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121.
Multicriteria decision making (MCDM) can provide an efficient mean for considering various and conflicting objectives to reveal the alternative that maximizes the decision maker's (DM) utility. In this paper, we propose a new interactive MCDM method for implicit alternatives to help a DM obtain a most preferred solution. We employ a Tchebycheff function to generate weights for objectives consistent with the DM's responses to pairwise comparisons between alternatives and present a mixed integer linear programming formulation to generate these weights. Thus, we approximate the DM's utility function by a Tchebycheff function and generate weights consistent with the DM's responses. We test our approach with different true utility functions on various sized multiple criteria linear programming problems. The computational results show that even with non‐Tchebycheff true utility functions, our method can generate alternatives very close to the optimal solution with few questions. The comparison of our results with other methods reveals its advantages. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
122.
《Trends in cognitive sciences》2015,19(11):633-636
123.
Charles B. Cross 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):353-370
Dretske's conclusive reasons account of knowledge is designed to explain how epistemic closure can fail when the evidence for a belief does not transmit to some of that belief's logical consequences. Critics of Dretske dispute the argument against closure while joining Dretske in writing off transmission. This paper shows that, in the most widely accepted system for counterfactual logic (David Lewis's system VC), conclusive reasons are governed by an informative, non-trivial, logical transmission principle. If r is a conclusive reason for believing p in Dretske's sense, and if p logically implies q, and if p and q satisfy one additional condition, it follows that r is a conclusive reason for believing q. After introducing this additional condition, I explain its intuitive import and use the condition to shed new light on Dretske's response to scepticism, as well as on his distinction between the so-called ‘lightweight’ and ‘heavyweight’ implications of a piece of perceptual knowledge. 相似文献
124.
Robin McKenna 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(4):782-798
The target of this paper is the ‘simple’ knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is constituted by a single epistemic rule of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p’ (where p is a proposition). My aim is to argue that those who are attracted to a knowledge account of assertion should prefer what I call the ‘complex’ knowledge account, according to which assertion is constituted by a system of rules all of which are, taken together, constitutive of assertion. One of those rules—which, following John Searle, I call the ‘preparatory condition’—is of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p.’ All else being equal, simple accounts are preferable to complex accounts. I argue in this paper that all else isn't equal. While the simple knowledge account provides an elegant explanation of certain data, it is hard to see how to integrate the simple knowledge account into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. Because the complex knowledge account avoids this objection while explaining the same data as the simple knowledge account does, I conclude that the complex knowledge account is superior to the simple knowledge account. 相似文献
125.
Theodore J. Everett 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):273-286
This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion. 相似文献
126.
Richard Stillman 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(4):769-781
It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism (E2D) that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial theory of reference-fixation for proper names and argue that E2Dists ought to reject this theory. They discuss three alternatives to the theory that render E2D immune to the Argument from Misclassification. I demonstrate here that each of these alternatives either (i) replicates the faults of the original theory by assigning necessary 1-intensions to a posteriori utterances, or (ii) makes 1-intensions creatures of darkness. I argue that, although the Argument from Misclassification does indeed rely on a controversial theory of reference-fixation, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber have indicated no promising alternative to this theory. 相似文献
127.
128.
In the last few years, especially after the Brexit referendum and the 2016 U.S. elections, there has been a surge in academic interest for misinformation and disinformation. Social, cognitive, and political scientists' work on these phenomena has focused on two main aspects:
- Individuals' (and by extension societies') vulnerability to misinformation;
- Factors and interventions that can increase individuals' (and societies') resistance to misinformation.
129.
Julia Driver 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(3):367-383
Abstract: Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to distinguish them at the level of good produced. It follows from this that a consequentialist account is best placed to avoid a conflation of moral and epistemic virtue. 相似文献
130.
《周易》古经与墨家思想 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
诸子之学皆源于《易》。就墨家而言,其思想的基本特征为贵节非乐,贵兼泛爱.尚用尚齐,兴利节用,尚力自苦,尚贤尚同.右鬼薄葬,非礼非命。以此为参照,考诸《易经》,不难发现.墨家思想的许多方面,如尚节、尚力、尚用、兴利等,皆可在《易经》中见其端绪。 相似文献