Towards Gratitude to Nature: Global Environmental Ethics for China and the World

This paper asks what should be the basis of a global environmental ethics.As Gao Shan has argued,the environmental ethics of Western philosophers such as Holmes Rolston and Paul Taylor is based on extending the notion of intrinsic value to that of objects of nature,and as such it is not very compatible with Chinese ethics.This is related to Gao's rejection of most—if not all—Western "rationalist" environmental ethics,a stance that I grant her for pragmatic reasons (though I remain neutral about it theoretically).Gao argues that the Daoist notion of living in harmony with nature can instead become the basis of a Chinese environmental ethics.However,the involved Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is,in my view,based on an aesthetic property.The paper argues that despite the appeal of the Daoist view for a Chinese environmental ethics,an aesthetic property cannot provide the basis for a global environmental ethics.The paper also considers another version of Daoist environmental ethics,which does not rely on an aesthetic notion,but I argue that it too fails as such a candidate.As an alternative,the paper considers and applies contemporary Western thinkers on gratitude (such as Robert Emmons and Elizabeth Loder),proposing that gratitude to nature (environmental gratitude)can indeed provide the needed basis.     

Is There an Identity Crisis in Environmental Ethics?

Environmental ethics is both a moral philosophy and an applied ethics.This duality has led some people to feel confused about environmental ethics' identity and to cast doubts on its legitimacy.This paper,by distinguishing and exploding environmental ethics' two patterns of inquiry (the moral philosophy pattern and the applied ethics pattern) and their characteristics,tries to resolve the discipline's identity crisis and to argue for its legitimacy.     

The exercise pill: should we replace exercise with pharmaceutical means?

New physiological and pharmacological research points to the possibility of a pill that produces the complete physiological effects of exercise. Is replacement of exercise with a pill a good idea? And if so, under what circumstances? To explore answers, I have examined three approaches to the understanding exercise. From a dualist point of view, exercise is explained mechanistically in terms of physiological cause and effect relationships. From this perspective, and in particular for reluctant exercisers, there seems to be no strong argument against the use of a pill. From a phenomenological point of view, exercise is understood from a first person perspective focusing on experiential qualities. It is argued that a pill can never replace the embodied, experiential values of exercising and their potential ethical significance. In other words, the use of a pill is rejected. From a critical social constructivist point of view, exercise is understood as an expression of sociocultural values. Exercise can be a source of both bodily alienation and embodied self-realization and meaning. It is argued that in settings of alienating exercise malpractice, an exercise pill can be a temporary lesser evil approach. It is pointed out, however, that the long-term solution to malpractice is not a pill but a change of practice. In a final section, the possibility of the exercise pill is contextualized in the larger, bio-ethical debate on human enhancement.     

Toward a decolonial global ethics

This paper argues that decolonial theory can offer a distinctive and valuable ethical lens. Decolonial perspectives give rise to an ethics that is fundamentally global but distinct from, and critical of, moral cosmopolitanism. Decolonial ethics shares with cosmopolitanism a refusal to circumscribe normative commitments on the basis of existing political and cultural boundaries. It differs from cosmopolitanism, though, by virtue of its rejection of the individualism and universalism of cosmopolitan thought. Where cosmopolitan approaches tend to articulate abstract principles developed from within a particular Western tradition, decolonial approaches reject abstract global designs in favour of inter-cultural dialogue amongst multiple people(s), including peoples who deem collective and non-human entities to be of fundamental moral importance. In addition, decolonial global ethics rejects universality in favour of ‘pluriversality’.     

Meditation and the cultivation of virtue

In recent decades, social psychology has produced an expansive array of studies wherein introducing a seemingly morally innocuous feature into the situation a subject inhabits often yields morally questionable, dubious, or even appalling behavior. Several fascinating lines of philosophical enquiry issue from this research, but the most pragmatically salient question concerns how we ought most effectively to develop and maintain the virtues so that such putatively morally problematic behavior is less likely to occur. In this paper, I examine four empirically embedded accounts of virtue cultivation: Hagop Sarkissian’s social signaling, Mark Alfano’s virtue labeling, Nancy Snow’s self-punishment, and Peter Railton’s implementation intentions. But none of these accounts of virtue cultivation provides adequate resources for regulating our affective states, whose attention-constricting and behavior-priming functional roles are likely at the root of much of our less than virtuous behavior. Instead, I defend an account of virtue cultivation that proceeds via meditation, which can help us to identify and regulate our emotions and moods. Further, meditation enables us to develop the attentional focus, emotional intelligence, and sense of social connection that ground (many of) the virtues and, thus, our virtuous behavior.     

A RANDOMNESS‐BASED THEODICY FOR EVOLUTIONARY EVILS

We develop and knit together several theodicies in order to find a more complete picture of why certain forms of (nonhuman) animal suffering might be permitted by a perfect being. We focus on an especially potent form of the problem of evil, which arises from considering why a perfectly good, wise, and powerful God might use evolutionary mechanisms that predictably result in so much animal suffering and loss of life. There are many existing theodicies on the market, and although they offer helpful resources, we combine and further develop several proposals to produce a composite theodicy that avoids certain shortcomings of the individual theodicies. An important element of our project is locating a role for randomness in cosmic and biological evolution. In particular, we show how randomness might enhance or enable certain goods, including everlasting goods, at the risk of temporary evils.     

Reply to Nadler: Spinoza and the metaphysics of suicide

Steven Nadler has argued that Spinoza can, should, and does allow for the possibility of suicide committed as a free and rational action. Given that the conatus is a striving for perfection, Nadler argues, there are cases in which reason guides a person to end her life based on the principle of preferring the lesser evil. If so, Spinoza’s disparaging statements about suicide are intended to apply only to some cases, whereas in others (such as the case of Seneca) he would grant that suicide is dictated by reason. Here, I object to Nadler’s interpretation by showing that it conflicts with Spinoza’s metaphysical psychology. Even given Nadler’s interpretation of the conatus doctrine, the possibility that reason could guide a person to commit suicide is incompatible with the conatus of the mind. Spinoza holds that the mind cannot contain an adequate idea ‘that excludes the existence of our body’ (E3p10). Yet, as I argue, in order for reason to guide a person voluntarily to end her life, she would need to have an adequate idea representing her death – an idea that excludes the existence of her body. For this reason, Spinoza's system rules out the possibility of rational suicide.     

Equality,its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people’s features. In this paper, I challenge Singer’s argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.     

Ethical social justice: Do the ends justify the means?

This article offers an ethical decision‐making model, informed by community psychology values, as a means for guiding psychologists when engaging in social justice‐oriented work. The applicability of this model is demonstrated through a case analysis elucidating how America's psychologists individually and collectively arrived at the decision to endorse torture—ostensibly as a means for preventing terrorism. Critics have wondered how the American Psychological Association succumbed to these involvements, and how to prevent such ethical lapses in the future. Unfortunately, the American Psychological Association's ethical codes fail to provide explicit guidance for psychologists' involvement in social justice work that impacts communities and systems. To address this gap, we present a values‐driven, ethical decision‐making framework that may be used to guide psychologists' future practices. This framework infuses fundamental community psychology values (i.e., caring and compassion; health; self‐determination and participation, human diversity, social justice; and critical reflexivity) into a 9‐step model.     

Modeling the Instructional Effectiveness of Responsible Conduct of Research Education: A Meta-Analytic Path-Analysis

Predictive modeling in education draws on data from past courses to forecast the effectiveness of future courses. The present effort sought to identify such a model of instructional effectiveness in scientific ethics. Drawing on data from 235 courses in the responsible conduct of research (RCR), structural equation modeling techniques were used to test a predictive model of RCR course effectiveness. Fit statistics indicated the model fit the data well, with the instructional characteristics included in the model explaining approximately 85% of the variance in RCR instructional effectiveness. Implications for using the model to develop and improve future RCR courses are discussed.