Hexagram 4 of the I Ching: Analytical Psychology and Jung's Developmental Process

Theories, as well as history itself, are subject to their archetypal underpinnings, as well as to synchronicity, cyclic and sequential change. Some of Jung's early life experiences, his theories, and their permutations in his followers are considered in relation to Hexagram 4 of the I-Ching.
Jung's infantile wounds, his lack of adequately mirroring and metabolizing parents gave rise to a Puer Aeternus complex. This complex is explored as it is brought out through the lines of Hexagram 4 in the I-Ching. The complex is considered as pertinent to some problematical parts of Jung's theory and its impact on analytic history and behavior. Jung's genius and adaptive healing use of the building blocks of this complex are also discussed.
It is proposed that the descendants of Freud and Jung internalize the problems of their forefathers in much the same way that patients internalize the problems of their parents. Particular theories suggest similar personal affinities (and even histories) in their followers. Jung's childhood problems are considered for the way they may reverberate in Jungian practice today.     

Book reviews

Ulanov, Ann & Barry., Transforming Sexuality. The Archetypal World of Anima and Animus.
Ulanov, Ann Belford., The Functioning Transcendent: A Study in Analytical Psychology.
Von Franz, Marie-Louise., Archetypische Dimensionen der Seele. [Archetypal Dimensions of the Soul.]
Stevens, Anthony & Price, John., Evolutionary Psychiatry: A New Beginning.
Field, Nathan., Breakdown and Breakthrough: Psychotherapy in a New Dimension.
Tacey, David J., Remaking Men: Jung, Spirituality and Social Change.
Lopez-Pedraza, Rafael., Anselm Kiefer: 'After the Catastrophe'.
Diamond, Stephen A., Anger, Madness and the Daimonic: The Psychological Genesis of Violence, Evil and Creativity.     

Casuistry and Principlism: The Convergence of Method in Biomedical Ethics

Casuistry and principlism are two of the leading contenders to be considered the methodology of bioethics. These methods may be incommensurable since the former emphasizes the examination of cases while the latter focuses on moral principles. Conversely, since both analyze cases in terms of mid-level principles, there is hope that these methods may be reconcilable or complementary. I analyze the role of principles in each and thereby show that these theories are virtually identical when interpreted in a certain light. That is, if the gaps in each method are filled by a concept of judgment or Aristotelian practical wisdom, these methods converge.     

COLLECTIVE RELIGIO‐SCIENTIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON ISLAM AND HIV/AIDS: I. BIOMEDICAL SCIENTISTS

During the 1990s, biomedical scientists and Muslim religious scholars collaborated to construe Islamic responses for the ethical questions raised by the AIDS pandemic. This is the first of a two‐part study examining this collective legal reasoning (ijtihād jamā‘ī). The main thesis is that the role of the biomedical scientists is not limited to presenting scientific information. They engaged in the human rights discourse pertinent to people living with HIV/AIDS, gave an account of the preventive strategy adopted by the World Health Organization, and offered an (Islamic) virtue‐based preventive model. Finally, these scientists tried to draft a number of Islamic legal rulings (a?kām), usually seen in Islamic jurisprudence as the exclusive business of Muslim religious scholars. This multilayered role played by the scientists reflects intriguing developments in the Islamic religio‐ethical discourse in general and in the field of Islamic jurisprudence in particular.     

A new puzzle about belief and credence

I present a puzzle about belief and credence, which takes the form of three independently supported views that are mutually inconsistent. The first is the view that S has a modal belief that p (e.g., S believes that probably-p) if and only if S has a corresponding credence that p. The second is the view that S believes that p only if S has some credence that p. The third is the view that, possibly, S believes that p without a modal belief that p. [Word Count: 85]     

Critical Thinking is Epistemically Responsible

Michael Huemer ( 2005 ) argues that following the epistemic strategy of Critical Thinking—that is, thinking things through for oneself—leaves the agent epistemically either worse off or no better off than an alternative strategy of Credulity—that is, trusting the authorities. Therefore, Critical Thinking is not epistemically responsible. This article argues that Reasonable Credulity entails Critical Thinking, and since Reasonable Credulity is epistemically responsible, the Critical Thinking that it entails is epistemically responsible too.     

Promising,Expecting, and Utility

While openmindedness is often cited as a paradigmatic example of an intellectual virtue, the connection between openmindedness and truth is tenuous. Several strategies for reconciling this tension are considered, and each is shown to fail; it is thus claimed that openmindedness, when intellectually virtuous, bears no interesting essential connection to truth. In the final section, the implication of this result is assessed in the wider context of debates about epistemic value.     

VALUES IN SCIENCE

Abstract In this essay, which was his presidential address to the Philosophy of Science Association, Ernan McMullin argued that the watershed between “classic” philosophy of science (by this meaning, not just logical positivism but the logicist tradition in theory of science stretching back through Kant and Descartes to Aristotle) and the “new” philosophy of science can best be understood by analyzing the change in our perception of the role played by values in science. He begins with some general remarks about the nature of value, goes on to explore some of the historical sources for the claim that judgement in science is value‐laden, and concludes by reflecting on the implications of this claim for traditional views of the objectivity of scientific knowledge‐claims.     

Knowing failably and Moorean assertions

Knowledge-fallibilism is a species of a genus that I call knowledge-failabilism. Each is a theory of knowledge's nature. One apparent challenge to knowledge-failabilism's truth is the prima facie absurdity of Moorean assertions like ‘It's raining but I do not believe that it is.’ Does each such assertion convey an implicit and unfortunate contrast, even a contradiction? I argue that this Untenable Contrast analysis fails: no such contrast is present within the speaker's perspective at the pertinent time.     

Infinite Epistemic Regresses and Internalism

This article seeks to state, first, what traditionally has been assumed must be the case in order for an infinite epistemic regress to arise. It identifies three assumptions. Next it discusses Jeanne Peijnenburg's and David Atkinson's setting up of their argument for the claim that some infinite epistemic regresses can actually be completed and hence that, in addition to foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism, there is yet another solution (if only a partial one) to the traditional epistemic regress problem. The article argues that Peijnenburg and Atkinson fail to address the traditional regress problem, as they don't adopt all of the three assumptions that underlie the traditional regress problem. It also points to a problem in the notion of making probable that Peijnenburg and Atkinson use in their account of justification.