Pigeons can discriminate locations presented in pictures

The present experiments were designed to teach pigeons to discriminate two locations represented by color photographs. Two sets of photographs were taken at two distinctive locations on a university campus. These sets represented several standpoints at each location. For the true-discrimination group, pictures from the two locations were differentially associated with reward; for the pseudodiscrimination group, half of the views from each location were arbitrarily but consistently associated with reward. The former group acquired the discrimination much more rapidly. These birds also showed good transfer to new views from the standpoints used in training and to a new standpoint at each location not used in training. In a second experiment, another group of pigeons could terminate any training trial by pecking an “advance” key. Three of 4 subjects used this option to reduce the duration of trials in which pictures from the negative location were presented. These data suggest that pigeons can integrate views shown in pictures into a “concept” of a location. The method used here may be the experimental analogue of a common, natural process by which animals learn to identify locations.     

On the limits of the matching concept in monkeys (Cebus apella).

Two cebus monkeys, with many years of experience matching a variety of static visual stimuli (forms and colors) within a standard matching-to-sample paradigm, were trained to press a left lever when a pair of displayed static stimuli were the same and to press a right lever when they were different. After learning the same/different task, the monkeys were tested for transfer to dynamic visual stimuli (flashing versus steady green disks), with which they had no previous experience. Both failed to transfer to the dynamic stimuli. A third monkey, also with massive past experience matching static visual stimuli, was tested for transfer to the dynamic stimuli within our standard matching paradigm, and it, too, failed. All 3 subjects were unable to reach a moderate acquisition criterion despite as many as 52 sessions of training with the dynamic stimuli. These results provide further evidence that, in monkeys, the matching (or identity) concept has a very limited reach; they consequently do not support the view held by some theorists that an abstract matching concept based on physical similarity is a general endowment of animals.     

Transfer of matching-to-figure samples in the pigeon

Three pigeons were trained on a modified six-key matching-to-sample procedure. The third peck on the figure-sample key (which presented a bird, hand, face, beetle, rabbit, fish, flower, or red hue, as the sample) lighted only one comparison key. Every three additional pecks on the sample lighted another comparison key, up to a maximum of five keys. Pecks on keys of matching figures produced grain. Pecks on nonmatching keys (mismatches) turned off all lights on the comparison keys and repeated the trial. Three figures were used during acquisition. The birds learned to peck each sample until the matching comparison stimulus appeared on one of three comparison stimulus keys, and then to peck that key. Later, five novel stimuli, employed as both sample and comparison stimuli, and two additional matching keys were added. Each bird showed matching transfer to the novel samples. The data suggest that the birds may have learned the concept of figure matching rather than a series of two-component chains or discrete five-key discriminations.     

Category discrimination by pigeons using five polymorphous features

Eight pigeons were trained to discriminate between sets of color photographs of natural scenes. The scenes differed along five two-valued dimensions (site, weather, camera distance, camera orientation, and camera height), and all combinations of the feature values were used. One value of each dimension was designated as positive, and slides containing three or more positive feature values were members of the positive stimulus set. Thus, each feature had an equal, low, correlation with reinforcement, and all features had zero correlations with each other. Seven of the 8 pigeons learned this discrimination, and their responding came under the control of all five features. Within the positive and negative stimulus sets, response rates were higher to stimuli that contained more positive feature values. Once discrimination had been achieved, reversal training was given using a subset of the slides. In this subset, only a single feature was correlated with reinforcement. All pigeons learned this reversal successfully and generalized it to additional photographs with the same feature content. After reversal, the original reinforcement contingencies were reinstated, and training was continued using all the slides except those that had been used in reversal. Reversal generalized to these slides to some extent. Analysis of the response rates to individual slides showed that, compared with prereversal training, only the feature that had been subjected to reversal contingencies showed a reversed correlation with response rate. The remaining features showed the same correlation with response rate as they had before reversal training. Thus, reversal on some members of a category following category discrimination training led to generalization to stimuli within the category that were not involved in the reversal, but not to features that were not reversed. It is therefore inappropriate to refer to the pigeons as learning a concept.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

共享概念的性质对拥有关系句子情景模型建立的影响

应用扇效应技术探讨共享概念的性质对建构拥有关系情境模型的影响。共包括2个实验,探讨在将“多人买1物”句式中的所购“物品”改变为隐含共同地点信息的“物品”条件下,被试对“多人买1物”拥有行为句式的学习是否表现出扇效应。结果表明,当所购物品隐含的相同地点信息的情况下,“多人买1物”的拥有行为句式无论是否具有明确的地点状语,都如同“1人买多物”的句式一样,没有表现出扇效应,与Radvanskv的研究结果不同。据此认为,只有在共享概念是属于情景模型建构的维度信息的情况下,有共享概念的信息才能整合为同一个情景模型。     

The Power to Feel Fear and The One to Feel Happiness are the Same

The centre of Adorno's Critical Theory is occupied by the theme of happiness. He speaks of the impaired life, of the unjustness of society, of murderous prejudices, of the atrocities in history, of the dissonance in art, of the unhappy consciousness, because something better can only be described from a point of opposition. Happiness cannot be objectified as possession, it always needs to be experienced subjectively, somatically. (With happiness it is like with truth: One does not have it, one is in it.) Happiness cannot be prescribed and ordered; nothing can be done to guarantee happiness. (Happiness goes beyond doing.) Happiness (like fear) has to do with being open to experience which can overwhelm the self. Sexual and aesthetical experience are models for such overwhelming happiness. The sensation of happiness always is very personal, but in this experience the individual leaves its particularity behind. One has to differentiate between goal and object: Happiness may be a goal, but not it itself, only what obstructs it, can be an object of Critical Theory.     

Sehen, Sichtbarkeit und empirische Forschung

Vision, Visibility, and Empirical Research. In general, natural scientists use the concept of observation in a liberal way: they talk of observing electrons, DNA, or distant quasars. Several philosophers of science have recently argued for a similar use of the concept of observation: they have claimed that the important aspects of scientific research can only be properly reconstructed in accordance with how this term is actually used in science. With reference to an example from astronomy, I point out that the proposed generalisation of the concept of observation leads to undesirable consequences. I argue that a differentiated conceptual framework is required in order to give an adequate account of the varieties of scientific experience. Thus, the appropriate starting point for distinguishing these various scientific research practices should not be the generalised scientific conception of observation, but instead distinctly different uses of the term observation drawn from ordinary language. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Self‐concept clarity and relationship satisfaction at the dyadic level

Self‐concept clarity is an individual resource that is associated with couple relationship well‐being. In two dyadic studies, the authors investigated whether and how self‐concept clarity has implications for both partners' relationship satisfaction. Study 1 tested and supported the hypothesis that self‐concept clarity concurrently predicts own and partner's relationship satisfaction through couple identity in a sample of 202 dating couples. Study 2 tested and supported the hypothesis that self‐concept clarity predicts longitudinal change in own and partner's relationship satisfaction through positive (i.e., supportive and common) dyadic coping behaviors in a sample of 97 married couples. The findings clarify and expand the benefits of self‐concept clarity for partners' relational well‐being.     

The gap that makes us desperate: Paths from language to mental health

Although past research provided some clues about the relation of language use with mental health, the mediatory functions of personality variables in this relationship have been ignored. This research examined the mediatory role of self‐concept clarity in the relationship between language use perceived by individuals and mental health indicators including anxiety, depression, and alexithymia. Based on the theoretical framework suggested by ?im?ek (2010), two studies sought to test two alternative structural equation models in data from university students in the first study (n = 250) and data from other groups in the second study (n = 331). The first model assumed that the relationship of language use with anxiety, depression, and alexithymia was mediated by self‐concept clarity. The second model tested the mediatory role of both anxiety and self‐concept clarity in this relationship. The results of the first study showed that the second model fitted better to the data than the first. Consistent with the first study, the results of the second study confirmed that the second model produced better goodness of fit statistics than the first model.