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71.
Theodore J. Everett 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(2):273-286
This paper presents a new solution to the problem of peer disagreement that distinguishes two principles of rational belief, here called probability and autonomy. When we discover that we disagree with peers, there is one sense in which we rationally ought to suspend belief, and another in which we rationally ought to retain our original belief. In the first sense, we aim to believe what is most probably true according to our total evidence, including testimony from peers and authorities. In the second, we aim to base our beliefs only on objective evidence and argumentation, even if that lowers the probability of their being true. The first principle of rational belief tends to serve the short-term epistemic interests of individuals, while the second tends to serve the long-term epistemic interests of both individuals and groups. The best way to reconcile these principles in cases of peer disagreement is to associate them with two corresponding species of belief, here called perception and opinion. 相似文献
72.
Richard Stillman 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2015,93(4):769-781
It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism (E2D) that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial theory of reference-fixation for proper names and argue that E2Dists ought to reject this theory. They discuss three alternatives to the theory that render E2D immune to the Argument from Misclassification. I demonstrate here that each of these alternatives either (i) replicates the faults of the original theory by assigning necessary 1-intensions to a posteriori utterances, or (ii) makes 1-intensions creatures of darkness. I argue that, although the Argument from Misclassification does indeed rely on a controversial theory of reference-fixation, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber have indicated no promising alternative to this theory. 相似文献
73.
Alison Fernandes 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2016,94(4):736-751
When we deliberate about what to do, we appear to be free to decide on different options. Three accounts use ordinary beliefs to explain this apparent freedom—appealing to different types of ‘epistemic freedom’. When an agent has epistemic freedom, her evidence while deliberating does not determine what decision she makes. This ‘epistemic gap’ between her evidence and decision explains why her decision appears free. The varieties of epistemic freedom appealed to might look similar. But there is an important difference. Two rely on an agent's ability to justifiably form beliefs unconstrained by evidence, and identify decisions as beliefs—either beliefs about acts (Velleman) or about decisions (Joyce and Ismael). But, when used to explain apparent freedom, these accounts face serious problems: they imply that agents have epistemic freedom over evidence-based beliefs, and rely on a faulty notion of justification. Underlying these troubles, it turns out that these accounts presuppose an unexplained apparent ability to form different beliefs. A third variety of epistemic freedom uses ignorance conditions instead (Levi and Kapitan). We appear free partly because we're ignorant of what we'll decide. Ignorance-based accounts avoid the above problems, and remain a promising alternative. 相似文献
74.
Jack C. Lyons 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2016,59(7-8):867-888
Stewart Cohen argues that much contemporary epistemological theorizing is hampered by the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ is a term of art (rather than something we all pretheoretically understand) and one that is never given any serious explication in a non-tendentious, theory-neutral way. He suggests that epistemologists are therefore better off theorizing in terms of rationality, rather than in terms of ‘epistemic justification’. Against this, I argue that even if the term ‘epistemic justification’ is not broadly known, the concept it picks out is quite familiar, and partly because it’s a term of art, justification talk is a better vehicle for philosophical theorizing. ‘Rational’ is too unclear for our philosophical purposes, and the fact that ‘epistemic justification’ gets fleshed out by appeal to substantive, controversial theses is no obstacle to its playing the needed role in epistemological theorizing. 相似文献
75.
Matthew McGrath 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2016,59(7-8):889-905
Stewart Cohen offers a critique of much contemporary epistemology. Epistemologies use the term ‘epistemic’ in order to specify the issues they investigate and about which they disagree. Cohen sees widespread confusion about these issues. The problem, he argues, is that ‘epistemic’ is functioning as an inadequately defined technical term. I will argue, rather, that the troubles come more from non-technical vocabulary, in particular with ‘justification’ and ‘ought’, and generally from the difficulty of explaining normativity. Overall, the message of this paper is that normativity is what’s hard to understand, not the term ‘epistemic.’ 相似文献
76.
Sampada Karandikar Hansika Kapoor Jordan Litman 《Asian Journal of Social Psychology》2021,24(1):69-82
Epistemic curiosity (EC) is the motive and need to seek knowledge. The present work entails validation of the English EC Scale translated into the Hindi language. Study 1 comprised confirmatory factor analysis of the Hindi scale using a sample of 223 bilingual Indians (143 females). The 10‐item two‐factor structure with Interest and Deprivation subscales was validated for the Hindi EC Scale. Convergent and discriminant validity was established, and model fits were assessed separately for males and females, along with measurement invariance testing. In Study 2, linguistic invariance testing and cross‐cultural comparisons were undertaken for a sample of 151 Indians (93 females) and 219 Americans (179 females) for the EC scales, to assess similarities in the underlying factor structure. Indians did not differ from Americans in their responses to the English EC Scale, but slight differences were observed for the Hindi EC Scale, suggesting an interplay of language and culture. Further, independent t tests compared the two samples on measures of curiosity, gossip, personality, and affect. Americans had a higher tendency toward interpersonal curiosity and agreeableness whereas Indians scored higher on intellect. Cross‐cultural and linguistic differences as well as future work are presented. In sum, the Hindi EC Scale is a valid and reliable instrument that can facilitate further translations into other Indian languages. 相似文献
77.
Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia 《Metaphilosophy》2012,43(3):204-220
The similarities between the philosophical debates surrounding assessment sensitivity and moral luck run so deep that one can easily adapt almost any argument from one debate, change some terms, adapt the examples, and end up with an argument relevant to the other. This article takes Brian Rosebury's strategy for resisting moral luck in “Moral Responsibility and ‘Moral Luck' ” (1995) and turns it into a strategy for resisting assessment sensitivity. The article shows that one of Bernard Williams's examples motivating moral luck is very similar to one of the examples John MacFarlane uses to motivate the assessment sensitivity of epistemic modals, and in particular the assessment sensitivity of the auxiliary verb “might.” This means that, if Rosebury is right and we do not actually need moral luck to explain Williams's example, we may not need assessment sensitivity to account for the semantic behaviour of the epistemic modal verb “might” either. 相似文献
78.
Ilona M. McNeill E. Tory Higgins Carsten K. W. De Dreu Bernard A. Nijstad 《决策行为杂志》2012,25(3):315-327
In decision making, people can focus on decisional outcomes (outcome focus), but they can also focus on gaining knowledge about the decisional domain (learning focus). Furthermore, people differ in the strength of their epistemic needs—their preference for developing a rich and accurate understanding of the world. We invoke the regulatory fit theory to predict that higher epistemic needs better fit a learning focus than lower epistemic needs, resulting in a greater increase in valuation of the chosen option when a learning rather than an outcome focus is induced. This general hypothesis was tested and supported in three studies, each focusing on a different proxy to epistemic needs. Thus, individuals experienced greater value when they had lower expertise (Study 1), higher need for assessment (Study 2), and higher need for cognition (Study 3) when a learning rather than an outcome focus was induced. Implications for work on epistemic needs, regulatory fit theory, and decision‐making practice are discussed. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
79.
Jacqueline Feldman 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1-2):133-143
Since their emergence in the nineteenth century, the epistemology of social sciences has oscillated from aiming at the classical model of scientificity to emphasizing its own specificities. We argue here that the existence of unambiguous, well defined objects has allowed discoveries and cumulativity in the natural sciences. Whereas, in the social sciences, the term is most often used in a metaphorical meaning, as it represents a basically fluid and changing reality. Its apprehension partly depends on the emotional/intellectual identity of the researcher, which makes it difficult to achieve a full consensus. Yet, beside real, natural or created objects, we do find structures, regularities and objectivations in society. 相似文献
80.
Ryan Hickerson 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(6):1133-1153
This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called ‘the general rules’: natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we ought to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental. 相似文献