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121.
When people engage in a task, they often take preliminary actions (preprocessing) to simplify primary processing. Usually, a trade‐off is made between the costs of preprocessing and primary processing. We conducted three experiments to find out whether people could adaptively estimate the utility of preprocessing depending on the task situation. The result demonstrated that in performing a high‐complexity task, almost all the participants reduced their overall task performance cost by conducting cost‐adaptive preprocessing. However, for a low‐complexity task, participants tended to conduct preprocessing even though this increased overall task performance cost. Based on these results, we discuss human nature from the viewpoint of the influence of cognitive effort. 相似文献
122.
Damiano Migliorini 《Theology & Sexuality》2013,19(1-2):111-130
ABSTRACTI will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels. 相似文献
123.
Anand Jayprakash Vaidya 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(4):533-556
Should we always engage in critical thinking about issues of public policy, such as health care, gun control, and LGBT rights? Michael Huemer (2005) has argued for the claim that in some cases it is not epistemically responsible to engage in critical thinking on these issues. His argument is based on a reliabilist conception of the value of critical thinking. This article analyzes Huemer's argument against the epistemic responsibility of critical thinking by engaging it critically. It presents an alternative account of the value of critical thinking that is tied to the notion of forming and deploying a critical identity. And it develops an account of our epistemic responsibility to engage in critical thinking that is not dependent on reliability considerations alone. The primary purpose of the article is to provide critical thinking students, or those that wish to reflect on the value of critical thinking, with an opportunity to think metacritically about critical thinking by examining an argument that engages the question of whether it is epistemically responsible for one to engage in critical thinking. 相似文献
124.
Linton Wang 《Synthese》2008,162(1):133-156
The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic
relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of
epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions
rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge
attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some cases, considering a new counter-
possibility can raise the epistemic standard of knowledge attribution. Instead, the paper shows that considering a new counter-possibility
can only lower the epistemic position of a putative knower. Moreover, since the comparison, by the nature of conditionals,
is free from any commitment to the truth-values of specific knowledge attributions, my conclusion is free from the debate
between contextualism and invariantism on whether the truth-value of a knowledge attribution can actually vary with context. 相似文献
125.
Bryan Renne 《Synthese》2008,165(2):225-245
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of how to reason about knowledge, belief, and communication. This paper studies
the relative expressivity of certain fragments of the DEL language for public and private communication. It is shown that
the language of public communication with common knowledge and the language of private communication with common knowledge
are expressively incomparable for the class of all pointed Kripke models, which provides a formal proof that public and private
communication are fundamentally different in the presence of common knowledge. It is also shown that single-recipient private
communication does not add expressive power to the language of modal logic with common knowledge for any class of transitive pointed Kripke models. The latter result provides a sense in which positive introspection—believing our own beliefs—induces
a kind of self-dialog. 相似文献
126.
人类竭尽所能 ,在最大的限度上去减少各种罪恶 ,其中 ,包括恶“德”的手段在内。为了更好地运用恶“德”这种手段 ,加强对它的研究和运用是十分必要的。 相似文献
127.
Brian Ribeiro 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(5):714-732
Abstract: Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do; we would be “insulated” from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique from within. Having given my argument for this claim (which I call the Continuity Argument), I consider and respond to two important objections. I conclude that the skeptic has a powerful meta‐argument to be deployed in defending the legitimacy of his skeptical conclusions against the slings and arrows of (those I call) the half‐true theorists. 相似文献
128.
Philip Percival 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):29-47
Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint. 相似文献
129.
Juli Eflin 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1&2):48-68
Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding. 相似文献
130.
Sound and complete axiomatizations are provided for a number of different logics involving modalities for the knowledge of multiple agents and operators for branching time, extending previous work of Halpern, van der Meyden and Vardi [to appear, SIAM Journal on Computing] for logics of knowledge and linear time. The paper considers the system constraints of synchrony, perfect recall and unique initial states, which give rise to interaction axioms. The language is based on the temporal logic CTL*, interpreted with respect to a version of the bundle semantics. 相似文献