Game Logic and its Applications II

This paper provides a Genzten style formulation of the game logic framework GLm (0 m ), and proves the cut-elimination theorem for GLm. As its application, we prove the term existence theorem for GL used in Part I.     

Without Intuitions

This paper criticizes Analytic philosophy with its reliance on intuitions in pursuit of conceptual analysis. Rejecting naturalism as an alternative philosophical method, I offer in its place a pragmatic and revisionary conception of philosophical method. I explain the method of Analytic philosophy and show why reliance on intuitions is essential to that method, which is unable to provide substantive answers to philosophical problems. I further show that reflective equilibrium or wide analysis requires some criterion of intuition choice and that this criterion can be applied directly to definitions themselves.     

Intuitions,Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium

It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. This paper develops a methodology for philosophical theorizing that attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, it develops and defends a methodology it calls Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. It argues that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing a mechanism to check the influence of bias on our intuitions. In section 1, it defends the claim that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. In section 2, it outlines recent arguments against the reliability of intuitions. In section 3, it explains and defends its account of Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium.     

Economic cooperation in western Asia

Any changing system both develops and evolves (individuates). The evolution of the biosphere must therefore be taken in context of the development of the earth, which appears to have followed typical developmental rules of dissipative structures. Two different perspectives are possible on dissipative structures—the classical externalist perspective, which views open systems as becoming progressively negentropic, and the newer, internalist perspective, which views them from within as becoming increasingly disorderly. A history of the universe can be traced, alternately stressing the one and the other perspective, which can form the basic structure of a modern, science‐based creation myth.     

Memory Drum Theory

Two experiments investigated the memory drum theory’s prediction (Henry & Rogers, 1960) that simple reaction time (SRT) increased with the complexity of the response to be initiated. Experiment 1 (N = 9) matched the Experiment 1, Group 1, SRT condition described by Henry and Rogers. Results of Experiment 1 replicated those of Henry and Rogers and indicated that the memory drum theory’s prediction of increased SRT as a function of increased complexity of response was tenable. Experiment 2 (N = 11) tested the effects of anatomical unit, extent, and target size on SRT, premotor time, and motor time. The results supported the contention that alternative explanations for SRT were possible. With complexity constant, increases in anatomical unit lead to increases in SRT, but only in the motor time component which indicated electromechanical rather than neuromotor program delays. It is proposed that the increased motor time could be explained by peripheral events such as the duration maximum torque must be applied by the agonist muscle(s) to generate the angular acceleration required to initiate rapid movement. SRT, premotor time, and motor time increased when target size was reduced from 6.35 cm to .79 cm. The increased premotor time could be a function of the determining of new equilibrium points for the elbow joint during response initiation. No effects on SRT were observed for extent.     

Deep learning and punctuated equilibrium theory

Deep learning is associated with the latest success stories in AI. In particular, deep neural networks are applied in increasingly different fields to model complex processes. Interestingly, the underlying algorithm of backpropagation was originally designed for political science models. The theoretical foundations of this approach are very similar to the concept of Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET). The article discusses the concept of deep learning and shows parallels to PET. A showcase model demonstrates how deep learning can be used to provide a missing link in the study of the policy process: the connection between attention in the political system (as inputs) and budget shifts (as outputs).     

Mutual support in games: Some properties of Berge equilibria

The Berge equilibrium concept formalizes mutual support among players motivated by the altruistic social value orientation in games. We prove some basic results for Berge equilibria and their relations to Nash equilibria, and we provide a straightforward method for finding Berge equilibria in n-player games. We explore some specific examples, and we explain how the Berge equilibrium provides a compelling model of cooperation in social dilemmas. We show that the Berge equilibrium also explains coordination in some common interest games and is partially successful in explaining the payoff dominance phenomenon, and we comment that the theory of team reasoning provides alternative solutions to these problems.     

Fanciful Examples

This article defends the use of fanciful examples within the method of wide reflective equilibrium. First, it characterizes the general persuasive role of described cases within that method. Second, it suggests three criteria any example must meet in order to succeed in this persuasive role; fancifulness has little or nothing to do with whether an example is able to meet these criteria. Third, it discusses several general objections to fanciful examples and concludes that they are objections to the abuse of described cases; they identify no special problem with fanciful examples.     

Common morality: comment on Beauchamp and Childress

The notion of common morality plays a prominent role in some of the most influential theories of biomedical ethics. Here, I focus on Beauchamp and Childress’s models in the fourth and fifth edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics as well as on a revision that Beauchamp proposed in a recent article. Although there are significant differences in these works that require separate analysis, all include a role for common morality as starting point and normative framework for theory construction in combination with a coherence theory of moral justification. I defend to some extent the existence and empirical significance of common morality, as delineated by Beauchamp and Childress in different versions, but criticize its normative role. It is neither convincing as a moral foundation nor well compatible with a standard coherentist justification. I suggest that the authors should give up the foundational account for a more modest account of common morality as resource of well-established moral insights and experiences, which have proved generally valid but neither sufficient nor infallible. Beauchamp’s latest proposal appears as a step in this direction; indeed, it may be the beginning of the end of his common-morality theory.