Validation of a category system for arguments in conflict discourse

Theories of individuation predict systematic differences in argumentative behavior between adolescent girls and their mothers. In order to reveal the nature and functions of this kind of discourse, two studies were carried out on 110 mother-daughter pairs. The second study (n=80) replicated and extended the first study (n=30) on an independent sample. The mother-daughter pairs were asked to discuss a subject that had recently been at issue between them. To assess the argumentative behavior, a category system was developed that reflects the functional character of utterances in discourse. The aim of the research was to test the reliability and validity of the category system. Daughters are assumed to verbalize their own needs and preferences to increase the differences to the mother, and to weaken or reject the mother's arguments in an effort to resist control. Mothers, on the other hand, are supposed to exert control over the behavior of their daughters but do so within bounds of mutuality. This should lead to verbal initiatives and attempts to explain, support and modify their positions and arguments. The data showed high reliability of the categorization of arguments. The categories also differentiated between mothers and daughters. Daughters were more likely to try to weaken and reject (and accept) the mother's arguments and to state preferences while mothers tried to support and explain their positions and to retain control by initiating questions and arguments to which the daughters responded.     

Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.     

《物种起源》中的类比方法及其论证作用

达尔文在《物种起源》中区分了自然选择学说包括的两种不同的原理：适应原理和性状分歧原理。他对类比方法的应用也有两种：一是类比论证,二是发现的启发法。关于适应原理的类比只起到了启发法的作用,达尔文对这种类比的理解是假说一演绎主义的;关于性状分歧原理的类比是一种归纳推理,达尔文对这种类比的理解是归纳主义的。     

The Medieval Origins of Conceivability Arguments

The central recommendation of this article is that philosophers trained in the analytic tradition ought to add the sensibilities and skills of the historian to their methodological toolkit. The value of an historical approach to strictly philosophical matters is illustrated by a case study focussing on the medieval origin of conceivability arguments and contemporary views of modality. It is shown that common metaphilosophical views about the nature of the philosophical enterprise as well as certain inference patterns found in thinkers from Descartes to Chalmers have their origin in the theological concerns of the Scholastics. Since these assumptions and inference patterns are difficult to motivate when shorn of their original theological context, the upshot is that much post‐Cartesian philosophy is cast in an altogether unfamiliar, and probably unwelcome, light. The methodological point, however, is that this philosophical gain is born of acquaintance with the history of ideas.     

A Pragma-Dialectical Approach of the Analysis and Evaluation of Pragmatic Argumentation in a Legal Context

This paper answers the question how pragmatic argumentation which occurs in a legal context, can be analyzed and evaluated adequately. First, the author surveys various ideas taken from argumentation theory and legal theory on the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Then, on the basis of these ideas, she develops a pragma-dialectical instrument for analyzing and evaluating pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Finally she demonstrates how this instrument can be used by giving an exemplary analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court.     

Normative and Descriptive Analyses of Simpson's Paradox in Decision Making

Suppose that you are evaluating two delivery companies. Your investigation shows that Company B has a better on-time rate for small packages and also for large packages. Despite Company B's performance, however, Company A has a better overall on-time rate. This situation exemplifies Simpson's Paradox, in which the judged relationship between two variables (e.g., company and performance) differs depending on whether that relationship is viewed within subcategories of a third variable (e.g., package size) or in the aggregate. A normative analysis is presented arguing that the reasonableness of using the third variable depends upon the sample size as well as the separation between and variability within categories. To test subjects' abilities to behave appropriately in Simpson's Paradox situations, we examined responses to variations in these factors in five studies. Results showed that subjects had little or no sensitivity to differing stimulus set sizes. Also, subjects were sensitive to relationship strength and the variability within and between groups, and in nonnormative ways. Subjects' judgment behavior is related to a broader perspective concerning selection among multiple available levels of analysis based on a consideration of argument strength.     

Moral supervenience

Abstract

It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.     

Competing Explanations and Explaining-Away Arguments

An “explaining-away argument” [EAA] aims to discredit some explanatory hypothesis by appealing to the explanatory power of an alternative hypothesis. Nietzsche's genealogical argument against theism and Darwin's case against Paley's “old argument of design in nature” are famous examples. In order for EAAs to have their negative force, they must satisfy several conditions. After clarifying these conditions, I focus in on one in particular: the two hypotheses in question offer potential explanations that compete with one another. I develop a formal account of what it takes for potential explanations to compete, and I use this account to argue that EAAs are often misapplied today. This is due to the fact that philosophers often fail to appreciate the subtle line dividing competing from non-competing explanations.     

What <Emphasis Type="Italic">is</Emphasis> wrong with intelligent design?

While a great deal of abuse has been directed at intelligent design theory (ID), its starting point is a fact about biological organisms that cries out for explanation, namely “specified complexity” (SC). Advocates of ID deploy three kind of argument from specified complexity to the existence of a designer: an eliminative argument, an inductive argument, and an inference to the best explanation. Only the first of these merits the abuse directed at it; the other two arguments are worthy of respect. If they fail, it is only because we have a better explanation of SC, namely Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection.