From the clarity of ideas to the validity of judgments: Kant's farewell to epistemic perfectionism

Against the standard interpretation of Kant's ‘Copernican revolution’ as the prioritization of epistemology over ontology, I argue in this paper that his critique of traditional metaphysics must be seen as a farewell to the perfectionism on which early modern rationalist ontology and epistemology are built. However, Kant does not simply replace ‘perfection’ with another fundamental concept of normativity. More radically, Kant realizes that it is not simply ideas but only the relation of ideas that can be subject to norms, and thus he shifts the focus from the reality of ideas to the validity of judgments. Section 1 of this paper clarifies the pre-Kantian role of the concept of perfection and examines Kant's critical response to that concept. Section 2 identifies Kant's point of departure from the Cartesian ‘way of ideas.’ Section 3 explains the key problem of his novel account of epistemic normativity. I conclude that Kant's anti-perfectionism must be seen as the driving force behind his ‘Copernican revolution’ in order to fully appreciate his mature account of epistemic normativity.     

Justification is potential knowledge

This paper will articulate and defend a novel theory of epistemic justification; I characterize my view as the thesis that justification is potential knowledge (JPK). My project is an instance of the ‘knowledge-first’ programme, championed especially by Timothy Williamson. So I begin with a brief recapitulation of that programme.     

Knowledge despite falsehood

I examine the claim, made by some authors, that we sometimes acquire knowledge from falsehood. I focus on two representative cases in which a subject S infers a proposition q from a false proposition p. If S knows that q, I argue, S's false belief that p is not essential to S's cognition. S's knowledge is instead due to S's belief that p′, a proposition in the neighbourhood of p that S (dispositionally) believes (and knows). S thus knows despite her false belief. The widely accepted and plausible principle that inferential knowledge requires known premises is unscathed.     

Development and Psychometric Evaluation of the Social Justice Scale (SJS)

The study describes the development of the Social Justice Scale (SJS). Practitioners, educators, students, and other members of the community differ on their attitudes and values regarding social justice. It is important to assess, not only individuals' attitudes and values around social values, but also other constructs that might be related to social justice behaviors. The implication of Ajzen in Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 50:179-211, (1991) theory of planned behavior suggests that attitudes, perceived behavioral control, and social norms predict intentions, which then lead to behaviors. A scale was designed to measure social justice-related values, attitudes, perceived behavioral control, subjective norms, and intentions based on a four-factor conception of Ajzen's theory. Confirmatory factor analysis and analyses for reliability and validity were used to test the properties of the scale.     

Enhancing Social Justice by Promoting Prosocial Values in Career Development Interventions

In career counseling, social justice is typically integrated by helping oppressed groups navigate their way around obstacles of injustice while also working to dislodge the oppressive conditions from society. The authors affirm both of these courses of action while also advocating a third strategy: inviting clients to serve as agents of change by introducing and incorporating prosocial values into career development interventions. This article makes the case that this strategy may enhance client well‐being while simultaneously promoting harmony among organizations and society. Support for this strategy comes from theory, research, and the ethical approaches for working with values in counseling.     

Integrating Women's Voices and Theory: A Comprehensive Domestic Violence Intervention for Latinas

Using both academic theories and two decades of experience in community, this article presents the work conducted by Caminar Latino (Latino Journey), a comprehensive intervention for Latino families affected by domestic violence. Having developed in both analogous and independent ways from theories in the academic field, Caminar Latino provides a unique opportunity to explore ways in which ecological theory and tenets of feminist therapy can be combined within a social justice framework to address this severe social problem. Of particular relevance to therapists, advocates and others working in this field is the ongoing inclusion of the voices of women participants as a central tenet of the intervention.     

Differentiation of Self and Social Justice Commitment Mediated by Hope

This study tested a theoretical model of hope mediating the relationship between differentiation of self and social justice commitment among graduate students (N = 202) in the helping professions. The theory was based primarily on the social justice philosophies of Martin Luther King Jr., Cornel West, and Paulo Freire using a cultural psychology approach. Results generally supported the theoretical model. Implications are considered for both training and future research on social justice.     

Why global justice matters

Why does global justice as a philosophical inquiry matter? We know that the world is plainly unjust in many ways and we know that something ought to be done about this without, it seems, the need of a theory of global justice. Accordingly, philosophical inquiry into global justice comes across to some as an intellectual luxury that seems disconnected from the real world. I want to suggest, however, that philosophical inquiry into global justice is necessary if we want to address the problems of humanity. First, in some cases, a theory of global justice is needed for identifying what counts as legitimate problems of justice. Second, even in obvious cases of injustices, such as the fact of preventable extreme poverty to which we know we have an obligation to respond, we cannot know the content and the limits of these obligations and who the primary bearers of these obligations are without some theoretical guidance. However, I acknowledge that philosophical inquiry on global justice risks becoming a philosophical parlor game if it loses sight of the real-world problems that motivate the inquiry in the first place. If global justice is to provide the tools for addressing the problems of humanity, it must remain a problems-driven enterprise.     

First steps toward an understanding of procedural fairness

In four experiments, we tested whether 20‐month‐old infants are sensitive to violations of procedural impartiality. Participants were shown videos in which help was provided in two different ways. A main character provided help to two other agents either impartially, by helping them at the same time, or in a biased way, by helping one agent almost immediately while the other after a longer delay. Infants looked reliably longer at the biased than at the unbiased help scenarios despite the fact that in both scenarios help was provided to each beneficiary. This suggests that human infants can attend to departures from impartiality and, in their second year, they already show an initial understanding of procedural fairness.     

LYING TO THE NAZI AT THE DOOR

Moral philosophers and theologians have long debated the classic moral dilemma of lying to an intruder in order to save a refugee. This dilemma presents an especially difficult challenge to those who reject consequentialist reasoning. Many contemporary defenders of Thomas Aquinas have argued that lying is never permissible under any circumstances, but none has offered a satisfactory answer to the question of what one ought to do when facing such a dilemma. I argue that there can be no morally satisfying answer to this question, because every possible action will involve some degree of sin, even if lying is the least sinful action. This should not lead us to redefine what it means to tell a lie, nor to say that lying to the intruder is a good or right action; rather, it should lead us to acknowledge the tragic dimension of life in a fallen world.