Erikson's General and Adult Developmental Revisions of Freudian Thought: “Outward,Forward, Upward”

In this paper I explore Erik Erikson's revisions of Freudian thought and reasons for his conceptual departure. I show Erikson as the second stage psychoanalytic theorist who shifted thought upward in consciousness, outward to the social world, and forward throughout the complete life span. I explore Erikson's dispute of Freud's reductionism and predeterminism, and illustrate Erikson's movement afield of a model of mental illness, fragmentation, and negation. I explore Erikson's view that the social world is both inside and outside the psyche, rather than solely external to the person as Freud had held. Addressed is Erikson's conversion of Freud's notions of adult morality to a developmental view of the adult as a potentially moral–ethical person, and Erikson's revision of Freud's concepts of the potentially rational adult to a view of the adult with rational and emotional attributes. These words are Erikson's (1975, p. 39) terms for his theoretical focus. Erikson said that he had felt compelled to alter Freudian views, for the second stage psychoanalytic thought in which he participated required a focus on healthy development instead of attention to deviations from health. Such thought also required analysis of the importance of consciousness and of engagement in the social world, as well as a theory of adult development that extends throughout the mature years to chart the person's psychosocial growth and the development of principled behavior. To Erikson, Freud's views were reductionistic due, in part, to their placement within Newtonian and Darwinian thought. Further, Freud's thought was based on the assumption of an invariably moral person, and of the human who would eventually rise above the irrational powers that he found to govern the self. In this paper, I take up these points. I look to Erikson's revisions of Freudian thought, emphasizing the ways in which he made us think differently about psychological life and about adults in their ongoing development. This synthesis adheres to the points Erikson himself made about his departure from Freud, thoughts that appear in Erikson's (1987b) Harvard notes and marginalia, in his audiotapes, and in portions of his published writings.     

Teaching ethical analysis in environmental management decisions: A process-oriented approach

The general public and environmental policy makers often perceive management actions of environmental managers as “science,” when such actions are, in fact, value judgments about when to intervene in natural processes. The choice of action requires ethical as well as scientific analysis because managers must choose a normative outcome to direct their intervention. I examine a management case study involving prescribed burning of sagebrush (Artemisia tridentata) communities in south-central Montana (USA) to illustrate how to teach students to ethically evaluate a management action by precisely identifying: 1) the proposed management action, 2) the deficiency of the system to be remedied by the action, 3) the stakeholders affected by the action, and 4) the category and type of values affirmed in the management action. Through such analysis, students are taught to recognize implicit and explicit value judgments associated with management actions, identify stakeholders to whom managers have legitimate ethical obligations, and practice a general method of ethical analysis applicable to many forms of environmental management. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Fourteenth Annual Meeting, Association for Practical and Professional Ethics, February 24–27, 2005.     

Common-Sense Virtue Ethics and Moral Luck

Moral luck poses a problem for out conception of responsibility because it highlights a tension between morality and lack of control. Michael Slote’s common-sense virtue ethics claims to avoid this problem. However there are a number of objections to this claim. Firstly, it is not clear that Slote fully appreciates the problem posed by moral luck. Secondly, Slote’s move from the moral to the ethical is problematic. Thirdly it is not clear why we should want to abandon judgements of moral blame in favour of judgements of ethical deplorability. Finally this paper defends an alternative solution to the problem of moral luck, which focuses on judgements of probability, but which has been rejected by Slote.     

Origins of the ethical attitude

This paper seeks to explore the genesis of the capacity for an ethical attitude, personally and professionally. As analysts working in intimate clinical settings, ethics is at the foundation of our professional lives, as it is at the foundation of our humanity and what it is we struggle towards in our own personal development. The ethical attitude presupposes special responsibilities that we choose to adopt in relation to another. Thus, a parallel situation pertains between caregiver and child and between analyst and patient: they are not equal partners, but nevertheless are in a situation of mutuality, shared subjectivity, and reciprocal influence. The basic premise of this paper is that the analytic attitude is an ethical attitude, and that the ethical attitude is a developmental achievement, and as such it may reach beyond the depressive position.     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.     

Ethical Egoism, Utilitarianism and the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency

In this paper I shall consider the difficulty for Ethical Egoism, Act Utilitarianism and later what I shall call Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism, that they both commit the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency. I shall distinguish various forms of the fallacy of pragmatic inconsistency; in particular I shall distinguish between the fallacy of direct and indirect pragmatic inconsistency, and shall argue that though both Ethical Egoism and Act Utilitarianism probably commit both, Cumulative Effect Utilitarianism does not.How art thou out of breath when thou hast breath To say to me that thou art out of breath?William Shakespeare,Romeo and Juliet. But when I tell him he hates flatterers, He says he does, being then most flattered.William Shakespeare,Julius Caesar.     

WHAT DOES EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY TELL US ABOUT PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION?

Abstract. Considerations from evolutionary biology lead Michael Ruse, among others, to a naturalistic turn in philosophy. I assess some of the pragmatic and skeptical conclusions concerning ethics, religion, and epistemology that Ruse draws from his evolutionary naturalism. Finally, I argue that there is an essential tension between science and religion which forecloses the possibility of an ultimate reconciliation between the two as they are now understood.     

Detection of gender-related categories by 10-month-old infants

Thirty-two 10-month-olds completed an habituation procedure where a male or female face was paired with a specific object. Results reveal 10-month-olds can form categories based on correlations among attributes of social information. Basic processes involved in gender role formation are present in 10-month-olds.     

Ethical questions in the age of the new eugenics

As a result of the publicly funded Human Genome Project (HGP), and an increasing number of private enterprises, a new form of eugenic theory and practice has emerged, differing from previous manifestations. Genetic testing has become a consumer service that may now be purchased at greatly reduced cost. While the old eugenics was pseudoscientific, the new eugenics is firmly based on DNA research. While the old eugenics focused on societal measures against the individual, the new eugenics emphasizes the family as a control agent. Eugenics is now voluntary, with the promise of abortion for those afraid of producing genetically damaged children. The ethical concepts of beneficence, avoidance of maleficence, autonomy, and equity are discussed in terms of aspects of the HGP. One major issue is the need for an ethical system available to health consumers that will empower them and assist in their biogenic decisions. “The concentration on the genes implicated in cancer is only a special case of a general genomania (emphasis added) that surfaces in ... the weekly announcements in The New York Times of the location of yet another gene for another disease. The revealing rhetoric of this publicity is always the same; only the blanks need to be filled in: ‘It was announced today by scientists at [Harvard, Vanderbilt, Stanford] Medical School that a gene responsible for [some, many, a common form of] [schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s, arteriosclerosis, prostate cancer] has been located and its DNA sequence determined. This exciting research, say scientists, is the first step in what may eventually turn out to be a possible cure for this disease.’” Lewontin ¹ Portions of this paper were presented at the Eighth National Conference on Applied Ethics, Long Beach, CA, February 27, 28 and March 1, 1997.