Deep learning and punctuated equilibrium theory

Deep learning is associated with the latest success stories in AI. In particular, deep neural networks are applied in increasingly different fields to model complex processes. Interestingly, the underlying algorithm of backpropagation was originally designed for political science models. The theoretical foundations of this approach are very similar to the concept of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET). The article discusses the concept of deep learning and shows parallels to PET. A showcase model demonstrates how deep learning can be used to provide a missing link in the study of the policy process: the connection between attention in the political system (as inputs) and budget shifts (as outputs).     

Trade‐off ranking method for multi‐criteria decision analysis

Multi‐criteria decision analysis presumes trade‐off between different criteria. As a result, the optimal solution is not unique and can be represented by the Pareto frontier in the objective space. Each Pareto solution is a compromise between different objectives. Despite a limited number of Pareto optimal solutions, the decision‐maker eventually has to choose only one option. Such a choice has to be made with the use of additional preferences not included in the original formulation of the optimization problem. The paper represents a new approach to an automatic ranking that can help the decision‐maker. In contrast to the other methodologies, the proposed method is based on the minimization of trade‐off between different Pareto solutions. To be realized, the approach presumes the existence of a well‐distributed Pareto set representing the entire Pareto frontier. In the paper, such a set is generated with the use of the directed search domain algorithm. The method is applied to a number of test cases and compared against two existing alternative approaches.     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.     

Fanciful Examples

This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of described cases; they identify no special problem with fanciful examples.     

A one-step method for modelling longitudinal data with differential equations

Differential equation models are frequently used to describe non-linear trajectories of longitudinal data. This study proposes a new approach to estimate the parameters in differential equation models. Instead of estimating derivatives from the observed data first and then fitting a differential equation to the derivatives, our new approach directly fits the analytic solution of a differential equation to the observed data, and therefore simplifies the procedure and avoids bias from derivative estimations. A simulation study indicates that the analytic solutions of differential equations (ASDE) approach obtains unbiased estimates of parameters and their standard errors. Compared with other approaches that estimate derivatives first, ASDE has smaller standard error, larger statistical power and accurate Type I error. Although ASDE obtains biased estimation when the system has sudden phase change, the bias is not serious and a solution is also provided to solve the phase problem. The ASDE method is illustrated and applied to a two-week study on consumers’ shopping behaviour after a sale promotion, and to a set of public data tracking participants’ grammatical facial expression in sign language. R codes for ASDE, recommendations for sample size and starting values are provided. Limitations and several possible expansions of ASDE are also discussed.     

The robustness of the factor structure of the Self-Restraint Scale: What does self-restraint encompass?

In contrast with the original version of the Self-Restraint Scale (SRS; [Weinberger, D.A., & Schwartz, G.E. (1990). Distress and restraint as superordinate dimensions of self-reported adjustment: A typological perspective. Journal of Personality, 58, 381–417]), confirmatory factor analysis did not support a four-factor solution. In the current study an exploratory factor analysis revealed a three-factor structure. Although the original subscales suppression of aggression, consideration of others, and impulse control were confirmed by the data, responsibility did not fit within the overall concept of self-restraint. These results provide some indication that although the subscales can be used independently, the way self-restraint is conceptualized should be reconsidered. Future studies are needed to confirm the factor structure observed in the current study.     

Common morality: comment on Beauchamp and Childress

The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here, I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification. I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible. Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality theory.

小学数学真实性问题解决的调查研究

在常规课堂上对来自北京市两所小学148位10-12岁的小学生进行真实性问题的测验,研究结果表明:1)被试中对真实数学问题作出真实性解答的人数比例约为四分之一,高于国外同类研究中比例.2)作出常规解答的人数比例约为一半,显著高于作出真实解答的人数比例.3)六年级被试作出真实解答的人数比例普遍高于四年级,但是在某些问题上,六年级被试中作出常规解答的人数比例反而高于四年级.4)被试对不同真实问题的反应存在一定的差异,这可能与真实问题的特点有关.     

Penser autrement les difficultés scolaires : les apports du Rorschach en système intégré

This study examines school under-achievement from the perspective of clinical psychology. We compare 2 groups of children in the 3^rd grade (mean age 9) based on their results on a national test of French language and Mathematics. We present the Rorschach results of 7 high performers compared to 7 low performers, all of whom have IQ scores (K. ABC) that are in the average range (90 - 109). The Rorschach data (Comprehensive System) demonstrate no differences between these groups of children concerning affective functioning and stress tolerance. However, the quantitative and qualitative results are notably different concerning attitudes relative to complex situations, in the area of critical self-perception and conflict-resolution strategies.     

RESPECTING HUMAN DIGNITY: CONTRACT VERSUS CAPABILITIES

Abstract: There appears to be a tension between two commitments in liberalism. The first is that citizens, as rational agents possessing dignity, are owed a justification for principles of justice. The second is that members of society who do not meet the requirements of rational agency are owed justice. These notions conflict because the first commitment is often expressed through the device of the social contract, which seems to confine the scope of justice to rational agents. So, contractarianism seems to ignore the justice claims of the severely cognitively impaired. To solve this problem, Martha Nussbaum proposes the capabilities approach. The justifiability condition, on this approach, is met by the idea of overlapping consensus. This essay argues that overlapping consensus cannot meet liberalism's justifiability condition, nor is it more inclusive of the cognitively impaired. Therefore, we have reason to retain the contract device and look for another way to ensure that liberalism respects the justice claims of all.