Narrative competence and constructive developmental theory: A proposal for rewriting theBildungsroman in the postmodern world

Some of the chief characteristics of the narrative psychology of Bruner, Polkinghorne, Sarbin, Freeman, Howard, and White and Epston are outlined with implications for therapy discussed. Narrative psychology is then related to some current models of adult development, including those of Kegan, Perry, Belenky, Labouvie-Vief, Levinson, Basseches, and Pascual-Leone. Types of narrative competence are discussed and an argument is made that developmental readiness for narrative must be considered if narrative approaches are going to be applied. Different types of narrative approaches are shown to be indicative of particular developmental stages. The social relativism of narrative psychology is addressed and it is argued that developmental models provide a scheme for assessing the maturity of alternative narrative constructions.     

A fallacious argument against moral absolutes

The denial of moral absolutes rests, I think, on a seductive but fallacious argument, which I shall attempt both to expound and to refute here. Human beings are highly complex creatures living in a highly complex world. Every human being is different from every other, every interaction or relationship between or among human beings is unique. Hence also every occasion for moral choice is also unique, and all those action kinds - be theyadultery, murder, rape, theft, ortorture on which moralists are accustomed to pass judgment include an enormous variety of differing transactions, which ideally ought to be evaluated one by one. Moreover, each proposed action has a variety of different aspects: intention, foreseen consequence, conventional meaning, and symbolic significance for example, which bear on moral choice in a wide variety of ways. Moral rules are therefore rules of thumb, open to exceptions whenever persuasive arguments for making them are provided.     

Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Michael Huemer ( 2005 ) argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.     

Promising,Expecting, and Utility

While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.     

VALUES IN SCIENCE

Abstract In this essay, which was his presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Ernan McMullin argued that the watershed between “classic” philosophy of science (by this meaning, not just logical positivism but the logicist tradition in theory of science stretching back through Kant and Descartes to Aristotle) and the “new” philosophy of science can best be understood by analyzing the change in our perception of the role played by values in science. He begins with some general remarks about the nature of value, goes on to explore some of the historical sources for the claim that judgement in science is value‐laden, and concludes by reflecting on the implications of this claim for traditional views of the objectivity of scientific knowledge‐claims.     

Knowing failably and Moorean assertions

Knowledge-fallibilism is a species of a genus that I call knowledge-failabilism. Each is a theory of knowledge's nature. One apparent challenge to knowledge-failabilism's truth is the prima facie absurdity of Moorean assertions like ‘It's raining but I do not believe that it is.’ Does each such assertion convey an implicit and unfortunate contrast, even a contradiction? I argue that this Untenable Contrast analysis fails: no such contrast is present within the speaker's perspective at the pertinent time.     

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.     

Overcoming obstacles to a truly global psychological theory,research, and praxis in Africa

In African countries, psychology as it is taught, researched, and practised contributes to epistemic injustice and epistemological violence while depriving Africans of epistemic agency. This is largely because psychology has remained and continues to remain Eurocentric. However, the continual Eurocentric hegemony is not entirely imposed but internalised. This has made this Eurocentric hegemony self-perpetuating with African involvement. In this paper, the sources of this hegemony are explored with a view to identifying how Africans themselves contribute to the persistence of these academic “ills”. Furthermore, processes are examined through which African psychologists can disentangle themselves from this vicious cycle in order to make accurate and innovative contributions to the global understanding of human nature. Nsamenang’s pioneering role in confronting the wrongs is discussed, paving the way for the next generation of African psychologists to make contributions that are similar to, or surpass, Nsamenang’s lifetime contributions. I conclude by making some recommendations as to the way forward in the post-Nsamenang era.     

Fuzzy Genes: Epistemic Tensions in Genomics

Genomics contributed to making modern biology a prolific multi-disciplinary field leading to new approaches such as systems biology. Reporting in the media reflects the high stakes involved in these changes, but such reporting often appears inconsistent as contradictory claims are made about new applications contrasting with uncertainties from new insights. Such inconsistent claims might relate to different disciplines involved in the field. New approaches from engineering disciplines such as computer science have changed research practices and approaches towards the object; the meaning of genes having become context-dependent. Since disciplines must cooperate, tensions arise over methods, evidence criteria and the significance of hypotheses. The concept of epistemic cultures, developed to highlight differences between distant fields such as high-energy physics and molecular biology, can render insights into the ‘cultures’ related to practices and approaches within genomics. Qualitative interviews with scientists shed light on how computer science and experimental molecular biology co-operate and which problems arise from epistemic differences as the criteria for relevant findings become subject to the disciplinary context. In addition, genomics-like approaches have entered other fields of biological research, whilst systems biology further challenges hypothesis-driven experimentation. This may lead to a new epistemic culture differing from the one previously described. These findings provide insights into how different accounts arise and shed light on general properties of prolific multi-disciplinary research fields. Inconsistencies in the way such fields appear from outside might be considered normal rather than the exception.