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181.
182.
This study compared 2- to 4-year-olds who understand how counting works (cardinal-principle-knowers) to those who do not (subset-knowers), in order to better characterize the knowledge itself. New results are that (1) Many children answer the question "how many" with the last word used in counting, despite not understanding how counting works; (2) Only children who have mastered the cardinal principle, or are just short of doing so, understand that adding objects to a set means moving forward in the numeral list whereas subtracting objects mean going backward; and finally (3) Only cardinal-principle-knowers understand that adding exactly 1 object to a set means moving forward exactly 1 word in the list, whereas subset-knowers do not understand the unit of change. 相似文献
183.
刘剑 《医学与哲学(人文社会医学版)》2008,29(2):15-18
生命伦理学所追求的,是在基本原则指导下建构一个程序规则,让各种理论和价值观获得平等对话和合作的机会。必须充分尊重中国文化传统和社会现实,谨慎而合理的利用西方生命伦理资源。同时,也要意识到生命伦理学的发展所呈现给我们的是鲜活的伦理生活和问题,隐含在问题背后的对生命本身的价值思考,将逐渐展现出其理论趋向和可行的道德规则。 相似文献
184.
Linton Wang 《Synthese》2008,162(1):133-156
The interest of epistemic comparative conditionals comes from the fact that they represent genuine ‘comparative epistemic
relations’ between propositions, situations, evidences, abilities, interests, etc. This paper argues that various types of
epistemic comparative conditionals uniformly represent comparative epistemic relations via the comparison of epistemic positions
rather than the comparison of epistemic standards. This consequence is considered as a general constraint on a theory of knowledge
attribution, and then further used to argue against the contextualist thesis that, in some cases, considering a new counter-
possibility can raise the epistemic standard of knowledge attribution. Instead, the paper shows that considering a new counter-possibility
can only lower the epistemic position of a putative knower. Moreover, since the comparison, by the nature of conditionals,
is free from any commitment to the truth-values of specific knowledge attributions, my conclusion is free from the debate
between contextualism and invariantism on whether the truth-value of a knowledge attribution can actually vary with context. 相似文献
185.
Bryan Renne 《Synthese》2008,165(2):225-245
Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL) is the study of how to reason about knowledge, belief, and communication. This paper studies
the relative expressivity of certain fragments of the DEL language for public and private communication. It is shown that
the language of public communication with common knowledge and the language of private communication with common knowledge
are expressively incomparable for the class of all pointed Kripke models, which provides a formal proof that public and private
communication are fundamentally different in the presence of common knowledge. It is also shown that single-recipient private
communication does not add expressive power to the language of modal logic with common knowledge for any class of transitive pointed Kripke models. The latter result provides a sense in which positive introspection—believing our own beliefs—induces
a kind of self-dialog. 相似文献
186.
关系补救是当一种侵犯行为导致关系中的正面状态消失、负面状态出现时, 由一方、双方或第三方做出并使关系恢复到积极状态的一系列行为集合。现有研究主要集中在垂直关系补救与个体-组织关系补救方面。垂直关系补救分为挑战、提供、接受、感激四个阶段, 应根据关系违背类型和文化类型权变性地选择补救策略。个体-组织关系补救的潜在机制为信任展示机制和不信任的约束机制, 应根据一致性原则, 进行系统性与动态性的关系补救。未来的研究可以基于嵌入视角提炼工具变量, 并进行跨层次多要素协同整合分析, 推进本土化的实证研究。 相似文献
187.
Brian Ribeiro 《Metaphilosophy》2004,35(5):714-732
Abstract: Recent literature on skepticism has raised a nearly univocal voice in condemning skeptical argumentation on the grounds that such argumentation necessarily involves our adopting some nonordinary or unnatural perspective. Were this really so, then skeptical conclusions would not speak to us in the way in which skeptics think they do; we would be “insulated” from any such conclusions. I argue that skeptical argumentation need not rely on any nonordinary or unnatural standards. Rather, the skeptic's procedure is to offer a critique from within. Having given my argument for this claim (which I call the Continuity Argument), I consider and respond to two important objections. I conclude that the skeptic has a powerful meta‐argument to be deployed in defending the legitimacy of his skeptical conclusions against the slings and arrows of (those I call) the half‐true theorists. 相似文献
188.
Philip Percival 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):29-47
Pace Zagzebski, there is no route from the value of knowledge to a non–reliabilist virtue–theoretic epistemology. Her discussion of the value problem is marred by an uncritical and confused employment of the notion of a "state" of knowledge, an uncritical acceptance of a "knowledge–belief" identity thesis, and an incoherent presumption that the widely held thought that knowledge is more valuable than true belief amounts to the view that knowledge is a state of true belief having an intrinsic property which a state of 'mere" true belief lacks. Her arguments against a "machine–product" conception of knowledge are undermined by these flaws, while the alternative "agent–act" model she recommends is unattractive, at odds with the knowledge–belief identity thesis she favours, and no solution to the problem of the value of knowledge she poses. I end with the observation that her version of virtue–theoretic epistemology points in the direction of cognitive decision–theoretic norms, and I briefly discuss the bearing of this fact upon her viewpoint. 相似文献
189.
Juli Eflin 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1&2):48-68
Traditional epistemology has, in the main, presupposed that the primary task is to give a complete account of the concept knowledge and to state under what conditions it is possible to have it. In so doing, most accounts have been hierarchical, and all assume an idealized knower. The assumption of an idealized knower is essential for the traditional goal of generating an unassailable account of knowledge acquisition. Yet we, as individuals, fail to reach the ideal. Perhaps more important, we have epistemic goals not addressed in the traditional approach – among them, the ability to reach understanding in areas we deem important for our lives. Understanding is an epistemic concept. But how we obtain it has not traditionally been a focus. Developing an epistemic account that starts from a set of assumptions that differ from the traditional starting points will allow a different sort of epistemic theory, one on which generating understanding is a central goal and the idealized knower is replaced with an inquirer who is not merely fallible but working from a particular context with particular goals. Insight into how an epistemic account can include the particular concerns of an embedded inquirer can be found by examining the parallels between ethics and epistemology and, in particular, by examining the structure and starting points of virtue accounts. Here I develop several interrelated issues that contrast the goals and evaluative concepts that form the structure of both standard, traditional epistemological and ethical theories and virtue–centered theories. In the end, I sketch a virtue–centered epistemology that accords with who we are and how we gain understanding. 相似文献
190.
Sound and complete axiomatizations are provided for a number of different logics involving modalities for the knowledge of multiple agents and operators for branching time, extending previous work of Halpern, van der Meyden and Vardi [to appear, SIAM Journal on Computing] for logics of knowledge and linear time. The paper considers the system constraints of synchrony, perfect recall and unique initial states, which give rise to interaction axioms. The language is based on the temporal logic CTL*, interpreted with respect to a version of the bundle semantics. 相似文献