Intervening causation and the mitigation of responsibility for harm doing II. The role of limited mental capacities

The present study investigated (i) the conditions under which the proximal cause of an event affects judgments of a distal cause, (ii) the capacities persons need to be held responsible for their actions, and (iii) the relationship between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution. Subjects read about situations in which an initial act, in combination with a later behavior by a second person, produced harm. The age and mental state of the second person were varied. It was found that cause and blame assigned to the initial action was greater when the second person was a child or mentally disturbed, as compared to a sane adult. Causal and moral responsibility were related to the understanding, reasoning capacity, and ability to control behavior of the person judged. Finally, support was obtained for an entailment model of the relations between judgments of causation, blame, and restitution.     

Orientations toward relationships: Choosing a situation in which to begin a relationship

An investigation was conducted to examine how individuals choose situations in which to initiate relationships. It was hypothesized that individuals' self-monitoring orientation and the characteristics of their relationship partners would interact to determine situation choices. Accordingly, low- and high-self-monitoring men were asked to rate their preferences for interacting in romantic and nonromantic situations with particular types of partners. The characteristics of the partners were varied along two dimensions: physical attractiveness and personality desirability. Results demonstrated that low-, relative to high-, self-monitoring individuals' preferences for interacting in romantic situations were more influenced by the personality characteristics of potential partners. In contrast, high-, relative to low-, self-monitoring individuals' preferences for interacting in romantic situations were more influenced by the physical attractiveness of potential partners. Neither of these effects occurred when preferences for nonromantic situations were assessed. Implications of these differences for the initiation, maintenance, and dissolution of relationships were discussed.     

Three-state models of memory development: A review of advances in statistical methodology

A certain family of three-state Markov processes has been widely used in experiments on children's memory. Although the statistical machinery for these models is well developed in most respects, two shortcomings have been noted in recent literature reviews. First, the parameters of the models are not identifiable. Second, goodness-of-fit tests are laborious to execute and their sampling distributions are unknown. New procedures for dealing with these difficulties are reported.     

Children's preference for novelty in selective learning: Developmental stability or change?

Data relating novelty preference to age for normal children are inconsistent, although a current theory predicts a developmental shift from novelty to familiarity preference in selective learning (D. Zeaman, 1976, in T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), Habituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology (pp. 297–320), Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum). Support for this theory, however, has been derived primarily from studies of retardate learning. Normal children's novelty preference was examined within a modified Moss-Harlow (E. Moss & H. F. Harlow, 1947, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 40, 333–342) design to compare Zeaman's model with that of S. L. Witryol and W. Wanich (1983, The Journal of Genetic Psychology, 143, 3–8). Each of 16 problems, consisting of three single-stimulus demonstration trials and one two-choice test, was administered to 180 children (mean CA 4, 5.5, and 7 years) in three reward conditions. Novelty was manipulated by varying stimulus familiarization in the demonstration trials. Experiment 1 showed strong preferences for novel over familiar (demonstrated) stimuli at each age. Experiment 2 revealed novelty preference across age levels, two levels of reward contrast, and two levels of task difficulty. It was reasoned that Moss-Harlow tasks designed for normal children typically present a much higher level of difficulty than that intended by researchers. Furthermore, developmental decreases in novelty preference by retardates may derive from (a) transfer of training from prior experiments and (b) specific, repetitive instructions which may have directed attention away from stimulus novelty.     

Control of children's observing responses by information feedback during visual discrimination learning

Four experiments examined the control of observing responses by information feedback during visual discrimination learning. Second-grade children participated in Experiment 1; kindergarten, second-, and fifth-grade children were subjects in Experiments 2 and 3, and grade 5 and adult subjects were tested in Experiment 4. In order to view the stimuli, subjects in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 activated lights in viewing boxes; in Experiment 4, stimulus fixations were measured using a corneal reflection technique. Fifth graders and adults observed the discriminative stimuli for longer times on trials following negative feedback than on trials following positive feedback; in contrast, kindergartener's observing was not affected by type of feedback. Second graders showed smaller and less reliable reactions to type of feedback than did older subjects. These results support the view that visual observing is controlled by cognitive processes associated with hypothesis testing.     

Children's affective,behavioral, and cognitive responses to social comparison

Relative outcomes in social commerce with peers are potent determinants of cognitions and behavior in young children. Although there has been considerable attention given to the behavioral consequences of social comparisons following the receipt of rewards, there has been less concern with cognitive or affective consequences. Additionally, little is known about the accrued effects of multiple social comparison experiences that may be consistent or inconsistent with one another. In the present study, young children received a constant level of reward but the amount they saw a peer receive was varied. There were two sequences of reward distribution, and in a given sequence children received either the same number of rewards as the peer (=), more (+), or fewer (?). In a 3 × 3 factorial design all possible combinations occurred. A negative inequality in reward distribution, no matter where it fell in a sequence, made children sad and inclined children to distribute fewer rewards to peers. When a sequence contained an initial experience of positive inequality, children decreased subsequent levels of self-reward. Experiencing a comparison that revealed a negative inequality in reward distribution also disrupted children's accuracy in appraising the overall distribution of rewards: even when an initial negative inequality was completely offset by an equivalent experience of positive inequality, children inaccurately concluded that they had received fewer rewards than their peers.     

Excuse inference modification in children and adults

The ability of first- and third-grade children and college adults to make excuse inferences about a speaker's use of an utterance and to modify those inferences appropriately upon receiving later information was examined in four experiments. Short stories containing an utterance by a speaker were read aloud. Utterances in the story were preceded by contextual information that suggested either that the speaker was truthful or making an excuse. Utterances were followed by information that confirmed or disconfirmed the excuse interpretation. The results of Experiment 1 indicated that even first and third graders can make excuse inferences, but these children rarely modify these interpretations upon receiving disconfirming information. In Experiments 2–4 possible reasons for the children's interpretive inflexibility were examined by varying the difficulty of relating the excuse interpretation and succeeding information. Results suggested processing difficulty, as well as an interpretive “set,” contributed to the children's inflexibility.     

Probability and delay of reinforcement as factors in discrete-trial choice.

Pigeons chose between two alternatives that differed in the probability of reinforcement and the delay to reinforcement. A peck on the red key always produced a delay of 5 s and then a possible reinforcer. The probability of reinforcement for responding on this key varied from .05 to 1.0 in different conditions. A response on the green key produced a delay of adjustable duration and then a possible reinforcer, with the probability of reinforcement ranging from .25 to 1.0 in different conditions. The green-key delay was increased or decreased many times per session, depending on a subject's previous choices. The purpose of these adjustments was to estimate an indifference point, or a delay that resulted in a subject's choosing each alternative about equally often. In conditions where the probability of reinforcement was five times higher on the green key, the green-key delay averaged about 12 s at the indifference point. In conditions where the probability of reinforcement was twice as high on the green key, the green-key delay at the indifference point was about 8 s with high probabilities and about 6 s with low probabilities. An analysis based on these results and those from studies on delay of reinforcement suggests that pigeons' choices are relatively insensitive to variations in the probability of reinforcement between .2 and 1.0, but quite sensitive to variations in probability between .2 and 0.     

Determination of a behavioral transfer function: White-noise analysis of session-to-session response-ratio dynamics on concurrent VI VI schedules

Six pigeons were exposed to concurrent variable-interval schedules in which the programmed reinforcer ratios changed from session to session according to a pseudorandom binary sequence. This procedure corresponded to the stochastic identification paradigm (“white-noise experiment”) of systems theory and enabled the relation between log response ratios in the current session and log reinforcer ratios in all previous sessions to be determined. Such dynamic relations are called linear transfer functions. Both nonparametric and parametric representations of these, in the form of “impulse-response functions,” were determined for each bird. The session-to-session response ratios resulting from the session-to-session pseudorandom binary variations in reinforcer ratios were well predicted by the impulse-response functions identified for each pigeon. The impulse-response functions were well fitted by a second-order dynamic model involving only two parameters: a time constant and a gain. The mean time constant was 0.67 sessions, implying that the effects of abrupt changes in log reinforcer ratios should be 96% complete within about five sessions. The mean gain was 0.53, which was surprisingly low inasmuch as it should equal the sensitivity to reinforcement ratio observed under steady-state conditions. The same six pigeons were subjected to a similar experiment 10 months following the first. Despite individual differences in impulse-response functions between birds within each experiment, the impulse-response functions determined from the two experiments were essentially the same.     

Discriminated interresponse times: role of autoshaped responses.

When discriminated interresponse-time (IRT) procedures have been used to assess preference relations among temporally extended operants, deviations from matching have been obtained. Using a yoked-control procedure, the present study found that key pecking in a discriminated IRT procedure has two sources of strength--that arising from the response-reinforcer contingency that is explicitly arranged, and that arising from a stimulus-reinforcer contingency that is a by-product of the explicitly arranged contingency. The key pecking of all lead birds, and that of 3 of the 4 birds exposed to a yoked autoshaping procedure, was controlled by the keylight that signaled the lead birds' criterion IRTs. Because stimulus control of key pecking by the keylight, whether autoshaped or discriminative, fosters deviations from matching, the discriminated IRT procedure does not provide an appropriate basis for conclusions about preference relations among IRTs.