“Some more” notes,toward a “third” sophistic

Historians of rhetoric refer to two Sophistics, one in the 5th century B.C. and another c. 2nd century A.D. Besides these two, there is a 3rd Sophistic, but it is not necessarily sequential. (The 3rd is counter to counting sequentially.) Whereas the representative Sophists of the 1st Sophistic is Protagoras, and the second, Aeschines, the representative sophists of the 3rd are Gorgias (as proto-Third) and Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Paul de Man.To distinguish between and among Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and then Protagoras, Gorgias, and Lacan, the author determines how far each of these personages can count. The model of counting, used semiotically across the topoi of possible/impossible, is that of the people of New Guinea: one thing, two things, many things. It is determined (generally) that the philosophers, including Aristotle, count to one; the Sophists to two; and Gorgias, Lacan, and Lyotard, et al. count to many things, thereby breaking up a monism or binarism. The ancient philosophers employ a substratum of probability to hold together the contraries of possible/impossible; the Sophists employ anti/logic, which keeps the contraries/antitheses separate and therefore without synthesis, but which eventually threatens the integrity of the substratum, or the law of non-contradiction; and Gorgias, Lacan, Lyotard et al. theorize about the impossibility/Resistance of the Logos (reason, logic, law, argumentation, history) to Theory/Totalization, because of the Gorgian Kairos and the Lacanian Real — both of which enter the Logos and break up the cycle of the antitheses and create something new, irrational (Untersteiner).This breaking up has a negative/positive influence on Protagoras's man-measure doctrine, which in turn has a similar influence on the problem of the ethical subject. The subject/agent not only no longer knows (by way of Logos) but also no longer acts (as independent agent); the subject becomes a function of Logos as determined by Kairos/Real; it moves from a hypotaxis/syntaxis of one and two to a radical parataxis/paralogy of some more.From the Impossibility/tragedy of knowledge, however, comes the Possible, or Possibilisms, which allows for the new (though divided) ethical subject to reclaim its position as individual. Such a reclamation of the subject, however, has a profound effect on argumentation, and especially the notion of consensus. What is wanted, then, in a Third Sophistic ethical — as opposed to a political — rhetoric is dissensus through radical parataxes and paralogies.     

ALPHABET LETTERS AS TOKENS: TRAINING PRESCHOOL CHILDREN IN LETTER RECOGNITION AND LABELLING DURING A TOKEN EXCHANGE PERIOD1

In token economies, we typically consider the instructional opportunities available during the periods of token delivery, but may overlook educational opportunities available at the time of token exchange. The present studies examined the use of labelled tokens and routines in the token exchange period to teach alphabet letter recognition to economically disadvantaged preschool children. The children earned points for a variety of academic behaviors in an early morning classroom setting. At no time were alphabet letters introduced or taught during class. Later, during a midmorning token exchange period, operated according to a department store model, the children were given their points in the form of poker chips inscribed with upper-case alphabet letters. They were required to discriminate among these lettered chips before exchanging them for backup reinforcers sold in four or five stores. To assess alphabet letter knowledge, probe evaluations were periodically conducted in which questions requiring alphabet letter recognition and labelling were asked. The answers to these questions were not reinforced. Alphabet letter training during token exchange periods consisted of having a child display the lettered chips, whereupon a teacher asked a number of recognition-type questions. Wrong answers were corrected, and correct answers praised. The child was allowed to exchange the tokens when the number required for a purchase had been recognized correctly. The periodic probe evaluations revealed consistent increases in correct alphabet letter recognition and, as a byproduct, alphabet labelling was facilitated, even though not explicitly trained. Thus, once the letters were recognized, correct labelling shortly followed. The sequential training of new sets of letters was used to demonstrate experimental control within subjects for two children. A control for exposure to the letters was provided by using the labelled tokens, but requiring the counting of chips rather than letter discrimination in the exchange period for two other children. This procedure produced chance levels of letter recognition, which were subsequently improved when the discrimination procedure was added. Posttraining probes, conducted at one and three weeks after training when the labelled tokens and discrimination routines were no longer in use, revealed the same high levels of recognition and labelling performance found during training. Thus, it appears that labelled tokens may be used to teach discriminations during token exchange periods so long as responses are differentiated on the basis of relevant dimensions of the stimuli.     

Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency

In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.How art thou out of breath when thou hast breath To say to me that thou art out of breath?William Shakespeare,Romeo and Juliet. But when I tell him he hates flatterers, He says he does, being then most flattered.William Shakespeare,Julius Caesar.     

The psychology of whistleblowing

Whistleblowing, its antecedents, and its aftermath are complex and varied phenomena. Motivational factors in the perception of alleged misconduct and in the response to such allegations by the accused and the institution are examined. Understanding the psychological processes that underlie some of the surprising behavior surrounding whistleblowing will enable those who perceive wrongdoing, as well as the professional societies and work organizations which voice their concern, to better respond to apparent wrongdoing, while preserving the reputation and mental health of all parties to such cases. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium entitled “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do About Whistleblowing” held during the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seattle, Washington, 15 February, 1997.     

Ethics and Imagination

Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases.     

Identification with deficient rank loading matrices in confirmatory factor analysis: Multitrait-multimethod models

This paper presents some results on identification in multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) models. Some MTMM models are not identified when the (factorial-patterned) loadings matrix is of deficient column rank. For at least one other MTMM model, identification does exist despite such deficiency. It is also shown that for some MTMM CFA models, Howe's (1955) conditions sufficient for rotational uniqueness can fail, yet the model may well be identified and rotationally unique. Implications of these results for CFA models in general are discussed.     

WHAT DOES EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY TELL US ABOUT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION?

Abstract. Considerations from evolutionary biology lead Michael Ruse, among others, to a naturalistic turn in philosophy. I assess some of the pragmatic and skeptical conclusions concerning ethics, religion, and epistemology that Ruse draws from his evolutionary naturalism. Finally, I argue that there is an essential tension between science and religion which forecloses the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation between the two as they are now understood.     

Individual Differences in Religious Motivation Influence How People Think

Motives matter and may have implications for how people cognitively experience meaning through religion and spirituality. Specifically, intrinsically motivated people perceive religion and spirituality are more central to meaning in life, which should promote a tendency to adopt more coherent, expansive cognitive representations. In contrast, extrinsically motivated people may adopt narrower cognitive representations since their motivation is more proximally oriented. The present study tests these possibilities by examining how religious motivation relates to action identification (tendency to use coherent, higher‐level cognitive representations). Results from 630 participants revealed that among religious people, intrinsic and extrinsic‐personal religious motivations indirectly influence higher‐level action identification through strength of spiritual beliefs. These relationships were not evident among nonreligious people. Furthermore, extrinsic‐social religious motivation and religious service attendance did not relate to action identification. These findings demonstrate that religious motivation differences are consequential for the action identities people rely upon to form a sense of meaning.