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91.
Julia Driver 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(3):367-383
Abstract: Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to distinguish them at the level of good produced. It follows from this that a consequentialist account is best placed to avoid a conflation of moral and epistemic virtue. 相似文献
92.
《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(3):387-396
Books reviewed:
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
93.
Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
94.
Fernando Raymundo Velázquez-Quesada 《Synthese》2009,169(2):283-300
We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference
is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand,
is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving
us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the
logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together.
We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and
mention how the work can be extended. 相似文献
95.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
96.
David Hitchcock 《Argumentation》1992,6(2):251-270
Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation. Causal relevance consists in an item's ability to help produce an outcome in a situation. Epistemic relevance, a distinct concept, consists in the ability of a piece of information (or a speech act communicating or requesting a piece of information) to help achieve an epistemic goal in a situation. It has this ability when it can be ineliminably combined with other at least potentially accurate information to achieve the goal. The relevance of a conversational contribution, premiss relevance and conclusion relevance are species of epistemic relevance thus defined. The conception of premiss relevance which results provides a basis for determining when the various arguments ad called fallacies of relevance are indeed irrelevant. In particular, an ad verecundiam appeal is irrelevant if the authority cited lacks expertise in a cognitive domain to which the conclusion belongs, the authority does not exercise its expertise in coming to endorse the conclusion, or the conclusion does not belong to a cognitive domain; otherwise the ad verecundiam is relevant. 相似文献
97.
Ladislav Kvasz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):201-232
The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems
to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many.
The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and
to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during
the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of
considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we
define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility
to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we
call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification
of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary
(the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions
to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
98.
99.
Stephen Hetherington 《Philosophia》2006,34(3):303-310
It is not unusual for epistemologists to argue that ordinary epistemic practice is a setting within which (infallibilist) scepticism will not arise. Such scepticism is deemed to be an alien invader, impugning such epistemic practice entirely from without. But this paper argues that the suggested sort of analysis overstates the extent to which ordinary epistemic practice is antipathetic to some vital aspects of such sceptical thinking. The paper describes how a gradualist analysis of knowledge can do more justice to what sceptics seek to achieve – while also showing how sceptical thinking can even be part of (and is able to have some muted epistemic impact within) ordinary epistemic practice.
相似文献
Stephen HetheringtonEmail: |
100.
In dynamic epistemic logic and other fields, it is natural to consider relativization as an operator taking sentences to sentences. When using the ideas and methods of dynamic logic, one would like to iterate operators. This leads to iterated relativization. We are also concerned with the transitive closure operation, due to its connection to common knowledge. We show that for three fragments of the logic of iterated relativization and transitive closure, the satisfiability problems are fi1 11–complete. Two of these fragments do not include transitive closure. We also show that the question of whether a sentence in these fragments has a finite (tree) model is fi0 01–complete. These results go via reduction to problems concerning domino systems. 相似文献