Language,Behaviour, and Empathy. G.H. Mead’s and W.V.O. Quine’s Naturalized Theories of Meaning

ABSTRACT

The paper compares Mead’s and Quine’s behaviouristic theories of meaning and language, focusing in particular on Mead’s notion of sympathy and Quine’s notion of empathy. On the one hand, Quine seems to resort to an explanation similar to Mead’s notion of sympathy, referring to ‘empathy’ in order to justify the human ability to project ourselves into the witness’s position; on the other hand, Quine’s reference to the notion of empathy paves the way to a more insightful comparison between Mead’s behaviourism and an explanation of the emergence of the linguistic from pre-linguistic communication based on empathic identification processes. However, Mead is less ambiguous than Quine in his use of the notion of sympathy finds a fecund parallel in the current neuroscientific and neuro-phenomenological hypothesis on ‘empathy’. The article contends that the ambiguity in Quine’s account of empathy is due to the exigency of trying to elucidate the link between the rules of language in a cultural context and the natural, that is ‘instinctive’, basis of the process of learning a language. This is the reason why his epistemological behaviourism is particularly close to the non-reductionist naturalism of Mead. The working hypothesis proposed in the conclusion deals with the core notions of ‘gesture’ and ‘behaviour’.     

Perry's Legacy: Models of Epistemological Development

This paper compares the different ways that intellectual development has been described by W. Perry (1970) and M. Belenky, B. Clinchy, N. Goldberger, and J. Tarule (1986); M. Baxter Magolda (1992); and P. King and K. Kitchener (1994). The similarities are summarized into a comprehensive, gender-neutral 4-stage model (E. J. West, 1996). The nature of the stages is discussed from both a constructivist-developmental perspective (H. G. Furth, 1981; A. Colby & L. Kohlberg, 1987) and using skill-complexity theory (M. L. Commons, E. J. Trudeau, S. A. Stein, F. A. Richards, & S. R. Krause, 1998; M. L. Commons, D. Danaher-Gilpin, P. M. Miller, & E. A. Goodheart, 2002). Educational implications are proposed.     

Integrated analysis of indigenous psychologies: Comments and extensions of ideas presented by Shams, Jackson, Hwang and Kashima

The purpose of the present paper is to provide an integrated analysis of indigenous psychologies and to outline the epistemological foundation of indigenous psychologies. In the first part of this paper, the authors provide commentary of the four articles in this Special Issue. In the second section, the epistemological foundation of general psychology is reviewed. General psychology has adopted positivism in search of abstract and universal laws of human behavior and eliminated the subjective aspects of human functioning (i.e. agency, meaning, intention and goals) and the influence of context and culture. In the third section, the authors introduce the transactional model of science. In this approach, human beings are viewed as agents of their own action and are motivated to control and manage their environment. In the fourth section, indigenous psychologies and culture are defined. Cultural differences exist due to the diverse goals that cultures pursue, the methods people use to attain the goals, and the differential use of natural and human resources. In the fifth section, a review of empirical studies focusing on academic achievement is provided to highlight the scientific merits of indigenous psychologies. In the final section, the authors distinguish between the speculative analyses of indigenous concepts from systematic indigenous analyses. Indigenous psychologies represent a scientific paradigm in which the goal is to create a more rigorous, systematic and universal science that can be theoretically and empirically verified.     

The Constitutional Theatre

Constitutionalism is a typically modernist project in that it seeks to dictate social order by means of institutional design. This project, however, fails in two ways. Empirically, constitutionalism is confronted with the fact that constitutions have limited control over their social environment. Epistemologically, constitutionalism has great difficulty in finding a convincing foundational relation between abstract constitutional provisions and constitutional norms for concrete situations. On the basis of this poor record, it is hard to comprehend how constitutionalism remains such an influential factor in our polity. This article tries to explain our adherence to the philosophy of constitutional ordering by analysing its function in constitutional discourse. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Does Capital Punishment Deter Homicide?: A Case Study Of Epistemological Objectivity

This paper uses the debate about whether capital punishment deters homicide as a case study for examining the claim, made by many feminists and others, that the traditional ideal of objectivity in seeking knowledge is misguided. According to this ideal, knowledge seekers should strive to gather and assess evidence independently of any influences exerted by either their individual and societal circumstances or their moral values. This paper argues that, although the traditional ideal rests on some valid precepts, it is neverthelesss untenable. the author goes on to propose an alternative epistemological ideal – one that retains these valid precepts but also recognizes an important and legitimate role for people's circumstances and moral values in their efforts to find knowledge.     

Theological Shamelessness? A Response to Arthur Peacocke and David A. Pailin

This is a theological response to two programmatic essays, “Science and the Future of Theology: Critical Issues,” by Arthur Peacocke and “What Game is Being Played? The Need for Clarity about theRelationship between Scientific and Theological Understanding,” by David A. Pailin. It argues that the two authors, well informed by the recent developments in science, are reduplicating some methodological and epistemological trends common to nineteenth‐century theology. The feasibility of their project should, therefore, be examined on whether they succeed in answering the questions posed to the liberal project that dominated theological and philosophical scholarship in the last century. They are found to be wanting in their inadequate response to three considerations: (1) the persistence of particular manifestations of religion and theology's enduring refusal to accept thoroughly scientific “enlightened” criteria, (2) the epistemological implications of the eschatological character of the Christianmessage, and (3) the trinitarian paradigm for Christian theology and the life of faith.     

科学探究的认知机制研究述评

科学探究涉及一个复杂的认知过程，Klahr和Dunbar的SDDS模型、Kuhn的模型以及双过程模型对此过程进行了描述；另外研究者们还对科学探究过程不同阶段需要的认知技能和认知策略以及影响因素进行了研究。     

Contemplative dialogue as the basis for a transdisciplinary attitude: Ecoliteracy toward an education for human sustainability

Our EcoDialogue Center is an educational space for human sustainability within the University of Veracruz. We propose that creating sustainable knowledge requires re-thinking how we conceive ourselves as human beings. This requires paying attention to what we call “the quality of being,” which means caring about and attending to the physical–emotional–mental–spiritual as the foundation of education. This way we can create a space where we can dialogue contemplatively where all dimensions of our lives interact; the physical, the emotional, the communitarian, the social politic, the planetarium, and the spiritual being act with social–environmental responsibility.     

The Epistemic Regress Problem,the Problem of the Criterion,and the Value of Reasons

There are important similarities between the epistemic regress problem and the problem of the criterion. Each turns on plausible principles stating that epistemic reasons must be supported by epistemic reasons but that having reasons is impossible if that requires having endless regresses of reasons. These principles are incompatible with the possibility of reasons, so each problem is a paradox. Whether there can be an antiskeptical solution to these paradoxes depends upon the kinds of reasons that we need in order to attain our epistemic goals. This article explains the problems and considers the ways in which two different conceptions of human flourishing support the value of different kinds of reasons. One conception requires reasons that allow an easy solution to these paradoxes. The other—rational autonomy—requires reasons that depend upon endless regresses. So we cannot have the kinds of fully transparent reasons required for rational autonomy.     

Naturalizing Moral Justification: Rethinking the Method of Moral Epistemology

The companion piece to this article, “Situating Moral Justification,” challenges the idea that moral epistemology's mission is to establish a single, all‐purpose reasoning strategy for moral justification because no reasoning practice can be expected to deliver authoritative moral conclusions in all social contexts. The present article argues that rethinking the mission of moral epistemology requires rethinking its method as well. Philosophers cannot learn which reasoning practices are suitable to use in particular contexts exclusively by exploring logical relations among concepts. Instead, in order to understand which reasoning practices are capable of justifying moral claims in different types of contexts, we need to study empirically the relationships between reasoning practices and the contexts in which they are used. The article proposes that philosophers investigate case studies of real‐world moral disputes in which people lack shared cultural assumptions and/or are unequal in social power. It motivates and explains the proposed case study method and illustrates the philosophical value of this method through a case study.