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91.
Pierre Le Morvan 《Metaphilosophy》2005,36(5):688-707
Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief. 相似文献
92.
Clare Dixon 《Journal of Applied Logic》2006,4(1):50-78
Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an agent or component is important, and where change in this knowledge may occur over time. Here we use temporal logics of knowledge to reason about the game Cluedo. We show how to specify Cluedo using temporal logics of knowledge and prove statements about the knowledge of the players using a clausal resolution calculus for this logic. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using this logic to specify and verify the game Cluedo and describe related implementations. 相似文献
93.
Job De Grefte 《Metaphilosophy》2019,50(1-2):3-15
This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification. 相似文献
94.
Xingming Hu 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2019,49(3):291-313
According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding. 相似文献
95.
Miranda Fricker 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):154-173
The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. 相似文献
96.
《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(3):387-396
Books reviewed:
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
97.
Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
98.
Fernando Raymundo Velázquez-Quesada 《Synthese》2009,169(2):283-300
We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference
is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand,
is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving
us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the
logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together.
We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and
mention how the work can be extended. 相似文献
99.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
100.
本文由两部分组成。第一部分从消极角度分析了《尼各马科伦理学》的三条道德劝喻(“两恶之间取其小”、“曲木裁直”、“拒斥快乐”),认为亚里士多德的三条道德劝喻不仅彼此互相冲突,而且与亚氏伦理学的中心原则(只有心理上和行为上有德性的表现,才是德性的,才是一个有德性的人)是相互矛盾的。第二部分则着重从积极角度来看待这些冲突.认为恰好是这些冲突暴露了伦理学所要积极面对的问题、 相似文献