Comments on Plantinga’s Argument of Transworld Identity

Plantinga’s conception of possible worlds is problematic in one sense: it relies on the prior idea of modality. His strategy for resolving the puzzle of transworld identity is significant in the metaphysical sense but fruitless in the epistemological sense because world-indexed properties cannot be used as effectively in epistemic practice as their counterparts, i.e., space- and time-indexed properties. His isolation of transworld identification from transworld identity is unconvincing. This paper argues that the intelligibility of modal discourse and reference is the essence of transworld identity. It is also proved that transworld identification is the epistemic ground of such intelligibility. Hence, the transworld identification problem is the epistemological foundation of the transworld identity problem, and there must be a comprehensive answer to the former.     

组织政治知觉对乡村教师离职意向的影响:组织公平和组织认同的中介作用

以353名乡村中小学教师为样本,采用结构方程模型等统计方法,分析了组织政治知觉对乡村教师离职意向的影响,以及组织公平和组织认同的中介作用。结果表明：（1）组织政治知觉与乡村教师离职意向之间存在显著正相关,组织政治知觉与组织公平之间存在显著负相关;组织公平与组织认同之间存在显著正相关;组织认同与乡村教师离职意向之间存在显著负相关。（2）组织公平和组织认同在组织政治知觉对乡村教师离职意向的影响中起双重中介作用。     

Authorities’ knowledge of shared group membership and its effects on the respect-informing properties of procedural fairness

We observe that the voice-leads-to-respect process underlying relational models of procedural fairness is assumed to follow primarily if not solely from interaction with an in-group authority. Moreover, if the voice recipients believe that the authority is unaware of this shared group membership, then the provision of voice actually says nothing (to the voice recipients) about their standing as group members; the respect-providing information as valued in-group members is absent because the recipients know that the authority does not know of their shared group membership. We tested these assumptions in a three-way design manipulating the group membership of the authority (in-group vs. out-group), the nature of voice (provided vs. denied) and the nature of group membership knowledge (the authority knows or does not know the voice recipient’s group membership). A significant three-way interaction was found, as predicted, on respect and fairness ratings. These data provide clear experimental support for an unstated, and yet untested, assumption of relational models of procedural fairness.     

The egocentric nature of procedural justice: Social value orientation as moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures

In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we measured participants’ social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice.     

Iterated Belief Change and the Recovery Axiom

The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy. We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem that connects the semantic conditions we impose on iterated revision and our additional syntactical properties. We show interesting similarities between our framework and that of Darwiche–Pearl (Artificial Intelligence 89:1–29 1997). In particular, we show that intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are captured by the recovery axiom and our recovery-like postulates (the latter can be seen as weakenings of (C2)). We present postulates for contraction, in the same spirit as the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for revision, and provide a theorem that connects our syntactic postulates with a set of semantic conditions. Lastly, we show a connection between the contraction postulates and a generalisation of the recovery axiom. Portions of this paper were originally presented at ECAI 2002.     

Duties and Responsibilities Towards the Poor

Thomas Pogge has argued that we have strong negative duties to assist the global poor because we harm them through our contribution to the global economic order. I argue that Pogge’s concept of harm is indeterminate. The resources of any group will typically be affected by at least two economic schemes. Pogge suggests that the responsibility for any affected group’s shortfall from a minimum standard ought to be shared between the contributing schemes. I argue that shared responsibility can be interpreted in two different ways. Unfortunately, both interpretations are problematic. Lastly, I suggest a strategy for amending this problem.

Catholic Reflections for an Updated Donum Vitae Instruction: A New Catholic Challenge in a Post-Christian Europe

On February 22, 1987, the Congregation for the Doctrine of theFaith published the Donum Vitae Instruction. Twenty years later,on February 22, 2007, Pope Benedict XVI asked for an updateof this Instruction. According to the Donum Vitae Instructionof 1987, the principle of the holiness of life imposes respectfor human persons from the very beginning of human life. Inthese past 20 years, new medical techniques have raised freshethical issues that are to be addressed by the Roman CatholicChurch Magisterium. The Roman Catholic Church, in its updateof the Instruction planned for 2007, will have to explain howcivil law is to be regulated according to the fundamental normsof the moral law. The moral message of the new Donum Vitae (justas in the 1987 version) will be to affirm the substance of humanjustice: respect for human life, as expressed in the resolvenot to infringe on, or to protect such life. Even in a post-ChristianEurope, this theological message can be understood if it istrue that Europe is marked by the principle of the absoluteprotection of human life.     

“人体器官移植工作体系”框架的初步构想及其伦理使命

借鉴国内外相关成功经验,结合我国实际情况,对“人体器官移植工作体系”的构成以及各系统职能进行初步探讨。研究了该体系在阻止人体器官商业化、提高人体移植器官分配的公平高效性等方面发挥的作用。     

RELIABILISM AND SAFETY

Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to reliabilism.     

A strategy for assessing closure

This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed.