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121.
《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(3):387-396
Books reviewed:
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
122.
Linda Radzik 《The Journal of Ethics》2002,6(1):21-42
What makes an ``ought'' claim authoritative? What makes aparticular norm genuinely reason-giving for an agent? This paper arguesthat normative authority can best be accounted for in terms of thejustification of norms. The main obstacle to such a theory, however, isa regress problem. The worry is that every attempt to offer ajustification for an ``ought'' claim must appeal to another ``ought''claim, ad infinitum. The paper argues that vicious regress canbe avoided in practical reasoning in the same way coherentists avoid theproblem in epistemology. Norms are justified by their coherence withother norms. 相似文献
123.
Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
124.
András Kertész 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):269-288
Starting from an overview of approaches to naturalized epistemology, the paper shows, firstly, that Quine's programme yields
a sceptical paradox. This means that Quine's attempt to defeat scepticism itself yields a rather strong argument for scepticism
and thus against his own programme of naturalized epistemology. Secondly, it is shown that this paradox can be solved by an
approach called reflexive-heuristic naturalism. Finally, the paper also raises some fundamental problems which the solution
proposed has to leave open.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
125.
Fernando Raymundo Velázquez-Quesada 《Synthese》2009,169(2):283-300
We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference
is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand,
is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving
us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the
logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together.
We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and
mention how the work can be extended. 相似文献
126.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
127.
David Hitchcock 《Argumentation》1992,6(2):251-270
Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation. Causal relevance consists in an item's ability to help produce an outcome in a situation. Epistemic relevance, a distinct concept, consists in the ability of a piece of information (or a speech act communicating or requesting a piece of information) to help achieve an epistemic goal in a situation. It has this ability when it can be ineliminably combined with other at least potentially accurate information to achieve the goal. The relevance of a conversational contribution, premiss relevance and conclusion relevance are species of epistemic relevance thus defined. The conception of premiss relevance which results provides a basis for determining when the various arguments ad called fallacies of relevance are indeed irrelevant. In particular, an ad verecundiam appeal is irrelevant if the authority cited lacks expertise in a cognitive domain to which the conclusion belongs, the authority does not exercise its expertise in coming to endorse the conclusion, or the conclusion does not belong to a cognitive domain; otherwise the ad verecundiam is relevant. 相似文献
128.
Ladislav Kvasz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):201-232
The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems
to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many.
The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and
to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during
the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of
considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we
define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility
to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we
call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification
of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary
(the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions
to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
129.
Harvey Siegel 《Argumentation》1999,13(2):183-201
Central to argumentation theory is a concern with normativity. Argumentation theorists are concerned, among other things, with explaining why some arguments are good (or at least better than others) in the sense that a given argument provides reasons for embracing its conclusion which are such that a fair- minded appraisal of the argument yields the judgment that the conclusion ought to be accepted -- is worthy of acceptance -- by all who so appraise it.This conception of argument quality presupposes that the goodness of arguments is characterizable in terms of features of the argument itself. It makes no reference either to the attributes of the persons appraising the argument and judging its normative force, or to the context in which that appraisal is carried out. But recent work by a wide range of philosophers, argumentation theorists, and social theorists rejects such an abstract, impersonal notion of argument goodness. Instead, these theorists insist upon taking seriously, in the evaluation of arguments, the features of the evaluators themselves. In particular, such theorists emphasize the importance of cultural difference in argument appraisal. Often locating themselves under the banner of multiculturalism, they argue that the quality of an argument depends upon culturally-specific beliefs, values, and presuppositions; that an argument may be of high quality in one cultural context but of low quality in another. Consequently, they contend, no abstract, impersonal characterization of argument quality can succeed.In this paper I consider this multiculturalist approach to argument quality. I argue that while there is much merit in the general multiculturalist perspective, the multiculturalist argument against impersonal conceptions of argument quality fails. It fails for several reasons detailed below; most fundamentally, it fails because it itself presupposes just the kind of impersonal account of argument quality it seeks to reject. I call this presupposition that of transcultural normative reach. I identify this presupposition in the multiculturalist argument, and show how it undercuts the multiculturalist challenge to abstract, impersonal, transcultural conceptions of argument quality. I conclude with an evaluation of the strengths, and weaknesses, of the multiculturalist challenge to such conceptions of argument quality. 相似文献
130.