belief’ and in the ‘sense of reality’. The paper's main thesis consists of the distinction that it draws between immediacy‐testing and reality‐testing, with the further argument that this distinction not only dissipates the conceptual vagueness that generally surrounds the latter of the two concepts but also that it promotes a more precise analysis of the function of reality in dream and in virtual reality.     

Voluntary aspects of attentional control setting for detecting a feature‐defined target1

Abstract: Singleton targets that differ from distractors in a single salient attribute can be discerned regardless of the number of items in the display. Recent studies have indicated that the perception of singleton targets is facilitated by an attentional control setting. We focused on the voluntary aspect of the attentional control setting. Psychophysical and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) experiments examined the temporal characteristics of the attentional control setting by using an auditory cue. In both experiments, an auditorily cued feature‐search task was used. The cue validity (valid vs. neutral) and the cue lead time (CLT) were varied. In the psychophysical experiment, we established the effect of a symbolic cue on detection of a singleton. When the CLT was short or the cue was neutral, there was no facilitation, as re?ected by the slow activation of the attentional control setting. In our fMRI experiment, the brain activity indicates that this detection task activated the prefrontal cortex. These results demonstrate that the attentional control setting for facilitation of the singleton‐target perception modulates activity in regions of the prefrontal cortex.     

A psychophysiological study on the function of the response‐stop in the Eriksen task1,2

Abstract: In the Eriksen task, we examined the hypothesis ( Iwaki, 1998 ) that a negative event‐related potential, which was enlarged at the frontal site synchronized with the presentation of an erroneous response causing stimulus, is related to the response‐stop function. Fourteen subjects responded selectively with their hands to the stimuli that consisted of a central target letter and surrounding compatible noise letters (e.g., HHHHH) or incompatible noise (e.g., SHHHS for small‐conflict condition or SSHSS for large‐conflict). The results showed that the increased negativity for the incompatible stimuli was synchronized with the stimulus onset but not with the response. Based on the hypothesis above, it is predicted that greater enhancement of an erroneous response by a stimulus causes the response‐stop to work harder in order to avoid an error, and this results in the larger negativity. This was supported by the evidence showing that the negativity was largest for the large‐conflict incompatible stimulus, followed by the small‐conflict, and then the compatible. We also discuss the possibility that the negativity is the NO‐GO potential concerned with the response‐stop function.     

Keeping the Result in Sight and Mind: General Cognitive Principles and Language‐Specific Influences in the Perception and Memory of Resultative Events

We study how people attend to and memorize endings of events that differ in the degree to which objects in them are affected by an action: Resultative events show objects that undergo a visually salient change in state during the course of the event (peeling a potato), and non‐resultative events involve objects that undergo no, or only partial state change (stirring in a pan). We investigate general cognitive principles, and potential language‐specific influences, in verbal and nonverbal event encoding and memory, across two experiments with Dutch and Estonian participants. Estonian marks a viewer's perspective on an event's result obligatorily via grammatical case on direct object nouns: Objects undergoing a partial/full change in state in an event are marked with partitive/accusative case, respectively. Therefore, we hypothesized increased saliency of object states and event results in Estonian speakers, as compared to speakers of Dutch. Findings show (a) a general cognitive principle of attending carefully to endings of resultative events, implying cognitive saliency of object states in event processing; (b) a language‐specific boost on attention and memory of event results under verbal task demands in Estonian speakers. Results are discussed in relation to theories of event cognition, linguistic relativity, and thinking for speaking.     

Clinical cut‐off point for the Distrust dimension of the Dimensional Clinical Personality Inventory 2 (IDCP‐2)

The Clinical Dimensional Personality Inventory 2 (IDCP ‐2) is a 206‐item self‐report tool developed for the assessment of 12 dimensions (divided into 47 factors) of personality pathology. One of the scales comprising the instrument, the Distrust scale, is intended to provide psychometric information on traits closely related to the Paranoid Personality Disorder (PPD ). In the present research, we used the Item Response Theory and the Receiver Operating Characteristic curve analysis to establish a clinical meaningful cutoff for the Distrust scale. Participants were 1,679 adults, among outpatients diagnosed with PPD , outpatients diagnosed with other PD s, and adults from the community. The Wright map revealed that outpatients were located at the very high levels on the latent continuum of the Distrust scale, with a very large effect size for the mean difference between patients and non‐patients. The ROC curve supported a cutoff at −1.00 score in theta standardization which yielded 0.87 of sensitivity and 0.54 of specificity. Findings from the present investigation suggest the IDCP ‐2 Distrust scale is useful as a screening tool of the core features of the PPD . We address potential clinical applications for the instrument and discuss limitations from the present study.     

Do you get what you pay for? Preventing insufficient effort responding in MTurk and student samples

Previous research has developed multiple indices to detect instances of insufficient effort responding (IER; Huang et al., 2015, 0.1037/a0038510). Although these techniques are largely successful, conflation between effort and insufficient effort leads to unnecessary data removal, thus warranting investigation into IER prevention strategies such as warning statements. For example, Brühlmann et al. (2020, 10.1016/j.metip.2020.100022) reported that close to 60% of participants were flagged for IER on at least one IER detection index. The current study used positive, negative, and no warning statements in two samples (MTurk and university participant pool) to examine their impact on two types of IER. Results do not support the use of warning statements to reduce IER covertly, overtly, or overall. Although slightly more university participants were flagged for IER for two of five IER indices, the remaining three indices did not differ between samples. This finding represents an important contribution to survey research literature by directly comparing samples on a variety of IER indices. Implications for survey research necessitate the examination of additional prevention strategies and sample differences in IER.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.     

Make‐or‐Break: Chasing Risky Goals or Settling for Safe Rewards?

Humans regularly pursue activities characterized by dramatic success or failure outcomes where, critically, the chances of success depend on the time invested working toward it. How should people allocate time between such make‐or‐break challenges and safe alternatives, where rewards are more predictable (e.g., linear) functions of performance? We present a formal framework for studying time allocation between these two types of activities, and we explore optimal behavior in both one‐shot and dynamic versions of the problem. In the one‐shot version, we illustrate striking discontinuities in the optimal time allocation policy as we gradually change the parameters of the decision‐making problem. In the dynamic version, we formulate the optimal strategy—defined by a giving‐up threshold—which adaptively dictates when people should stop pursuing the make‐or‐break goal. We then show that this strategy is computationally inaccessible for humans, and we explore boundedly rational alternatives. We compare the performance of the optimal model against (a) a myopic giving‐up threshold that is easier to compute, and even simpler heuristic strategies that either (b) only decide whether or not to start pursuing the goal and never give up or (c) consider giving up at a fixed number of control points. Comparing strategies across environments, we investigate the cost and behavioral implications of sidestepping the computational burden of full rationality.