Time and memory: towards a pacemaker-free theory of interval timing

A popular view of interval timing in animals is that it is driven by a discrete pacemaker-accumulator mechanism that yields a linear scale for encoded time. But these mechanisms are fundamentally at odds with the Weber law property of interval timing, and experiments that support linear encoded time can be interpreted in other ways. We argue that the dominant pacemaker-accumulator theory, scalar expectancy theory (SET), fails to explain some basic properties of operant behavior on interval-timing procedures and can only accommodate a number of discrepancies by modifications and elaborations that raise questions about the entire theory. We propose an alternative that is based on principles of memory dynamics derived from the multiple-time-scale (MTS) model of habituation. The MTS timing model can account for data from a wide variety of time-related experiments: proportional and Weber law temporal discrimination, transient as well as persistent effects of reinforcement omission and reinforcement magnitude, bisection, the discrimination of relative as well as absolute duration, and the choose-short effect and its analogue in number-discrimination experiments. Resemblances between timing and counting are an automatic consequence of the model. We also argue that the transient and persistent effects of drugs on time estimates can be interpreted as well within MTS theory as in SET. Recent real-time physiological data conform in surprising detail to the assumptions of the MTS habituation model. Comparisons between the two views suggest a number of novel experiments.     

Infants' sensitivity to differential luminance as information about depth

To what degree are young infants able to perceive differential shadowing and to what degree are they able to utilize this stimulus parameter as information about depth? Two habituation experiments were performed. In Experiment 1, a group of 5-month-old infants were habituated to a low frequency, vertical, and approximately sinusoidal luminance grating superimposed on a flat colored surface. This display induced stable 3-D perception in adult subjects. After habituation, the infants viewed two test displays at alternating trials. One was made up of real half cylinders matching the light distribution of the habituation display and the other was made up of a square wave grating of the same spatial frequency as in the habituation one. Adults perceived the latter display as flat. Results showed that both test displays were treated as new ones by the infants habituated to the sinusoidal grating. Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1, except that the subjects were 3 1/2-month-old. These infants treated the half cylinders as familiar and the square wave grating as new. The results indicate that infants at both age levels (3 1/2 and 5 months of age) were sensitive to the difference between sharp and gradual change in luminance which is a prerequisite for perceiving form from luminance. However, neither age group seemed to utilize gradual change in luminance as information about space.     

“Some more” notes,toward a “third” sophistic

Historians of rhetoric refer to two Sophistics, one in the 5th century B.C. and another c. 2nd century A.D. Besides these two, there is a 3rd Sophistic, but it is not necessarily sequential. (The 3rd is counter to counting sequentially.) Whereas the representative Sophists of the 1st Sophistic is Protagoras, and the second, Aeschines, the representative sophists of the 3rd are Gorgias (as proto-Third) and Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard, Michel Foucault, Jacques Lacan, and Paul de Man.To distinguish between and among Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, and then Protagoras, Gorgias, and Lacan, the author determines how far each of these personages can count. The model of counting, used semiotically across the topoi of possible/impossible, is that of the people of New Guinea: one thing, two things, many things. It is determined (generally) that the philosophers, including Aristotle, count to one; the Sophists to two; and Gorgias, Lacan, and Lyotard, et al. count to many things, thereby breaking up a monism or binarism. The ancient philosophers employ a substratum of probability to hold together the contraries of possible/impossible; the Sophists employ anti/logic, which keeps the contraries/antitheses separate and therefore without synthesis, but which eventually threatens the integrity of the substratum, or the law of non-contradiction; and Gorgias, Lacan, Lyotard et al. theorize about the impossibility/Resistance of the Logos (reason, logic, law, argumentation, history) to Theory/Totalization, because of the Gorgian Kairos and the Lacanian Real — both of which enter the Logos and break up the cycle of the antitheses and create something new, irrational (Untersteiner).This breaking up has a negative/positive influence on Protagoras's man-measure doctrine, which in turn has a similar influence on the problem of the ethical subject. The subject/agent not only no longer knows (by way of Logos) but also no longer acts (as independent agent); the subject becomes a function of Logos as determined by Kairos/Real; it moves from a hypotaxis/syntaxis of one and two to a radical parataxis/paralogy of some more.From the Impossibility/tragedy of knowledge, however, comes the Possible, or Possibilisms, which allows for the new (though divided) ethical subject to reclaim its position as individual. Such a reclamation of the subject, however, has a profound effect on argumentation, and especially the notion of consensus. What is wanted, then, in a Third Sophistic ethical — as opposed to a political — rhetoric is dissensus through radical parataxes and paralogies.     

SOME ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF SHORT-TERM WORKSHOPS IN THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION1

Workshops and seminars to expose different sectors of the professional community to the principles and applications of behavior modification are briefly discussed. The possible misapplication of procedures by conference participants, whose only exposure to behavioral methods has been at these workshops is viewed as a potentially serious ethical issue. It is suggested that the goals of such seminars and workshops must be clarified, and methods of evaluation of the participants' skills devised, lest we contribute to the misapplication of procedures and to the criticism that behavioral methods are unethical approaches to treatment.     

The psychology of whistleblowing

Whistleblowing, its antecedents, and its aftermath are complex and varied phenomena. Motivational factors in the perception of alleged misconduct and in the response to such allegations by the accused and the institution are examined. Understanding the psychological processes that underlie some of the surprising behavior surrounding whistleblowing will enable those who perceive wrongdoing, as well as the professional societies and work organizations which voice their concern, to better respond to apparent wrongdoing, while preserving the reputation and mental health of all parties to such cases. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the symposium entitled “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: What the Scientific Community Can Do About Whistleblowing” held during the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Seattle, Washington, 15 February, 1997.     

Ethics and Imagination

Cognitive semantics has made important empirical findings about human conceptualization. In this paper some findings concerning moral concepts are analyzed and their implications for medical ethics discussed. The key idea is that morality has to do with metaphors and imagination rather than with well-defined concepts and deduction. It is argued that normative medical ethics to be psychologically realistic should take these findings seriously. This means that an imaginative casuistry is to be preferred compared to principlism and to other forms of casuistry. Furthermore, the metaphorical character of central principles in medical ethics such as autonomy, utility, justice, and integrity is indicated. Such principles are interpreted as rules of thumb summarizing the collective wisdom concerning prototype cases.     

Ideas of self and community: Ethical implications for a communitarian conception of moral autonomy

This paper attempts to construct a concept of moral autonomy thai is compatible with a relationally-based or care-based ethical theory. After critiquing the traditional liberal identification of the ethical self with an abstract rational self detached from community and historical narrative, I argue that the ethical self emerges in a dialectical relation with the community itself. Essentially, I argue for a concept of autonomy that will be analyzed as a critical perspective from within a community rather than as a privileged view from outside. Central to this argument is an understanding of the nature and role of moral conversation in the regeneration of community. The nature of that conversation is examined.     

放弃治疗的伦理选择

放弃治疗在临床上是一个十分复杂的现象 ,只有将其放在“医学———文化”框架中进行全方位考察 ,才能从整体上加以正确把握。就伦理选择而言 ,放弃治疗必然面对诸多伦理冲突 ,临床医师若要化解伦理冲突 ,实现优化选择 ,就必须熟知和遵循基本的伦理准则。     

Legitimate lies: The relationship between omission,commission, and cheating

Across four experiments, we show that when people can serve their self‐interest, they are more likely to refrain from reporting the truth (lie of omission) than actively lie (lie of commission). We developed a novel online “Heads or Tails” task in which participants can lie to win a monetary prize. During the task, they are informed that the software is not always accurate, and it might provide incorrect feedback about their outcome. In Experiment 1, those in the omission condition received incorrect feedback informing them that they had won the game. Participants in commission condition were correctly informed that they had lost. Results indicated that when asked to report any errors in the detection of their payoff, participants in the omission condition cheated significantly more than those in the commission condition. Experiment 2 showed that this pattern of results is robust even when controlling for the perceived probability of the software error. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that receiving incorrect feedback makes individuals feel more legitimate in withholding the truth, which, in turn, increases cheating.