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131.
George Botterill 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):139-160
Abstract There are two epistemological problems connected with dreaming, which are of different kinds and require different treatment. The internal problem is best seen as a problem of rational consistency, of how we can maintain all of:
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Dreams are experiences we have during sleep.
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Dream‐experiences are sufficiently similar to waking experiences for the subject to be able to mistake them for waking experiences.
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We can tell that we are awake.
132.
Carl B. Sachs 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):562-565
ABSTRACTThis article advances a new analysis of stupidity as a distinctive form of cognitive failing. Section 1 outlines some problems in explicating this notion and suggests some desiderata. Section 2 sketches an existing model of stupidity, found in Kant and Flaubert, which serves as a foil for my own view. In Section 3, I introduce my theory: I analyse stupidity as form of conceptual self-hampering, characterised by a specific aetiology and with a range of deleterious effects. In Section 4, I show how this proposal meets the desiderata and I clarify how it diverges from existing accounts. My position is close to a ‘public health approach’, in contrast to the virtue/vice framework employed by Engel or Mulligan. 相似文献
133.
Michael Kober 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(3):365-381
Abstract Epistemic and moral certainities like ‘This is a hand’ or ‘Killing people is evil’ will be interpreted as constitutive rules of language games, such that they are unjustifiable, undeniable and serving as obliging standards of truth, goodness and rationality for members of a community engaging in the respective practices. 相似文献
134.
Javier González de Prado Salas 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(7):755-778
Several authors have claimed that indicative conditionals are sensitive to the epistemic perspective of agents. According to this sort of view, the truth of an indicative conditional depends on the background evidence of some relevant agent or group of agents. In this paper, I argue that the context-dependence of indicative conditionals goes beyond this. Indicative conditionals are not only sensitive to the evidence of agents, but also to contextual factors that determine what is inferable from such background evidence (plus the antecedent of the conditional). More specifically, my proposal is that when the inference associated with a conditional is defeasible, the truth of that conditional is sensitive to practical stakes (in a similar way that knowledge claims are sensitive to practical stakes). 相似文献
135.
Joane Deneault 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2013,174(6):386-407
The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research. 相似文献
136.
Onora O'Neill 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2013,56(4):387-405
Maclntyre's refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics aims to restore both intelligibility and rationality to moral discourse. In After Virtue he concentrates on showing how intelligible action requires that lives be led within institutional and cultural traditions. But he does not offer a developed account of practical reason which could provide grounds for seeking some rather than other intelligible continuations of lives and traditions. Despite Maclntyre's criticisms of Kant's ethics, a Kantian account of practical reasoning may complement his account of intelligibility. An appropriate interpretation of Kantian ethics is outlined, which escapes Maclntyre's criticisms, allows both for the universal character of basic moral principles and for the historical variability of intelligible action, and which makes moral worth or virtue the centre of the moral life. The refurbishing of Aristotelian ethics may be achieved by a Kantian completion. 相似文献
137.
ALEXANDER PASEAU 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(5):642-648
Abstract: This article presents and solves a puzzle about methodological naturalism. Trumping naturalism is the thesis that we must accept p if science sanctions p, and biconditional naturalism the apparently stronger thesis that we must accept p if and only if science sanctions p. The puzzle is generated by an apparently cogent argument to the effect that trumping naturalism is equivalent to biconditional naturalism. It turns out that the argument for this equivalence is subtly question‐begging. The article explains this and shows more generally that there are no scientific arguments for biconditional naturalism. 相似文献
138.
HEATHER BATTALY 《Metaphilosophy》2010,41(1-2):1-21
Abstract: This introduction to the collection Virtue and Vice, Moral and Epistemic addresses three main questions: (1) What is a virtue theory in ethics or epistemology? (2) What is a virtue? and (3) What is a vice? (1) It suggests that a virtue theory takes the virtues and vices of agents to be more fundamental than evaluations of acts or beliefs, and defines right acts or justified beliefs in terms of the virtues. (2) It argues that there are two important but different concepts of virtue: virtues are qualities that attain good ends, and virtues are qualities that involve good motives. (3) Accordingly, vices are qualities that either fail to attain good ends or involve bad motives. Finally, the introduction summarizes the eleven essays in the collection, which are divided into four sections: the Structure of Virtue Ethics and Virtue Epistemology; Virtue and Context; Virtue and Emotion; and Virtues and Vices. 相似文献
139.
When people engage in a task, they often take preliminary actions (preprocessing) to simplify primary processing. Usually, a trade‐off is made between the costs of preprocessing and primary processing. We conducted three experiments to find out whether people could adaptively estimate the utility of preprocessing depending on the task situation. The result demonstrated that in performing a high‐complexity task, almost all the participants reduced their overall task performance cost by conducting cost‐adaptive preprocessing. However, for a low‐complexity task, participants tended to conduct preprocessing even though this increased overall task performance cost. Based on these results, we discuss human nature from the viewpoint of the influence of cognitive effort. 相似文献
140.
Damiano Migliorini 《Theology & Sexuality》2013,19(1-2):111-130
ABSTRACTI will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels. 相似文献