A strategy for assessing closure

This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed.     

对我国《人体器官移植条例》的伦理审视

《人体器官移植条例》已经颁布实施,人体器官移植是一种公认的涉及敏感伦理问题的外科手术。通过分析《条例》是否充分体现了国际通行的生命/医学伦理原则,研究了人体器官移植进行进一步伦理规范的必要性,提出了人体器官移植应遵循的具体医学伦理原则。特别强调了其中的"公正"实体原则和"伦理审查"程序原则。     

PHILOSOPHERS OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: A TAXONOMY

Abstract: This essay explores various roles that philosophers occupy in relation to intellectual disability. In examining how philosophers define their object of inquiry as experts and gatekeepers, it raises critical questions concerning the nature of philosophical discourse about intellectual disability. It then goes on to consider three alternate positions, the advocate or friend, the animal, and the "intellectually disabled," each of which points to new ways of philosophizing in the face of intellectual disability.     

"必要伤害"作为生态伦理规范的合理性

"必要伤害"是在对不伤害原则理论缺陷的反思、挖掘和借鉴西方生态伦理学有关解决人与自然矛盾和冲突的伦理思想的基础上,提出的新的道德规范原则。它包括:人类为了自身的利益对自然界不得不做出的损害;人类为了自然的完整和稳定不得不对自身的权利做出让步、节制而造成的损害。"必要伤害"原则的提出,既丰富和完善生态伦理学的道德原则体系,又为人们的生态道德实践提供了有效的行为指导。     

Developing operating principles for systems change

Based on an analysis of the articles in this special issue, the authors propose five operating principles for systems change work. These principles are: clarifying the purpose of the systems change; identifying whether the change is one to an existing system or the change is to create a new system; conceptualize the work as systems change from the beginning; use an eclectic approach; and be open to opportunities that emerge while also undertaking forma analysis to identify leverage points. The authors argue that the time is now ripe to develop such principles and encourage community change agents to engage in a dialogue to explore, revise, eliminate or expand on these principles.     

Are There Any Rules?

The ``model of rules' that Ronald Dworkin attacks is an absurdmodel of law, if rules are taken to be standards that have nounspecified counterinstances, and whose application isalways uncontroversial. Dworkin gives good reason to thinkthat there are no such standards or virtually none in (e.g.)English law. But the model of rules is not misconceived, asDworkin claims. Rather, it needs a better understanding of the idea of a rule. I argue that the view that the law of a community is a system of rules needs to meet an importantchallenge that Dworkin has raised for jurisprudence: to accountfor the fact that legal rights and duties are frequentlycontroversial. I give an account of social rules thatexplains why controversy over their application in particularcases is common, and can be deep. So controversy gives noreason to reject the model of rules.     

大众与个人审美品位的认知与神经机制

大众与个人的审美品位分别代表了审美活动在个体间的一致性和差异性。将大众品位和个人品位相结合的新趋势正在挑战传统的"普遍性"审美法则,并日益凸显审美反应的个体差异。存在诸多因素可以调节大众和个人审美品位的相对比例,包括刺激类型、专业性、文化背景、先前经验和年龄等。大众与个人审美品位的神经机制中,奖赏系统和默认模式网络扮演重要角色。目前,审美品位与审美加工模型的理论关系有待进一步厘清和验证。未来相关研究可以在拓展审美对象领域、完善大众与个人审美品位与不同审美加工阶段的对应关系等方向上继续开展。     

An Unfinished Debate: What Are the Aims of Religion and Science?

I discuss the kinds of fundamental questions that must be addressed by people who develop theories about how religion and science are (or should be) related. After categorizing these questions as axiological, epistemological, ontological, or semantic, I focus on those that concern the goals of religion and science (the axiological issues). By distinguishing between epistemic and practical goals, individual and collective goals, and manifest and latent goals, I identify seven axiological questions. The various answers that religion/science theorists give or presuppose to these axiological questions help to explain why such deep, ongoing differences continue among them.