And so indeed are perfect cheat

Ethical discourse and fallacy theory come together in a natural way over concepts such as bias, prejudice, preconceived opinion, prototypical and stereotypical thinking, dogmatism and loyalty. By and large, these are concepts that have not been sufficiently worked up to bear the theoretical weight either of ethics or of logic. The present paper seeks to ameliorate this situation. It proposes that situations describable by any such concepts partition into (a) the rationally and morally regrettable and (b) the rationally and morally impeccable, and in any event, unavoidable. Finding (b) will come as a surprise to some theorists.[A]ll the artificial and figurative application of Words Eloquence hath invented are for nothing else but to insinuate wrongIdeas, move the Passions, and thereby mislead the Judgment; and so indeed are perfect cheat; And therefore, however laudable or allowable Oratory may render them in Harangues and popular Addresses, they are certainly, in all Discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided. ...John Locke,Essay on Human Understanding, Book III.     

On a neglected feature of moral agency

Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.     

Veritism and the normativity of logic

The idea that logic is in some sense normative for thought and reasoning is a familiar one. Some of the most prominent figures in the history of philosophy including Kant and Frege have been among its defenders. The most natural way of spelling out this idea is to formulate wide‐scope deductive requirements on belief which rule out certain states as irrational. But what can account for the truth of such deductive requirements of rationality? By far, the most prominent responses draw in one way or another on the idea that belief aims at the truth. In this paper, I consider two ways of making this line of thought more precise and I argue that they both fail. In particular, I examine a recent attempt by Epistemic Utility Theory to give a veritist account of deductive coherence requirements. I argue that despite its proponents’ best efforts, Epistemic Utility Theory cannot vindicate such requirements.     

认识性信任：学龄前儿童的选择性学习

人类个体对外界知识的获取很大程度上依赖于沟通, 即他人的证言。对儿童来说尤其如此。发展心理学家最近致力于研究学龄前儿童对他人证言的信任。一方面, 学龄前儿童往往会盲目地接受他人所告知的信息, 表现为轻信偏差; 另一方面, 儿童在知识学习上又会表现出高度的胜任力, 他们会借助一系列线索保证获取更为可靠的信息, 包括知识性线索和社会性线索。正如有关婴儿是否存在心理理论尚有争论, 儿童认识性信任的潜在机制也存在两种不同的取向, 涉及儿童是否理解信息者的心理状态。尽管对儿童知识性信息的研究取得了大量的成果和发现, 未来仍有许多问题值得探讨。     

More Than A Feeling: The Communicative Function of Regret

Rüdiger Bittner argues that regret is not useful and so it is always unreasonable to feel and express it. In this paper, I argue that regret is often reasonable because regret has a communicative function: it communicates where we stand with respect to things we have done and outcomes that we have caused. So, I not only argue that Bittner’s argument is unsuccessful, I also shed light on the nature and purpose of regret.     

The Truth-Conduciveness Problem of Coherentism and a Sellarsian Explanatory Coherence Theory

According to the truth-conduciveness problem of coherentism, the coherence theory of justification can hardly show that coherentist justification is truth-conducive. This problem is generally conceived as the most recalcitrant problem with the coherence theory. The purpose of this paper is to show that it does not pose a serious problem for a certain version of coherentism, namely a Sellarsian explanatory coherence theory of justification combined with the deflationary theory of truth. On this version of coherentism, our epistemic goal is to gradually improve our conceptual framework so as to maximize its explanatory coherence, and there is no substantial norm of truth independent of the norms of justification, so that we cannot evaluate the truth-conduciveness of a belief independently of the norms of justification. I argue that this version of coherentism can cope with the truth-conduciveness problem.     

Creating shared reality in interpersonal and intergroup communication: the role of epistemic processes and their interplay

We describe research on the creation of shared reality in communication, emphasizing the epistemic processes that allow communicators to achieve confident judgements and evaluations about a communication topic. We distinguish three epistemic inputs: (1) the communicator’s own judgement about the topic (judgement of communicator); (2) the communicator’s perception of the audience’s judgement about the topic (judgement of audience); and (3) the communicator’s message to the audience about the topic (message of communicator). We argue that the influence of each input increases with the communicator’s confidence in the validity of that input. We review a variety of empirical studies in terms of this framework. We also address barriers to shared-reality creation in intergroup communication and describe interventions that work by increasing the validity strength of judgement of an outgroup audience. We discuss the relation between the present research and other approaches to social influence and social sharing.     

The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe

There is an interesting contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe. Plausibly, if it is permissible to believe something from a perspective with incomplete evidence, it cannot become impermissible to believe it from a second perspective with complete evidence. In contrast, it seems that something permissible to do for an agent in a perspective with limited evidence can become impermissible in a second perspective in which all the relevant evidence is available. What is more, an agent with incomplete evidence may be permitted to do something that she knows would be impermissible if she occupied a perspective of complete evidence. In this paper, I argue that this contrast is explained by a disanalogy between the role played by belief in epistemic deliberation and the role played by action in practical deliberation. Epistemic deliberation may be closed by adopting other attitudes than belief (e.g. accepting some hypothesis as the most likely one), whereas in general, practical deliberation can only be closed by endorsing some course of action. Thus, when there are pressures to close some practical deliberation, agents have to make a decision about what to do even if they lack relevant information. By contrast, lacking relevant evidence, agents may always refrain from forming a belief and close instead their epistemic deliberation by adopting some other attitude.     

Armchair Disagreement

A commonly neglected feature of the so‐called Equal Weight View, according to which we should give our peers’ opinions the same weight we give our own, is its prima facie incompatibility with the common picture of philosophy as an armchair activity: an intellectual effort to seek a priori knowledge. This view seems to imply that our beliefs are more likely to be true if we leave our armchair in order to find out whether there actually are peers who, by disagreeing with us, force us to revise our beliefs. This article argues that the Equal Weight View should be spelled out in such a way that not only actual peer disagreement requires us to revise our beliefs, but also merely possible peer disagreement. This result is not a reductio ad absurdum of the view. Quite the opposite: it shows that the view is, contrary to appearance, compatible with our common way of doing philosophy.     

评论不一致性对消费者的双面影响:产品属性与调节定向的调节

以往有研究指出在线评论的不一致性会给企业带来负面影响,也有研究发现存在正面影响。之所以会存在两种截然相反的结论是因为,以往研究没有深入分析评论内容,忽略了造成不一致性的根源所在。通过引入产品属性及消费者调节定向,力图解释以往两种看似冲突的结论。结果表明:评论不一致性会通过影响消费者对产品的风险和独特性感知进而影响其购买意向;垂直属性评论(水平属性)不一致性越高,越会激发消费者的风险感知(独特性感知),进而降低(提高)购买意向;并且消费者调节定向对产品属性的调节作用会进一步调节。