An epistemic and dynamic approach to abductive reasoning: Abductive problem and abductive solution

We propose a study of abductive reasoning addressing it as an epistemic process that involves both an agent?s information and the actions that modify this information. More precisely, we present and discuss definitions of an abductive problem and an abductive solution in terms of an agent?s information, that is, in terms of knowledge and beliefs. The discussion is then formalised by ‘implementing’ our definitions in a dynamic epistemic logic framework, where the properties of these definitions are studied, an epistemic action that represents the application of an abductive step is introduced, and an illustrative example is provided. A number of the most interesting properties of abductive reasoning (those highlighted by Peirce) are shown to be better modelled within this approach.     

African philosophy and global epistemic injustice

In this paper, I consider how the discourse on global epistemic justice might be approached differently if some contributions from the African philosophical place are taken seriously. To be specific, I argue that the debate on global justice broadly has not been global. I cite as an example, the exclusion or marginalisation of African philosophy, what it has contributed and what it may yet contribute to the global epistemic edifice. I point out that this exclusion is a case of epistemic injustice. I observe that the absence of a philosophical technique that prevails on philosophers to engage with others from other traditions might be responsible for this epistemic lopsidedness and marginalisation. I go beyond the re-statement of this problem of marginalisation of African philosophy to point out relevant doctrines from the African place. I show how they are united under the methodological and ideological disposition of conversationalism. I argue that this ideology might be a better model for realising the goal of global epistemic justice which is the overcoming of all forms of exclusions and lopsidedness in global epistemic discourses through fair allocation of intellectual spaces.     

A METAPHILOSOPHICAL DILEMMA FOR EPISTEMIC EXTERNALISM

Abstract: In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it's implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.     

A comprehensive semantic framework for data integration systems

A data integration system provides the user with a unified view, called global schema, of the data residing at different sources. Users issue their queries against the global schema, and the system computes answers to queries by suitably accessing the sources, through the mapping, i.e., the specification of the relationship between the global schema and the sources. Since sources are in general autonomous subsystems, the information provided by the data at the sources and the mapping is likely not to be consistent with the knowledge expressed by the global schema. Therefore, the question arises of how to interpret user queries in such a situation, i.e., in the presence of data contradicting the global schema and the mapping. In this paper, we provide an in-depth analysis of the problem of dealing with inconsistencies in data integration systems. In this respect, we highlight the central role played by the mapping, and propose a general “mapping-centered” semantics that allows for computing significant answers to user queries even in the presence of inconsistent information. Based on such a semantic analysis, we define a general formal framework for data integration. Then, we argue that our semantic approach formalizes a very reasonable way of handling inconsistency in such systems, since practically all the existing proposals in the literature can be reconstructed in our framework. This allows for comparing and evaluating the different existing proposals.     

Using temporal logics of knowledge for specification and verification—a case study

Temporal logics of knowledge are useful for reasoning about situations where the knowledge of an agent or component is important, and where change in this knowledge may occur over time. Here we use temporal logics of knowledge to reason about the game Cluedo. We show how to specify Cluedo using temporal logics of knowledge and prove statements about the knowledge of the players using a clausal resolution calculus for this logic. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of using this logic to specify and verify the game Cluedo and describe related implementations.     

Pritchard Versus Pritchard on Luck

This paper argues for a particular account of luck by comparing two distinct versions of the modal account of luck that have been provided by Duncan Pritchard (2005, 2014). More specifically, it argues that there are three respects in which Pritchard’s earlier modal account of luck is preferable to his later account: it accounts better for the fact that luck comes in degrees, it includes a significance condition, and it better acknowledges the subjective nature of luck. The paper then discusses two consequences of the points it makes for epistemology: an alleged pragmatic encroachment, and a particular view on the relation between knowledge, luck, and justification.     

Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?

According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding.     

动机性信息加工理论及其在工业与组织心理学中的应用

“团队作为信息加工者的观点”认为, 团队执行复杂任务需要经过一系列认知决策, 哪些信息被共享, 以及信息共享和整合的质量, 共同决定团队效能的高低。动机性信息加工理论则进一步提出, 认知动机和社会动机共同决定了哪些信息被共享, 以及信息共享和整合的质量。认知动机决定信息加工的深度, 社会动机决定信息加工的方向, 两种动机共同决定决策质量。这一理论可以很好地整合谈判和创造力领域的研究结果, 并在团队效能领域得到很好的应用。动机性信息加工理论是对双过程模型和“团队作为信息加工者观点”的发展和整合, 并为决策质量的影响因素提供新的分类框架和研究思路。     

Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression.     

The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic Virtue

Abstract: Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to distinguish them at the level of good produced. It follows from this that a consequentialist account is best placed to avoid a conflation of moral and epistemic virtue.