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91.
Miranda Fricker 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(1-2):154-173
The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression. 相似文献
92.
Julia Driver 《Metaphilosophy》2003,34(3):367-383
Abstract: Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to distinguish them at the level of good produced. It follows from this that a consequentialist account is best placed to avoid a conflation of moral and epistemic virtue. 相似文献
93.
《Metaphilosophy》2002,33(3):387-396
Books reviewed:
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
James Campbell, Recovering Benjamin Franklin
Elliot L. Jurist, Beyond Hegel and Nietzsche: Philosophy, Culture, and Agency 相似文献
94.
Jesús P. Bonilla 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2002,33(2):349-368
Some peculiarities of the evaluation of theories within scientific research programmes (SRPs) and of the assessing of rival
SRPs are described assuming that scientists try to maximise an ‘epistemic utility function’ under economic and institutional
constraints. Special attention is given to Lakatos' concepts of ‘empirical progress’ and ‘theoretical progress’. A notion
of ‘empirical verisimilitude’ is defended as an appropriate utility function. The neologism ‘methodonomics’ is applied to
this kind of studies.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
95.
Fernando Raymundo Velázquez-Quesada 《Synthese》2009,169(2):283-300
We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference
is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand,
is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving
us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the
logic community, usually separately. In this work, we develop a logical language that allows us to describe them together.
We present syntax, semantics and a complete axiom system; we discuss similarities and differences with other approaches and
mention how the work can be extended. 相似文献
96.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
97.
Richard B. Miller 《The Journal of religious ethics》2009,37(1):131-158
This essay argues on behalf of a hybrid theory for an ethics of self-defense understood as the Forfeiture-Partiality Theory. The theory weds the idea that a malicious attacker forfeits the right to life to the idea that we are permitted to prefer one's life to another's in cases of involuntary harm or threat. The theory is meant to capture our intuitions both about instances in which we can draw a moral asymmetry between attacker and victim and cases in which we cannot. I develop the theory by attending to instances of intentional, villainous harm and instances of involuntary danger—the latter of which are a matter of bad luck. I call some bad luck cases "Interpersonal Lottery Conflicts." These cases refer to potentially lethal conflicts into which parties are thrown as victims of circumstance. Although neither party has a moral advantage over another, that fact does not preclude permissible self-defense. 相似文献
98.
David Hitchcock 《Argumentation》1992,6(2):251-270
Relevance is a triadic relation between an item, an outcome or goal, and a situation. Causal relevance consists in an item's ability to help produce an outcome in a situation. Epistemic relevance, a distinct concept, consists in the ability of a piece of information (or a speech act communicating or requesting a piece of information) to help achieve an epistemic goal in a situation. It has this ability when it can be ineliminably combined with other at least potentially accurate information to achieve the goal. The relevance of a conversational contribution, premiss relevance and conclusion relevance are species of epistemic relevance thus defined. The conception of premiss relevance which results provides a basis for determining when the various arguments ad called fallacies of relevance are indeed irrelevant. In particular, an ad verecundiam appeal is irrelevant if the authority cited lacks expertise in a cognitive domain to which the conclusion belongs, the authority does not exercise its expertise in coming to endorse the conclusion, or the conclusion does not belong to a cognitive domain; otherwise the ad verecundiam is relevant. 相似文献
99.
Ladislav Kvasz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):201-232
The question whether Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions could be applied to mathematics caused many interesting problems
to arise. The aim of this paper is to discuss whether there are different kinds of scientific revolution, and if so, how many.
The basic idea of the paper is to discriminate between the formal and the social aspects of the development of science and
to compare them. The paper has four parts. In the first introductory part we discuss some of the questions which arose during
the debate of the historians of mathematics. In the second part, we introduce the concept of the epistemic framework of a theory. We propose to discriminate three parts of this framework, from which the one called formal frame will be of
considerable importance for our approach, as its development is conservative and gradual. In the third part of the paper we
define the concept of epistemic rupture as a discontinuity in the formal frame. The conservative and gradual nature of the changes of the formal frame open the possibility
to compare different epistemic ruptures. We try to show that there are four different kinds of epistemic rupture, which we
call idealisation, re-presentation, objectivisation and re-formulation. In the last part of the paper we derive from the classification
of the epistemic ruptures a classification of scientific revolutions. As only the first three kinds of rupture are revolutionary
(the re-formulations are rather cumulative), we obtain three kinds of scientific revolution: idealisation, re-presentation, and objectivisation. We discuss the relation of our classification of scientific revolutions
to the views of Kuhn, Lakatos, Crowe, and Dauben.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
100.