DIMENSIONS OF LIFE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO THE INORGANIC AND THE ORGANIC IN PAUL TILLICH AND PIERRE TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

Abstract. Systems theory provides a surprisingly fruitful approach to several important ideas held in common by Paul Tillich and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. These include complexity or organization as the key to understanding the distinction between the inorganic and the organic, and hierarchy or levels in complex systems. Teilhard and systems theorists accept hierarchy as fundamental. Tillich questions the concept and prefers “dimensions,” including the inorganic, organic, psychological, spiritual, and historical dimensions. Tillich's rejection of hierarchy is questioned, but significant correlations are discovered in the systems interpretation of the psychological and spiritual dimensions as well as in the use of “centeredness” by both thinkers.     

Using awareness training to decrease nervous habits during public speaking

This study evaluated the effectiveness of awareness training for the reduction of three nervous habits that manifest during public speaking: filled pauses, tongue clicks, and inappropriate use of the word “like.” Four university students delivered short speeches during baseline and assessment sessions. Awareness training resulted in meaningful reductions in target behaviors for all participants. Booster awareness training sessions were necessary for all participants to achieve further reductions in target behaviors. Generality probes conducted in front of a small audience indicated that treatment effects generally maintained. Social validity scores indicated that the treatment was acceptable, and participants indicated not only decreased use of verbal fillers, but also improved overall public speaking ability posttreatment.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

Intergroup relations in action: Questions asked about lesbian,gay and bisexual issues in diversity training

This paper focuses on the questions which heterosexual trainees ask about lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) experience within diversity training about LGB issues. Drawing on a data corpus of 162 questions asked by trainees in 13 tape‐recorded training sessions, questions were coded into six categories: (1) general ‘understanding’ questions; (2) questions about the trainer's life, experience and practices; (3) professional practice questions; (4) questions about lesbian and gay related legislation, policies and procedures; (5) questions about specific people and projects and (6) questions about the meanings, derivations and correct use of terms and symbols. ‘Real’ questions are compared with the decontexualized questions (and answers to them) that are provided in training manuals and it is demonstrated that these questions differ markedly from how questions actually get asked and how they actually get answered. Recommendations are provided for improving training and the argument made for turning towards analyses of the real world in action, especially when considering intergroup relations. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Modulation of long-term memory by arousal in alexithymia: The role of interpretation

Moderate physiological or emotional arousal induced after learning modulates memory consolidation, helping to distinguish important memories from trivial ones. Yet, the contribution of subjective awareness or interpretation of arousal to this effect is uncertain. Alexithymia, which is an inability to describe or identify one’s emotional and arousal states even though physiological responses to arousal are intact, provides a tool to evaluate the role of arousal interpretation. Participants scoring high and low on alexithymia (N = 30 each) learned a list of 30 words, followed by immediate recall. Participants then saw either an arousing (oral surgery) or neutral video (tooth brushing). Memory was tested 24-h later. Physiological response to arousal was comparable between groups, but subjective response to arousal was impaired in high alexithymia. Yet, delayed word recognition was enhanced by arousal regardless of alexithymia status. Thus, subjective response to arousal, i.e., cognitive appraisal, was not necessary for memory modulation to occur.     

Thinking About Me: How Social Awareness Evolved

ABSTRACT— Humans seem unique in their consideration of others' goals, motivations, intentions, and needs. But the human form of social awareness did not spring from nowhere; certain mechanisms shared across primates formed the foundation from which these processes derived. A review of recent nonhuman primate research points to particular ancestral mechanisms, including an interest in images moving in synchrony with self, a mirror neuron system that responds in the same way to actions made by the self and by others, and inherited social tolerance that provided the bases for social thinking. Still there is a gap in tracking social awareness from these basic beginnings to the ability to think about self and other with respect to intentions and goals. Comparative and clinical work will fill in this gap and will map brain processes onto social thinking.     

Naming problems do not reflect a second independent core deficit in dyslexia: Double deficits explored

The double deficit hypothesis states that naming speed problems represent a second core deficit in dyslexia independent from a phonological deficit. The current study investigated the main assumptions of this hypothesis in a large sample of well-diagnosed dyslexics. The three main findings were that (a) naming speed was consistently related only to reading speed; (b) phonological processing speed and naming speed loaded on the same factor, and this factor contributed strongly to reading speed; and (c) although general processing speed was involved in speeded naming of visual items, it did not explain the relationship between naming speed and reading speed. The results do not provide support for the existence of a second independent core naming deficit in dyslexia and indicate that speeded naming tasks are mainly phonological processing speed tasks with an important addition: fast cross-modal matching of visual symbols and phonological codes.     

Exploring the impact of phonological awareness, visual–spatial working memory, and preschool quantity–number competencies on mathematics achievement in elementary school: Findings from a 3-year longitudinal study

This longitudinal study explored the importance of kindergarten measures of phonological awareness, working memory, and quantity–number competencies (QNC) for predicting mathematical school achievement in third graders (mean age 8 years 8 months). It was found that the impact of phonological awareness and visual–spatial working memory, assessed at 5 years of age, was mediated by early QNC, which predicted math achievement in third grade. Importantly, and confirming our isolated number words hypothesis, phonological awareness had no impact on higher numerical competencies (i.e., when number words needed to be linked with quantities [QNC Level II and above]) but predicted basic numerical competencies (i.e., when number words were isolated from quantities [QNC Level I]), explaining the moderate relationship between early literacy development and the development of mathematical competencies.     

On the signals underlying conscious awareness of action

To investigate whether conscious judgments of movement onset are based solely on pre-movement signals (i.e., premotor or efference copy signals) or whether sensory feedback (i.e., reafferent) signals also play a role, participants judged the onset of finger and toe movements that were either active (i.e., self initiated) or passive (i.e., initiated by the experimenter). Conscious judgments were made by reporting the position of a rotating clock hand presented on a computer screen and were then compared to the actual measured time of movement onset. In line with previous studies, judgment errors were found to be anticipatory for both finger and toe movements. There was a significant difference between judgment errors for active and passive movements, with judgments of active movements being more anticipatory than judgments of passive movements. This is consistent with a pre-movement (from here on referred to as an “efferent”) account of action awareness because premotor and efference copy signals are only present in active movements, whereas the main source of movement information in passive movements is sensory feedback which is subject to time delays of conduction (and hence predicts later judgment times for passive movements). However, judgments of active toe movement onset time were less anticipatory than judgments of active finger movement onset time. This pattern of results is not consistent with a pure efferent account of conscious awareness of action onset - as this account predicts more anticipatory judgments for toe movements compared to finger movements. Instead, the data support the idea that conscious judgments of movement onset are based on efferent (i.e., premotor, efference copy) and reafferent (i.e., feedback from the movement) components.     

A theory of consciousness

Consciousness is the subjective awareness of momentary experience interpreted in the context of personal memory and present state. I propose that two brain systems converge to create consciousness. The exogenous system sends information about multimodal external stimuli to basal dendrites in widely dispersed pyramidal cell ensembles in the cortex of the brain; this system produces synchronized fragments of sensations. The endogenous system distributes readout of representations of memories, activated in systems established by associative learning, diffusely to apical dendrites. Convergence of exogenous and endogenous inputs enhances cellular excitability, and fragmented sensations are thereby converted to fragments of perception. Local field potentials periodically modulate all cortical membrane potentials and facilitate synchronous discharge of these excited elements. Feedback between the cortex and the thalamus results in a cortico-thalamo-cortical reverberation, binding the fragments into a unified global percept. Sustained reverberation produces a resonating electromagnetic field of synchronized elements. The momentary content of information in the brain is this distributed coherence, which is negative entropy. Consciousness is a physical property of this field, producing the subjective awareness of this information.