Reflective equilibrium and moral objectivity

Ever since the introduction of reflective equilibrium in ethics, it has been argued that reflective equilibrium either leads to moral relativism, or that it turns out to be a form of intuitionism in disguise. Despite these criticisms, reflective equilibrium remains the most dominant method of moral justification in ethics. In this paper, I therefore critically examine the most recent attempts to defend the method of reflective equilibrium against these objections. Defenders of reflective equilibrium typically respond to the objections by saying that either reflective equilibrium can in fact safeguard moral objectivity or alternatively, even if it cannot, that there simply are no reasonable alternatives. In this paper, I take issue with both responses. First, I argue that given the non-foundationalist aspirations of reflective equilibrium, moral objectivity cannot be maintained. Second, I argue that reflective equilibrium is not the only game in town once intuitionism has been discarded. I argue that given their own normative ambitions, combined with their rejection of intuitionism, proponents of reflective equilibrium have reason to take alternative methods of moral justification, and more specifically transcendental arguments, more seriously than they have done so far. I end by sketching the outlines of what this alternative methodology might look like.     

医疗纠纷的解决机制

近年来,医疗纠纷呈上升趋势,不仅是医疗界和学术界关注的焦点和热点问题,而且已成为整个社会和政府极为关注并亟待解决的课题。在现有的法院诉讼、协商解决、行政调解等医疗纠纷解决机制下,应尽快建立医事仲裁制度,为解决医疗纠纷开辟新的途径。     

The Meta-Justification of Reflective Equilibrium

The paper addresses the possibility of providing a meta-justification of what appears to be crucial epistemic desiderata involved in the method of reflective equilibrium. I argue that although the method of reflective equilibrium appears to be widely in use in moral theorising, the prospects of providing a meta-justification of crucial epistemic desiderata are rather bleak. Nor is the requirement that a meta-justification be provided obviously misguided. In addition, I briefly note some of the implications of these results for our use of the method of reflective equilibrium and for the best interpretation of the method.     

How do children deal with socio-moral conflicts? Self-conscious emotions and conflict resolution in the narratives of institutionalized and noninstitutionalized children

Introduction

Self-conscious emotions play an important role in children's psychosocial functioning.

Non-Naturalist Moral Realism and the Limits of Rational Reflection

This essay develops the epistemic challenge to non-naturalist moral realism. While evolutionary considerations do not support the strongest claims made by ‘debunkers’, they do provide the basis for an inductive argument that our moral dispositions and starting beliefs are at best partially reliable. So, we need some method for separating truth from falsity. Many non-naturalists think that rational reflection can play this role. But rational reflection cannot be expected to bring us to truth even from reasonably accurate starting points. Reflection selects views that are coherent and conflict-free, yet there is no reason to think that the non-natural moral truth must be like this. Inasmuch as we seek coherent, conflict-free, ethical viewpoints, that suggests that our goal is not non-natural truth at all.     

Several programming models with unascertained parameters and their applications

Several programming models are introduced with the consideration of available unascertained information. In this case, the so‐called unascertained information is some numerical values whose ranges are known but their exact values are not. These models resolve several vital weaknesses of the traditional programming methods to a certain degree. Our study includes considerations of linear and non‐linear programming models with grey parameters, grey 0–1 programming, and satisfactory and quasi‐optimal solutions of grey linear programmings. Finally, some practical applications are given in order to test the applicability of our theory. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

Les erreurs commises lors de la résolution du problème source favorisent-elles le transfert analogique ? Un réexamen de la recherche de Gick et McGarry (1992)

Gick and McGarry (1992) show that inducing source problem difficulty by reducing the salience of its structural elements improves analogical transfer. According to them, this result is explained by similarities between mistakes made when solving the difficult source and target mistakes. In this study, we replicate Gick and McGarry study in order to do an analysis, not made by the authors, in the aim of testing the role of mistakes in analogical transfer. Our results replicate the effects Gick and McGarry observed, but show that theses effects are not explained by mistakes made on the source problem.     

It pays to compare: An experimental study on computational estimation

Comparing and contrasting examples is a core cognitive process that supports learning in children and adults across a variety of topics. In this experimental study, we evaluated the benefits of supporting comparison in a classroom context for children learning about computational estimation. Fifth- and sixth-grade students (N = 157) learned about estimation either by comparing alternative solution strategies or by reflecting on the strategies one at a time. At posttest and retention test, students who compared were more flexible problem solvers on a variety of measures. Comparison also supported greater conceptual knowledge, but only for students who already knew some estimation strategies. These findings indicate that comparison is an effective learning and instructional practice in a domain with multiple acceptable answers.     

Postfoundationalism and Interdisciplinarity: A Response to Jerome Stone

Abstract. In my recent work I argued that the religion and sciencedialogue is most successful when done locally and contextually. However, I also argued against theology's epistemic isolation in a pluralist, postmodern world, and for a postfoundationalist notion of human rationality that reveals the interdisciplinary, public nature of all theological reflection. I now want to explore the possibility that, when we look at what the prehistory of thehuman mind reveals about the biological roots of all human rationality, some forms of contemporary evolutionary epistemology may actually hold the key to understanding the kind of cognitive fluidity that enables true interdisciplinary reflection. Philosophically the religion and science dialogue benefits from this move when a postfoundationalist notion of rationality redescribes the dynamic interaction of our various disciplinary dialogues with one another as aform of transversal reasoning. Transversality in this sense justifies and urges an acknowledgment of multiple patterns of interpretation as one moves across the borders and boundaries of different disciplines.