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51.
Peter Gärdenfors has developed a semantics for conditional logic, based on the operations of expansion and revision applied to states of information. The account amounts to a formalisation of the Ramsey test for conditionals. A conditional A > B is declared accepted in a state of information K if B is accepted in the state of information which is the result of revising K with respect to A. While Gärdenfors's account takes the truth-functional part of the logic as given, the present paper proposes a semantics entirely based on epistemic states and operations on these states. The semantics is accompanied by a syntactic treatment of conditional logic which is formally similar to Gentzen's sequent formulation of natural deduction rules. Three of David Lewis's systems of conditional logic are represented. The formulations are attractive by virtue of their transparency and simplicity. 相似文献
52.
Jonathan E. Adler 《Argumentation》2004,18(3):279-293
Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the “dialectical tier“ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson 's dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a social-epistemic activity. 相似文献
53.
Polycarp Ikuenobe 《Argumentation》2004,18(2):189-211
I argue in a non-reductive sense for a plausible epistemic principle, which can (1) theoretically and instrumentally unify or systematize all fallacies, and (2) provide a justification for using such a principle for characterizing an erroneous argument as a fallacy. This plausible epistemic principle involves the idea of an error in the method of justification, which results in a failure to provide relevant evidence to satisfy certain standards of adequate proof. Thus, all fallacies are systematically disguised failures to provide substantive proof: a failure in the attempt to persuade rationally, as opposed to emotionally or rhetorically. I argue that the epistemic idea of begging the question is essential to this idea of a fallacy as an inadequate proof. 相似文献
54.
Pekka Väyrynen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2004,7(1):53-79
This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at
a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I
first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims
won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent
distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot
therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons
by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not
a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify
the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion,
and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’. 相似文献
55.
ZHANG Lifeng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2012,7(1):164
Plantinga’s conception of possible worlds is problematic in one sense: it relies on the prior idea of modality. His strategy for resolving the puzzle of transworld identity is significant in the metaphysical sense but fruitless in the epistemological sense because world-indexed properties cannot be used as effectively in epistemic practice as their counterparts, i.e., space- and time-indexed properties. His isolation of transworld identification from transworld identity is unconvincing. This paper argues that the intelligibility of modal discourse and reference is the essence of transworld identity. It is also proved that transworld identification is the epistemic ground of such intelligibility. Hence, the transworld identification problem is the epistemological foundation of the transworld identity problem, and there must be a comprehensive answer to the former. 相似文献
56.
FAN Ruiping 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2018,13(2):207
This essay provides a few critical points of view on Ni Peimin’s recent English translation of the Analects. It shows that his translations of ren into “human-heartedness” and of li into “ritual propriety” may indicate a willingness to recast these Confucian concepts in the modern ideology of western subjectivism or individualism, whereas Confucianism is not in the direction of such ideologies. Moreover, while Ni seems to offer a “no-rule” view of Confucian virtue ethics, he cannot deny the existence of moral rules and principles in the Confucian system. It is insufficient for him to emphasize the importance of Confucian “instructions” or “methods” as he does without explicating their relations to Confucian rules. Additionally, Ni’s gongfu Confucianism provides a necessary and healthy step back from the contemporary principlism that has been dominant and popular in contemporary politics, ethics, and applied ethics, but Ni goes too far in denying the importance of the moral rules and principles that are implicit or explicit in the Confucian ritual practices and upheld in Confucius’s Analects. 相似文献
57.
Samir Chopra Aditya Ghose Thomas Meyer Ka-Shu Wong 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(5):501-520
The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy.
We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and
present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection
between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem that connects the semantic conditions
we impose on iterated revision and our additional syntactical properties. We show interesting similarities between our framework
and that of Darwiche–Pearl (Artificial Intelligence 89:1–29 1997). In particular, we show that intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are captured by the recovery axiom and
our recovery-like postulates (the latter can be seen as weakenings of (C2)). We present postulates for contraction, in the
same spirit as the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for revision, and provide a theorem that connects our syntactic postulates with
a set of semantic conditions. Lastly, we show a connection between the contraction postulates and a generalisation of the
recovery axiom.
Portions of this paper were originally presented at ECAI 2002. 相似文献
58.
Fatima Agha Al‐Hayani 《Zygon》2008,43(4):783-795
In Islam, the acquisition of knowledge is a form of worship. But human achievement must be exercised in conformity with God's will. Warnings against feelings of superiority often are coupled with the command to remain within the confines of God's laws and limits. Because of the fear of arrogance and disregard of the balance created by God, any new knowledge or discovery must be applied with careful consideration to maintaining balance in the creation. Knowledge must be applied to ascertain equity and justice for all of humanity. Research in Islam must be linked to the broad ethical base set forth in the Qur'an and the Sunnah. Whether embryonic stem cell research or cloning is ethically acceptable in Islam depends on the benefits derived from such applications. What is most important for the scholars is to adhere to the concepts of compassion, mercy, and benefit to everyone. 相似文献
59.
Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">My Way</Emphasis> 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
John Perry 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):157-166
My aim in this study is not to praise Fischer's fine theory of moral responsibility, but to (try to) bury the “semi” in “semicompatibilism”.
I think Fischer gives the Consequence Argument (CA) too much credit, and gives himself too little credit. In his book, The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer gave the CA as good a statement as it will ever get, and put his finger on what is wrong with it. Then he declared
stalemate rather than victory. In my view, Fischer’s view amounts to sophisticated compatibilism. It would be nice to be able
to call it by its right name. In The Metaphysics of Free Will, Fischer develops his own version of Consequence Argument, which turns on two principles, one of which is the fixity of the
past. FP: For any action Y, agent S and time t, if it is true that is S were to do Y at t, some fact about that past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y at t. I argue that the equipment needed to reject FP (and thereby defend the most plausible version of compatibilism) is needed
to deal with the problem of fatalism. In addition, I argue that the rejection of FP is compatible with Fischer’s approach
to Frankfurt cases and with his account of transfer principles. 相似文献
60.
KELLY BECKER 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(5):691-704
Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to reliabilism. 相似文献