全文获取类型
收费全文 | 256篇 |
免费 | 9篇 |
国内免费 | 3篇 |
专业分类
268篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 13篇 |
2022年 | 5篇 |
2021年 | 6篇 |
2020年 | 13篇 |
2019年 | 22篇 |
2018年 | 14篇 |
2017年 | 13篇 |
2016年 | 11篇 |
2015年 | 16篇 |
2014年 | 15篇 |
2013年 | 30篇 |
2012年 | 13篇 |
2011年 | 1篇 |
2010年 | 6篇 |
2009年 | 8篇 |
2008年 | 3篇 |
2007年 | 5篇 |
2006年 | 7篇 |
2005年 | 7篇 |
2004年 | 7篇 |
2003年 | 19篇 |
2002年 | 10篇 |
2001年 | 4篇 |
2000年 | 1篇 |
1999年 | 6篇 |
1998年 | 1篇 |
1997年 | 3篇 |
1996年 | 1篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 3篇 |
排序方式: 共有268条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
261.
262.
Stephen Ingram 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2018,61(7):649-669
Some philosophers object to moral error theory by arguing that there a parity between moral and epistemic normativity. They maintain that moral and epistemic error theory stand or fall together, that epistemic error theory falls, and that moral error theory thus falls too. This paper offers a response to this objection on behalf of moral error theorists. I defend the view that moral and epistemic error theory do not stand or fall together by arguing that moral error theory can be sustained alongside epistemic expressivism. This unusual combination of theories can be underpinned by differences in the foundational norms that guide moral and epistemic inquiry. I conclude that the problem of epistemic normativity fails to show that it is compulsory for us to reject moral error theory. 相似文献
263.
Preschool children were presented with slides on a computer screen showing a novel object, together with two informants, one with an attractive and one with a less attractive face. Children were asked which informant they would like to ask about the name of the novel object. After hearing the informants provide conflicting names, they were asked who they thought was correct. Children were more likely to endorse names provided by the person with the more attractive face, a bias that cannot be justified on epistemic grounds. The implications of this finding are discussed. 相似文献
264.
James Wetzel 《The Journal of religious ethics》2004,32(2):271-300
John Milbank's case against secular reason draws much of its authority and force from Augustine's critique of pagan virtue. Theology and Social Theory could be characterized, without too much insult to either Augustine or Milbank, as a postmodern City of God. Modern preoccupations with secular virtues, marketplace values, and sociological bottom‐lines are likened there to classically pagan preoccupations with the virtues of self‐conquest and conquest over others. Against both modern and antique “ontological violence” (where ‘to be’ is ‘to be antagonistic’), Milbank advances an Augustinian hope for the peace that is both beyond and prior to the peace of (temporarily) repressed antagonism. One aim of this essay is to consider whether virtues conceived out of such a hope are really all that different from the virtues they are taken to replace. I take a critical look at Augustine's critique of pagan virtue, Milbank's appropriation of that critique, the applicability of that critique to Plato, and the polemical value of Augustine's notion of original sin. I end up being skeptical of the notion of a peculiarly Christian way to turn antagonistically conceived virtues into love, but I am not unsympathetic to Milbank's concerns about a loveless and self‐complacent secularity. 相似文献
265.
The paper describes the development of Dynamic Interpersonal Therapy for use with complex depression (DITCC), and a pilot study testing DITCC’s effectiveness. The pilot found large pre-post improvements in well-being and distress; moderate rates of reliable improvement and clinically significant change; and curvilinear declines in depression and anxiety. Treatment completers and near-completers (N= 19) showed a significant curvilinear decline in symptoms of depression (PHQ-9) and anxiety (GAD-7). The results provide preliminary evidence that DITCC can be used as an effective treatment approach for complex depression. However, further research is needed to test its effectiveness in different settings with a larger sample size, using appropriate comparison groups under controlled conditions to further elaborate the short-term and long-term effects. 相似文献
266.
267.
Christian B. Miller 《The journal of positive psychology》2019,14(1):6-19
ABSTRACTWritten from the perspective of a philosopher, this paper raises a number of potential concerns with how the VIA classifies and the VIA-IS measures character traits. With respect to the 24 character strengths, concerns are raised about missing strengths, the lack of vices, conflicting character strengths, the unclear connection between character strengths and virtues, and the misclassification of some character strengths under certain virtues. With respect to the 6 virtues, concerns are raised about conflicting virtues, the absence of practical wisdom, and factor analyses that do not find a 6 factor structure. With respect to the VIA-IS, concerns are raised about its neglect of motivation and about the underlying assumptions it makes about character traits. The paper ends by sketching a significantly improved classification which omits the 6 virtues and introduces additional strengths, vices, and a conflict resolution trait. 相似文献
268.
Participatory action research: towards (non-ideal) epistemic justice in a university in South Africa
ABSTRACTThe paper explores the possibilities for promoting epistemic justice in a South African university setting through a participatory action-based photovoice research project in which university researchers worked alongside undergraduate students with no prior experience of doing research. The student voices are employed to understand how learning as capability development and agency expansion can advance epistemic justice in a university setting of hierarchical relationships that make participatory action research challenging. The paper considers how, in this project, spaces of epistemic democracy intersected with the expansion of multidimensional functionings, resulting in more epistemic justice for the student-researchers. The paper considers the possibilities for change through a participatory project toward promoting epistemic justice at the individual level. It also explores some criticisms of the limits of such individual development in the face of structural challenges. 相似文献