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41.
ZHANG Lifeng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2012,7(1):164
Plantinga’s conception of possible worlds is problematic in one sense: it relies on the prior idea of modality. His strategy for resolving the puzzle of transworld identity is significant in the metaphysical sense but fruitless in the epistemological sense because world-indexed properties cannot be used as effectively in epistemic practice as their counterparts, i.e., space- and time-indexed properties. His isolation of transworld identification from transworld identity is unconvincing. This paper argues that the intelligibility of modal discourse and reference is the essence of transworld identity. It is also proved that transworld identification is the epistemic ground of such intelligibility. Hence, the transworld identification problem is the epistemological foundation of the transworld identity problem, and there must be a comprehensive answer to the former. 相似文献
42.
Samir Chopra Aditya Ghose Thomas Meyer Ka-Shu Wong 《Journal of Philosophical Logic》2008,37(5):501-520
The axiom of recovery, while capturing a central intuition regarding belief change, has been the source of much controversy.
We argue briefly against putative counterexamples to the axiom—while agreeing that some of their insight deserves to be preserved—and
present additional recovery-like axioms in a framework that uses epistemic states, which encode preferences, as the object of revisions. This makes iterated revision possible and renders explicit the connection
between iterated belief change and the axiom of recovery. We provide a representation theorem that connects the semantic conditions
we impose on iterated revision and our additional syntactical properties. We show interesting similarities between our framework
and that of Darwiche–Pearl (Artificial Intelligence 89:1–29 1997). In particular, we show that intuitions underlying the controversial (C2) postulate are captured by the recovery axiom and
our recovery-like postulates (the latter can be seen as weakenings of (C2)). We present postulates for contraction, in the
same spirit as the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for revision, and provide a theorem that connects our syntactic postulates with
a set of semantic conditions. Lastly, we show a connection between the contraction postulates and a generalisation of the
recovery axiom.
Portions of this paper were originally presented at ECAI 2002. 相似文献
43.
KELLY BECKER 《Metaphilosophy》2006,37(5):691-704
Abstract: Duncan Pritchard has recently highlighted the problem of veritic epistemic luck and claimed that a safety‐based account of knowledge succeeds in eliminating veritic luck where virtue‐based accounts and process reliabilism fail. He then claims that if one accepts a safety‐based account, there is no longer a motivation for retaining a commitment to reliabilism. In this article, I delineate several distinct safety principles, and I argue that those that eliminate veritic luck do so only if at least implicitly committed to reliabilism. 相似文献
44.
Peter Murphy 《Erkenntnis》2006,65(3):365-383
This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge
is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy
in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all
the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument for this conjecture. According
to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument
for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the
conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge
is closed. 相似文献
45.
Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed
toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role
here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence.
I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions
in question tend to misunderstand the justification of both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the
permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to
justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the
role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with
respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum.
相似文献
Troy JollimoreEmail: |
46.
LICIA CARLSON 《Metaphilosophy》2009,40(3-4):552-566
Abstract: This essay explores various roles that philosophers occupy in relation to intellectual disability. In examining how philosophers define their object of inquiry as experts and gatekeepers, it raises critical questions concerning the nature of philosophical discourse about intellectual disability. It then goes on to consider three alternate positions, the advocate or friend, the animal, and the "intellectually disabled," each of which points to new ways of philosophizing in the face of intellectual disability. 相似文献
47.
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49.
Mikael Stenmark 《Zygon》1997,32(4):491-514
I discuss the kinds of fundamental questions that must be addressed by people who develop theories about how religion and science are (or should be) related. After categorizing these questions as axiological, epistemological, ontological, or semantic, I focus on those that concern the goals of religion and science (the axiological issues). By distinguishing between epistemic and practical goals, individual and collective goals, and manifest and latent goals, I identify seven axiological questions. The various answers that religion/science theorists give or presuppose to these axiological questions help to explain why such deep, ongoing differences continue among them. 相似文献
50.
ROBERT AUDI 《The Journal of Ethics》1997,1(2):141-163
This paper explores the rationale for violence and coercion aimed at preventing abortion conceived as the killing of an innocent person. Some important arguments for personhood at conception are examined, and in the light of the examination the paper considers whether they warrant concluding that a free and democratic society should pass laws recognizing personhood at conception. The wider concern is what principles such a society should use as a basis for legal coercion and what principles conscientious individuals should use insofar as they judge that self-defense or, especially, protection of the innocent, requires violence. 相似文献