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61.
Provided here is a characterisation of absolute probability functions for intuitionistic (propositional) logic L, i.e. a set of constraints on the unary functions P from the statements of L to the reals, which insures that (i) if a statement A of L is provable in L, then P(A) = 1 for every P, L's axiomatisation being thus sound in the probabilistic sense, and (ii) if P(A) = 1 for every P, then A is provable in L, L's axiomatisation being thus complete in the probabilistic sense. As there are theorems of classical (propositional) logic that are not intuitionistic ones, there are unary probability functions for intuitionistic logic that are not classical ones. Provided here because of this is a means of singling out the classical probability functions from among the intuitionistic ones. 相似文献
62.
The Relation between Formal and Informal Logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Ralph H. Johnson 《Argumentation》1999,13(3):265-274
The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various (often incompatible) ways by various thinkers. After reviewing some of the more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic. 相似文献
63.
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65.
Every Finitely Reducible Logic has the Finite Model Property with Respect to the Class of ♦-Formulae
In this paper a unified framework for dealing with a broad family of propositional multimodal logics is developed. The key tools for presentation of the logics are the notions of closure relation operation and monotonous relation operation. The two classes of logics: FiRe-logics (finitely reducible logics) and LaFiRe-logics (FiRe-logics with local agreement of accessibility relations) are introduced within the proposed framework. Further classes of logics can be handled indirectly by means of suitable translations. It is shown that the logics from these classes have the finite model property with respect to the class of -formulae, i.e. each -formula has a -model iff it has a finite -model. Roughly speaking, a -formula is logically equivalent to a formula in negative normal form without occurrences of modal operators with necessity force. In the proof we introduce a substantial modification of Claudio Cerrato's filtration technique that has been originally designed for graded modal logics. The main core of the proof consists in building adequate restrictions of models while preserving the semantics of the operators used to build terms indexing the modal operators. 相似文献
66.
The logic of proofs was introduced by Artemov in order to analize the formalization of the concept of proof rather than the concept of provability. In this context, some operations on proofs play a very important role. In this paper, we investigate some very natural operations, paying attention not only to positive information, but also to negative information (i.e. information saying that something cannot be a proof). We give a formalization for a fragment of such a logic of proofs, and we prove that our fragment is complete and decidable. 相似文献
67.
The paper provides a uniform Gentzen-style proof-theoretic framework for various subsystems of classical predicate logic. In particular, predicate logics obtained by adopting van Behthem's modal perspective on first-order logic are considered. The Gentzen systems for these logics augment Belnap's display logic by introduction rules for the existential and the universal quantifier. These rules for x and x are analogous to the display introduction rules for the modal operators and and do not themselves allow the Barcan formula or its converse to be derived. En route from the minimal modal predicate logic to full first-order logic, axiomatic extensions are captured by purely structural sequent rules. 相似文献
68.
Sebastian Sunday Grève 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2018,96(1):168-182
This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed. 相似文献
69.
基于太极代数,本文证明八卦是八个逻辑范式,八卦中包含四对矛盾关系,其中"六子"构成辩证逻辑组。八卦是生命生产和思想生产都必须共同遵循的变化法则。学界似有这样的倾向,以为《周易》中只有类推逻辑而没有演绎逻辑,本文证明这种观点是不能成立的。八卦本质上就是演绎逻辑的,卦象的本质是逻辑法则。因此,基于卦象的联想或推理不能脱离八卦的逻辑内涵;否则,想象的灵活性必将导致卦象上的混淆,甚至使八卦沦为象数游戏的工具。 相似文献
70.
Tim Crane 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(1-2):20-37
Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.” 相似文献