On Classification of Scientific Revolutions

The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many. The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary (the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Ethics in Long-Term Care: Are the Principles Different?

It has become common in medical ethics to discuss difficult cases in terms of the principles of respect for autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. These moral concepts or principles serve as maxims that are suggestive of appropriate clinical behavior. Because this language evolved primarily in the acute care setting, I consider whether it is in need of supplementation in order to be useful in the long-term care setting. Through analysis of two typical cases involving residents of long-term care facilities, I argue for the additional principles of candor and responsibility for narrative integrity.     

The role of examples in moral philosophy

Contemporary moral philosophy for the most part relegates examples to a negative role, as counter-examples. In this essay a view is articulated according to which the example has a much more positive and more fundamental role to play in the argumentation of moral philosophy: according to this view, examples may provide grounding for general moral principles. Some of the philosophical implications or presuppositions of such a view of examples are examined.     

Scepticism and Ordinary Epistemic Practice

It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.

The Undecidability of Iterated Modal Relativization

In dynamic epistemic logic and other fields, it is natural to consider relativization as an operator taking sentences to sentences. When using the ideas and methods of dynamic logic, one would like to iterate operators. This leads to iterated relativization. We are also concerned with the transitive closure operation, due to its connection to common knowledge. We show that for three fragments of the logic of iterated relativization and transitive closure, the satisfiability problems are fi1 ¹₁–complete. Two of these fragments do not include transitive closure. We also show that the question of whether a sentence in these fragments has a finite (tree) model is fi0 ⁰₁–complete. These results go via reduction to problems concerning domino systems.     

Therapist + Social Media = Mental health influencer? Considering the research focusing upon key ethical issues around the use of social media by therapists

Current ethical guidelines for therapists who make use of social media are very limited. As a consequence, they leave much open to interpretation by professionals, an openness that may place the public and professionals at risk. This is particularly of note as therapists are increasingly making use of social media and many professionals are taking on roles as mental health influencers, both purposefully and without realising. Such developments raise many important ethical issues including considerations around influencer competency, integrity, the maintenance of confidentiality and risk management. These issues are briefly discussed in this paper alongside related current research focusing upon them. It is concluded that, despite the existence of ethical guidelines focusing upon social media use by therapists, current research suggests that therapists are not consistently following these guidelines. Moreover, it is argued that researchers and professional bodies, and their associated good practice guidelines, need to keep abreast of new developments to account for changes in social media usage.     

Cognitive colonialism: Nationality bias in Brazilian academic philosophy

This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to test for nationality bias among members of the Brazilian philosophical community. Faculty members and postgraduate students from philosophy departments at seven Brazilian universities evaluated texts attributed to authors of European and Latin American nationalities. Results showed a clear preference for French nationality over Brazilian. They were inconclusive, however, when contrasting other Latin American nationalities with European nationalities, which likely relates to the academic background of the participants. These overall results support the claim that Brazilian academic philosophers are highly critical of Brazilians who produce theories of their own. The paper calls on philosophers to carefully consider the ways in which Eurocentrism impacts their very ability to reason.     

On critical African philosophy: Mapping the boundaries of a good philosophical tradition

This essay deploys the existence of epistemic vices in the trajectory of Western philosophy to map the erasures and complicities that accompanied the emergence of contemporary African philosophy (CAP₁). It argues that the complicity of CAP₁ in the hyperspecialization and academic self-absorption that marked the professionalization of Western philosophy, makes it difficult to attend to the conditions for its own possibility. CAP₁ arguably needs to make a critical turn into critical African philosophy (CAP₂), understood as a metatheoretical and metaphilosophical framework for an internal transformation that is emancipatory. CAP₂ is envisioned, first, as a critique of postcoloniality that rehumanizes the autonomous African subject; and, second, as an ethicopolitical project that explores the cracks between philosophy as theoretical practice and philosophy as praxis in opening up the spaces for postcolonial emancipation. The essay identifies three conditions that instigate the emancipatory possibility of philosophizing on the continent: the spatial/platial, demosophic, and political.     

Philosophers ought to develop,theorize about,and use philosophically relevant AI

The transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is coming to philosophy—the only question is the degree to which philosophers will harness it. This paper argues that the application of AI tools to philosophy could have an impact on the field comparable to the advent of writing, and that it is likely that philosophical progress will significantly increase as a consequence of AI. The role of philosophers in this story is not merely to use AI but also to help develop it and theorize about it. In fact, the paper argues that philosophers have a prima facie obligation to spend significant effort in doing so, at least insofar as they should spend effort philosophizing.