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111.
Tuomas E. Tahko 《Metaphilosophy》2014,45(2):257-269
In formal ontology, infinite regresses are generally considered a bad sign. One debate where such regresses come into play is the debate about fundamentality. Arguments in favour of some type of fundamentalism are many, but they generally share the idea that infinite chains of ontological dependence must be ruled out. Some motivations for this view are assessed in this article, with the conclusion that such infinite chains may not always be vicious. Indeed, there may even be room for a type of fundamentalism combined with infinite descent as long as this descent is “boring,” that is, the same structure repeats ad infinitum. A start is made in the article towards a systematic account of this type of infinite descent. The philosophical prospects and scientific tenability of the account are briefly evaluated using an example from physics. 相似文献
112.
113.
Seth Oppong 《Journal of Psychology in Africa》2013,23(4):292-300
In African countries, psychology as it is taught, researched, and practised contributes to epistemic injustice and epistemological violence while depriving Africans of epistemic agency. This is largely because psychology has remained and continues to remain Eurocentric. However, the continual Eurocentric hegemony is not entirely imposed but internalised. This has made this Eurocentric hegemony self-perpetuating with African involvement. In this paper, the sources of this hegemony are explored with a view to identifying how Africans themselves contribute to the persistence of these academic “ills”. Furthermore, processes are examined through which African psychologists can disentangle themselves from this vicious cycle in order to make accurate and innovative contributions to the global understanding of human nature. Nsamenang’s pioneering role in confronting the wrongs is discussed, paving the way for the next generation of African psychologists to make contributions that are similar to, or surpass, Nsamenang’s lifetime contributions. I conclude by making some recommendations as to the way forward in the post-Nsamenang era. 相似文献
114.
Helge Torgersen 《Science as culture》2013,22(1):65-87
Genomics contributed to making modern biology a prolific multi-disciplinary field leading to new approaches such as systems biology. Reporting in the media reflects the high stakes involved in these changes, but such reporting often appears inconsistent as contradictory claims are made about new applications contrasting with uncertainties from new insights. Such inconsistent claims might relate to different disciplines involved in the field. New approaches from engineering disciplines such as computer science have changed research practices and approaches towards the object; the meaning of genes having become context-dependent. Since disciplines must cooperate, tensions arise over methods, evidence criteria and the significance of hypotheses. The concept of epistemic cultures, developed to highlight differences between distant fields such as high-energy physics and molecular biology, can render insights into the ‘cultures’ related to practices and approaches within genomics. Qualitative interviews with scientists shed light on how computer science and experimental molecular biology co-operate and which problems arise from epistemic differences as the criteria for relevant findings become subject to the disciplinary context. In addition, genomics-like approaches have entered other fields of biological research, whilst systems biology further challenges hypothesis-driven experimentation. This may lead to a new epistemic culture differing from the one previously described. These findings provide insights into how different accounts arise and shed light on general properties of prolific multi-disciplinary research fields. Inconsistencies in the way such fields appear from outside might be considered normal rather than the exception. 相似文献
115.
Theodore Kisiel 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):185-208
Abstract 1 This paper makes a preliminary case for a central and radical claim. I begin with Bernard Williams’ seldom-faced argument that integrity cannot be a moral virtue because it lacks two key ingredients of moral virtues, namely a characteristic thought and motivation. Whereas, for example, generosity involves the thought that another could use assistance, and the motivation to actually give assistance, integrity lacks these two things essential to morally excellent responses. I show that several maneuvers aimed at avoiding Williams’ challenge fail and that others are likely to remain unpersuasive. The paper concludes by offering an argument to the best explanation: Williams’ important insight is best explained by the supposition that integrity is an epistemic virtue, and an epistemic virtue of a practical sort. 相似文献
116.
George Botterill 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):139-160
Abstract There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of:
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Dreams are experiences we have during sleep.
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Dream‐experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences.
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We can tell that we are awake.
117.
Carl B. Sachs 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):562-565
ABSTRACTThis article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan. 相似文献
118.
Byeong D. Lee 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):528-543
ABSTRACTAccording to the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts, we can understand concepts in terms of norms or rules that bind those who apply them, and the application of a concept requires that the concept-user be sensitive to the norms governing its application. But this view faces some serious objections. In particular, according to Rosen, Glüer and Wikforss, this view leads to a vicious regress of norms. The purpose of this paper is to defend a version of the Kantian-Brandomian view of concepts against this objection. I argue that we can deal with this problem along the lines of a coherentist account of justification. 相似文献
119.
Michael Kober 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):365-381
Abstract Epistemic and moral certainities like ‘This is a hand’ or ‘Killing people is evil’ will be interpreted as constitutive rules of language games, such that they are unjustifiable, undeniable and serving as obliging standards of truth, goodness and rationality for members of a community engaging in the respective practices. 相似文献
120.
Javier González de Prado Salas 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(7):755-778
Several authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents. In this paper, I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence (plus the antecedent of the conditional). More specifically, my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes (in a similar way that knowledge claims are sensitive to practical stakes). 相似文献