What we talk about when we talk about epistemic justification

Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing.     

Cohen on ‘Epistemic’

Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper is that normativity is what’s hard to understand, not the term ‘epistemic.’     

Why so curious? Validation and cross‐cultural investigation of the Hindi Epistemic Curiosity Scale

Epistemic curiosity (EC) is the motive and need to seek knowledge. The present work entails validation of the English EC Scale translated into the Hindi language. Study 1 comprised confirmatory factor analysis of the Hindi scale using a sample of 223 bilingual Indians (143 females). The 10‐item two‐factor structure with Interest and Deprivation subscales was validated for the Hindi EC Scale. Convergent and discriminant validity was established, and model fits were assessed separately for males and females, along with measurement invariance testing. In Study 2, linguistic invariance testing and cross‐cultural comparisons were undertaken for a sample of 151 Indians (93 females) and 219 Americans (179 females) for the EC scales, to assess similarities in the underlying factor structure. Indians did not differ from Americans in their responses to the English EC Scale, but slight differences were observed for the Hindi EC Scale, suggesting an interplay of language and culture. Further, independent t tests compared the two samples on measures of curiosity, gossip, personality, and affect. Americans had a higher tendency toward interpersonal curiosity and agreeableness whereas Indians scored higher on intellect. Cross‐cultural and linguistic differences as well as future work are presented. In sum, the Hindi EC Scale is a valid and reliable instrument that can facilitate further translations into other Indian languages.     

扎根理论的运用：误区与策略

扎根理论在多学科研究中呈上升趋势,但运用误区和难点制约着研究质量。基于扎根理论的核心原则剖析常见的运用误区：忽视理论生成、将系统方法论窄化为编码程序、将理论抽样混同为目的性抽样或初始抽样;将理论等同于数据;重机械编码轻备忘录写作和持续比较。总结理论抽样、理论、适宜编码、备忘录撰写和持续比较的具体策略。最后提出扎根理论运用研究应秉承扎根、融合创新,注重系统性、规范性和灵活性。     

Semantic and Moral Luck

The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either.     

The Price of a Piece of Cheese: Value from Fit Between Epistemic Needs and a Learning Versus an Outcome Focus

In decision making, people can focus on decisional outcomes (outcome focus), but they can also focus on gaining knowledge about the decisional domain (learning focus). Furthermore, people differ in the strength of their epistemic needs—their preference for developing a rich and accurate understanding of the world. We invoke the regulatory fit theory to predict that higher epistemic needs better fit a learning focus than lower epistemic needs, resulting in a greater increase in valuation of the chosen option when a learning rather than an outcome focus is induced. This general hypothesis was tested and supported in three studies, each focusing on a different proxy to epistemic needs. Thus, individuals experienced greater value when they had lower expertise (Study 1), higher need for assessment (Study 2), and higher need for cognition (Study 3) when a learning rather than an outcome focus was induced. Implications for work on epistemic needs, regulatory fit theory, and decision‐making practice are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The knowledge-learning-instruction framework: bridging the science-practice chasm to enhance robust student learning

Despite the accumulation of substantial cognitive science research relevant to education, there remains confusion and controversy in the application of research to educational practice. In support of a more systematic approach, we describe the Knowledge-Learning-Instruction (KLI) framework. KLI promotes the emergence of instructional principles of high potential for generality, while explicitly identifying constraints of and opportunities for detailed analysis of the knowledge students may acquire in courses. Drawing on research across domains of science, math, and language learning, we illustrate the analyses of knowledge, learning, and instructional events that the KLI framework affords. We present a set of three coordinated taxonomies of knowledge, learning, and instruction. For example, we identify three broad classes of learning events (LEs): (a) memory and fluency processes, (b) induction and refinement processes, and (c) understanding and sense-making processes, and we show how these can lead to different knowledge changes and constraints on optimal instructional choices.     

胡方平《易学启蒙通释》刍议

胡方平是宋末元初传承朱熹易学的重要人物,所著《易学启蒙通释》是对朱子《易学启蒙》诠释之作,又是一部阐述象数的义理著作,其中阐发了阳尊阴卑、阴阳交易变易和理之所必同的思想,体现了胡方平以朱子易学为宗、突出象数中义理思想的易学特点。胡方平易学对朱子易学起着正本清源的作用,推动了中国易学的发展,是易学史上不可或缺的发展环节,占有重要的地位。     

Which Scientificity for the social Sciences?

Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, the epistemology of social sciences has oscillated from aiming at the classical model of scientificity to emphasizing its own specificities. We argue here that the existence of unambiguous, well defined objects has allowed discoveries and cumulativity in the natural sciences. Whereas, in the social sciences, the term is most often used in a metaphorical meaning, as it represents a basically fluid and changing reality. Its apprehension partly depends on the emotional/intellectual identity of the researcher, which makes it difficult to achieve a full consensus. Yet, beside real, natural or created objects, we do find structures, regularities and objectivations in society.