时间定价对亲社会行为的影响

时间定价就是将金钱价格赋予时间之上,用金钱来衡量时间的价值。已有研究表明,时间定价激活时间经济价值最大化的心理定势,使个体更看重时间的经济回报,花更少的时间帮助他人。但是,时间定价对亲社会行为的影响可能并不仅仅局限于时间利他。本研究通过三个实验,除了考察时间定价对时间利他的影响外,还进一步探讨时间定价对金钱利他的影响。结果显示,时间定价不仅影响个体的时间利他行为,也削弱了金钱利他行为。这表明,时间定价所激活的经济效用心理定势不仅仅局限于时间这一种资源的效用。     

African philosophy and global epistemic injustice

In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces.     

Subjective expected utility without preferences

This paper proposes a theory of subjective expected utility based on primitives only involving the fact that an act can be judged either “attractive” or “unattractive”. We give conditions implying that there are a utility function on the set of consequences and a probability distribution on the set of states such that attractive acts have a subjective expected utility above some threshold. The numerical representation that is obtained has strong uniqueness properties.     

The effect of construal level on unethical behavior

Construal level theory predicts that people will judge immoral events more harshly when these are presented in a way that elicits a higher construal level, relative to a lower construal level. Previous research supported this prediction using an Israeli sample but not a U.S. sample. This article compared Israeli and U.S. samples with respect to the interactive effect of utility and construal level on unethical behavioral intentions. We found that construal level did not affect unethical behavioral intentions in either the U.S. samples for low-utility level or the Israeli samples for low- and high-utility levels. In contrast, construal level affected unethical behavioral intentions in the U.S. sample for high-utility level: unethical behavioral intentions were higher in the low-construal level compared to the high-construal level. We discuss these findings and suggest additional factors that challenge arguments concerning the direct effect of construal level on unethical behavior.     

Les travailleurs handicapés sont-ils perçus comme des travailleurs compétents ?

Building on recent research in the area of social judgment, this paper examines how persons with disability are evaluated in a professional context. In three studies, participants without disability had to rate persons with or without disability, with or without a job, on traits reflecting the fundamental dimensions of social judgment (social desirability and social utility). Our results showed that persons with disability were systematically judged more negatively on social utility, but more positively on social desirability than persons without disability. Focusing on social utility, persons with disability were perceived as less competent, but more courageous than persons without disability. These results are discussed with regard to chances of persons with disability to succeed in the workplace.     

A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA FOR EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.     

Using temporal logics of knowledge for specification and verification—a case study

Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an agent or component is important, and where change in this knowledge may occur over time. Here we use temporal logics of knowledge to reason about the game Cluedo. We show how to specify Cluedo using temporal logics of knowledge and prove statements about the knowledge of the players using a clausal resolution calculus for this logic. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using this logic to specify and verify the game Cluedo and describe related implementations.     

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck

This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.     

Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?

According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding.     

动机性信息加工理论及其在工业与组织心理学中的应用

“团队作为信息加工者的观点”认为, 团队执行复杂任务需要经过一系列认知决策, 哪些信息被共享, 以及信息共享和整合的质量, 共同决定团队效能的高低。动机性信息加工理论则进一步提出, 认知动机和社会动机共同决定了哪些信息被共享, 以及信息共享和整合的质量。认知动机决定信息加工的深度, 社会动机决定信息加工的方向, 两种动机共同决定决策质量。这一理论可以很好地整合谈判和创造力领域的研究结果, 并在团队效能领域得到很好的应用。动机性信息加工理论是对双过程模型和“团队作为信息加工者观点”的发展和整合, 并为决策质量的影响因素提供新的分类框架和研究思路。