A disturbance of interpreting,of symbolisation and of curiosity in the analyst‐analysand relationship: (The patient without insight)1

The author examines the function of the analyst who may distort the unconscious communication with the patient by means of the expression of his countertransference. He studies a disturbance in curiosity and in symbolisation in a patient with a narcissistic pathology. Both problems were related to this failure in interpreting. The curiosity of the patient, which initially seemed to be non‐existent, was found to be directed towards investigating the mind of the analyst, this being his sole purpose. The disturbance in symbolisation was manifested as a constant verbal acting out, which was expressed as verbal communication empty of meaning. A change in the interpretative attitude enabled a modifi cation in the objective of the curiosity, which became focused on investigating his own inner world, and the emptiness of the verbal communication was replaced by representations. This change in communication allowed the analyst to relate the facts of the psychoanalytic relationship both with the patient's phantasy and with the events in his history. An idealised identifi cation with destructive aspects of the mother towards the father was discovered. This idealisation had been sustained by the analyst by means of his errors in interpreting. The author explores disturbances in symbol formation and in the use of symbols, and he considers the different states of emptiness.     

RUPTURES IN THE ANALYTIC SETTING AND DISTURBANCES IN THE TRANSFORMATIONAL FIELD OF DREAMS

This paper explores some implications of Bleger's (1967, 2013) concept of the analytic situation, which he views as comprising the analytic setting and the analytic process. The author discusses Bleger's idea of the analytic setting as the depositary for projected painful aspects in either the analyst or patient or both—affects that are then rendered as nonprocess. In contrast, the contents of the analytic process are subject to an incessant process of transformation (Green 2005). The author goes on to enumerate various components of the analytic setting: the nonhuman, object relational, and the analyst's “person” (including mental functioning). An extended clinical vignette is offered as an illustration.     

Boundary and analytic attitude: reflections on a summer holiday break

The effect of a boundary in analytic work at the summer holiday break is discussed in relation to archetypal experiences of exclusion, loss and limitation. Some attempts by patients to mitigate an analyst's act of separation are reviewed as enactments, and in particular the meanings of a gift made by one patient. Analytic attitude towards enactment from within different schools of practice is sketched, with reference to the effect on the analyst of departing from the received practice of their own allegiance. A theory is adumbrated that the discomfort of ‘contravening the rules’ has a useful effect in sparking the analyst into consciousness, with greater attention to salient features in an individual case. Interpretation as an enactment is briefly considered, along with the possible effects of containing the discomfort of a patient's enactment in contrast to confronting it with interpretation.     

Inside and outside the window: some fundamental elements in the theory of psychoanalytic technique

The underlying concern of this paper is that psychoanalysis as practised today is in danger of losing its specificity and so losing its way. The author suggests this is possible for three reasons: the problem analysts face in responding to the strong emotional demands the great majority of patients necessarily place on them, the unintended consequences of the apparent success of 'here and now technique' and the absence of good clinical theory. The paper mainly discusses the author's ideas about some core elements of the clinical theory that all psychoanalysts must use when they are working and proposes (at the risk of being facile) some relatively simple heuristics related to them which are meant to be helpful. Recalling Kurt Lewin's maxim that 'there is nothing so practical as a good theory', he will suggest that continuous reflection on how one is using theory in daily practice is highly practical, if the theory is good enough. Theory in fact is a necessary 'third' in psychoanalytic practice which, if kept in sufficient working order close enough to clinical experience, provides an ongoing and very necessary check on our sense of reality. But, of course, as a third it can, like reality itself, be the focus of both love and hate with equally problematic consequences. The paper starts with a clinical example of a difficult but apparently successful analysis reaching its end, which will be used throughout the paper to illustrate and elaborate the theoretical ideas set out.     

Trying to enter the long black branches: some technical extensions of the work of Frances Tustin for the analysis of autistic states in adults

The author suggests a number of technical extensions/clinical applications of Frances Tustin's work with autistic children, which are applicable to the psychoanalysis of neurotic, borderline and psychotic adults. These are especially relevant to those individuals in whom early uncontained happenings (Bion) have been silently encapsulated through the use of secretive autosensual maneuvers related to autistic objects and shapes. Although such encapsulations may constitute obstacles to emotional and intellectual development, are consequential in both the relational and vocational spheres for many analysands and present unending challenges for their analysts, the author demonstrates ways in which it may be possible to detect and to modify these in a transference-centered analysis. A detailed process of differential diagnosis between autistic states and neurotic/narcissistic (object-related) states in adults is outlined, along with several clinical demonstrations of the handling of a variety of elemental terrors, including the 'dread of dissolution.' The idiosyncratic and perverse use of the analytic setting and of the analyst and issues of the analysand's motivations are considered and illustrated. A new model related to 'objects in the periphery' is introduced as an alternative to the more classical Kleinian models regarding certain responses and/or non-responses to transference interpretation. Issues a propos the countertransference are also taken up throughout.     

The colourless canvas: representation, therapeutic action and the creation of mind

Freud's initial formulations viewed psychoanalysis as working towards the rediscovery of psychic elements - thoughts, feelings, memories, wishes, etc. - that were once known - represented in the mind, articulatable, thinkable - but then disguised and/or barred from consciousness. His subsequent revisions implicated a second, more extensive category of inchoate forces that either lost or never attained psychic representation and, although motivationally active, were not fixed in meaning, symbolically embodied, attached to associational chains, etc. Following Freud's theory of representation, the author conceptualizes these latter forces as "unrepresented" or "weakly represented" mental states that make a demand upon the mind for work and require transformation into something that is represented in the psyche, if they are to be thought about or used to think with. This paper describes, discusses and presents illustrations of this transformational process (figurability),that moves intersubjectively from unrepresented or weakly represented mental states to represented mental states, from force to meaning, from the inchoate to mental order.     

Creating One’s Reality: The Interaction of Politics Perceptions and Enactment Behavior

ABSTRACT

The current study investigated the previously unexamined relationship between politics perceptions and employee enactment behavior. Consistent with previous job stress and sense-making research, we hypothesized that individuals reporting low levels of enactment behaviors would be more adversely affected by politics perceptions than those who engaged in high levels of enactment behavior. Results across two samples provided strong support for the hypothesized relationships. Specifically, employees who reported low levels of enactment behavior experienced less satisfaction, less person–environment fit, and reported lower levels of effort when faced with highly political environments. Conversely, levels of satisfaction and person–environment fit perceptions of individuals reporting high levels of enactment behaviors were largely unaffected by highly political contexts. Implications of these findings, strengths and limitations, and avenues for future research are provided.     

SPONTANEOUS “CURES”: NORMAN REIDER'S FORGOTTEN PAPER,PART II

Part I of this paper combined an introduction to Norman Reider's original 1955 paper with a republication of the paper itself. Part II is a discussion of the complexities of a comparison of past and present psychoanalytic literature. The concept of enactment is proposed as one of many possible alternative views in considering Reider's notion of spontaneous “cures.” A careful consideration of these spontaneous cures within the ordinary ups and downs of any psychoanalytic treatment sheds important light on our continuing confusion about how we define the term cure, and therefore about the nature of change during psychoanalytic treatment. This alternative perspective is only one of many plausible ones for present‐day readers. The purpose of this republication is not to propose an explanation for “what really happened” with Reider and his patients; rather, it is to reconsider the fallacy of evaluating his paper outside its historical context and thereby failing to appreciate his courage in presenting what at the time were radical views. Questions about the complexity and confusion regarding cure and change require reexamination of the neglect of epistemology on the part of psychoanalysis in prolonging the confusion about distinguishing psychotherapy and psychoanalysis.     

Differentiating Two Kinds of Neutrality

Neutrality is a most important concept, yet a controversial one. Theorists of different analytic schools have defined it in their own terms, leaving behind them a legacy of disparate and often contradictory formulations. In this paper, the author reviews briefly some of these ideas about neutrality. Then, from a contemporary interpersonal/relational perspective, the author takes a new look at the idea of neutrality. The author points out how unacknowledged discrepancies among these ideas get in the way of understanding and so complicate analytic discourse, and argues that useful work with this concept requires that analysts differentiate between two aspects of neutrality, specifically operational neutrality and intentional neutrality. The theoretical discussion is followed by a case vignette illustrating the clinical usefulness of this differentiation.