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221.
Dick Howard 《Metaphilosophy》2001,32(5):463-501
I attempt to show that Marx was driven by a systematic philosophical goal expressed already in his doctoral dissertation and present throughout his mature political economic theory as well as in his practical political writings. I reconstruct this systematic – and critical – philosophical adventure in order to suggest that it is as philosophy that Marx's work retains its political bite today . In the process, I propose a reinterpretation of Marx's political theory that, once again, is traced through the entirety of Marx's corpus. The young Marx criticized Hegel's separation of the political from society; he then attempted to reduce the political sphere to civil society; the theory of alienated labor was elaborated as a theory of political economy that replaced the political; but in the end, when all three volumes of Capital and the unpublished Grundrisse are considered systematically, Marx sees capitalism as threatened ultimately by its inability to reflect politically on its own presuppositions, and hence its limits. 相似文献
222.
The present research demonstrates a so far unrecognized impediment of group performance, metacognitive myopia (Fiedler, 2012). Judges and decision-makers follow the given samples of information uncritically and neglect the metacognitive assessment of the samples' validity. Applying this notion to dyadic judgments, we instructed dyads to jointly estimate conditional probabilities p (Win|A) and p (Win|B) of Lotteries A and B. One person per dyad experienced a valid sample (winning rates conditional on lotteries). The other person experienced an invalid, reverse sample (lotteries conditional on winning). Whereas valid samples provide unbiased estimates of lotteries' winning probabilities, invalid samples can greatly misrepresent the association of winning and lotteries (depending on lottery base rates). Across three experiments, metacognitive myopia—both at the individual and at the dyadic group level—prevented participants from discriminating valid and invalid samples. Group judgments were biased toward erroneous implications of invalid samples, reflecting an equality bias among unequal group members. 相似文献
223.
Guillermo Marín Penella 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(4):480-492
This paper presents a program of action for the philosophy of regulatory science, based on a general theory of social epistemology. Two candidates are considered. The first one, offered by Alvin Goldman, is not fit for our purposes because it is focused on a veritism incompatible with non-epistemic aims of regulatory science. The second, championed by Steve Fuller, sociologically investigates the existing means of producing knowledge, to modify them with the goal of obtaining democratic aims through action on a legislative meta-level. The program has been built upon this procedure, instantiated by the identification, characterization, and modification of epistemic policies. 相似文献
224.
Yu Tong Fuxing Wang Judith Danovitch Weijun Wang 《The British journal of developmental psychology》2022,40(2):320-333
Prior studies have shown that children can select and evaluate information based on the previous accuracy of an informant. The current study examines how 5- to 6-year-old kindergarteners (N = 46) and 7- to 8-year-old second-graders (N = 48) in China judge scientific information provided by the internet or a teacher, and how a source's history of inaccuracy influences participants’ judgments. When lacking explicit information about previous accuracy, neither younger children nor older children showed differential trust in the internet or a teacher. After observing the internet providing inaccurate information, children in both age groups decreased their trust in statements from the internet. When the teacher was consistently inaccurate, children in both age groups also showed reduced preference for the teacher's statements. These findings demonstrate that 5- to 8-year-old children take into account history of inaccuracy when deciding whether to request or endorse information from the internet or a teacher. 相似文献
225.
Johan Hietanen Petri Turunen Ilmari Hirvonen Janne Karisto Ilkka Pättiniemi Henrik Saarinen 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(4):522-547
This paper argues that the main global critiques of scientism lose their punch because they rely on an uncharitable definition of their target. It focuses on epistemological scientism and divides it into four categories in terms of how strong (science is the only source of knowledge) or weak (science is the best source of knowledge) and how narrow (only natural sciences) or broad (all sciences or at least not only the natural sciences) they are. Two central arguments against scientism, the (false) dilemma and self-referential incoherence, are analysed. Of the four types of epistemological scientism, three can deal with these counterarguments by utilizing two methodological principles: epistemic evaluability of reliability and epistemic opportunism. One hopes that these considerations will steer the discussion on scientism to more fruitful pastures in the future. For example, there are interesting methodological considerations concerning what evaluability or reliability and epistemic opportunism entail. 相似文献
226.
227.
Marc Andree Weber 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(4):527-549
A commonly neglected feature of the so‐called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy. 相似文献
228.
Christopher Janaway 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2017,60(1-2):66-95
AbstractIn On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts. 相似文献
229.
The Hooded Man Paradox of Eubulides concerns the apparent failure of the substitutivity of identicals in epistemic (and other intentional) contexts. This paper formulates a number of different versions of the paradox and shows how these may be solved using semantics for quantified epistemic logic. In particular, two semantics are given which invalidate substitution, even when rigid designators are involved. 相似文献
230.
Lieven Decock 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):231-250
Quine's views on indispensability arguments in mathematics are scrutinised. A weak indispensability argument is distinguished
from a strong indispensability thesis. The weak argument is the combination of the criterion of ontological commitment, holism
and a mild naturalism. It is used to refute nominalism. Quine's strong indispensability thesis claims that one should consider
all and only the mathematical entities that are really indispensable. Quine has little support for this thesis. This is even
clearer if one takes into account Maddy's critique of Quine's strong indispensability thesis. Maddy's critique does not refute
Quine's weak indispensability argument. We are left with a weak and almost unassailable indispensability argument.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献