Shaping the Field of Theology and Science: A Critique of Nancey Murphy

Nancey Murphy is a key second-generation figure in the field of religion and science. Through a variety of responsibilities, some of which are reviewed here, she has worked as a discipline builder over the last fifteen years. After trying to convey the general spirit of Murphy's work, the author focuses on five areas where readers might resist her conclusions, including her "postmodern" theory of scientific (and religious) knowledge and truth, her treatment of theology and science as "separate but equal," and her defense of physicalism.     

Pragmatism, Science, And Society: A Review Of Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1

Richard Rorty's Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1 is a collection of papers that explores the implications of philosophical pragmatism in several areas, including natural science, mind—body issues in philosophy, and perspectives on liberal democracy and social change. Similarities between Rorty's pragmatism and Skinner's radical behaviorism are explored in each of these three areas. Although some important and interesting differences are found regarding the role of science in social change, most areas show remarkable similarities between the two systematic perspectives.     

Joining and leaving a new religious movement: A study of ex-members’ mental health

The impact of membership in new, often socially contested, religious movements (NRMs) on mental health of members and ex-members is still a controversial question in the psychological literature. In the present study, we interviewed 20 ex-members of various NRMs who also completed questionnaires measuring several cognitive (need for closure, world assumptions) and affective-emotional (parental and adult attachment, social relationships, depression) constructs. Ex-members were then compared with current NRM members and with individuals not involved in NRMs. It appeared that NRM membership compensated for some previously existing vulnerabilities reported by members (insecure attachment in childhood, few social relationships, negative life events). However, this supportive effect did not persist after the destabilizing experience of disaffiliation. Yet, ex-members remained strong believers and were very inclined to spirituality.     

Philosophy,Logic, Science,History

Analytic philosophy is sometimes said to have particularly close connections to logic and to science, and no particularly interesting or close relation to its own history. It is argued here that although the connections to logic and science have been important in the development of analytic philosophy, these connections do not come close to characterizing the nature of analytic philosophy, either as a body of doctrines or as a philosophical method. We will do better to understand analytic philosophy—and its relationship to continental philosophy—if we see it as a historically constructed collection of texts, which define its key problems and concerns. It is true, however, that analytic philosophy has paid little attention to the history of the subject. This is both its strength—since it allows for a distinctive kind of creativity—and its weakness—since ignoring history can encourage a philosophical variety of “normal science.”     

生存结构与心灵境界——面向21世纪的中国哲学

中国哲学可视为一种“生命哲学”或“生存哲学”,它所关注的核心问题就是“生存结构”或“生命结构”,而这种生命结构本质上又体现为阴阳结构.阴阳结构或阴阳范畴,从其内容来看,其实也就是中国人的心灵结构,同时也是我们的心灵境界,体现了一种生命关怀或“生命忧患”意识;从其形式方面来看,则是一种“结构思维”方法。当今人类面临着许许多多紧迫的世界性、全球性问题,以《周易》哲学为代表的中国生命结构哲学或许能够给我们以相当的启示.答案就是;多元一体,共存互补。     

WAYS OF DISCOURSE AND WAYS OF LIFE

In book X of the Republic, Plato famously reports “a quarrel between poetry and philosophy.” The present essay examines this quarrel in book X, along with other relevant parts of the Republic, by understanding “philosophy” and “poetry” as rival ways of life and rival ways of discourse. The essay first explains why, in Plato’s view, poetic discourse weakens one’s power to reason and is at odds with philosophic discourse. Then it shows how poetic discourse is bound up with a way of life that champions the value of freedom. Such a life forms a contrast with the philosophic life, which is marked more by stability and unity than by freedom. The quarrel, however, is not a simple antagonism. The essay hence concludes by discussing why, despite the opposition between the two, philosophy cannot do without poetry.     

董仲舒易学哲学思想探析

董仲舒的易学哲学思想是他的整个哲学体系的核心内容.其内涵丰富而深刻,主要表现在董仲舒赋予<易传>中的"元"以逻辑在先和价值根源之意义,表明"元"是一个价值本体范畴;他把<易传>的"继善成性"论改造为"天止人继"说,反映了人类在宇宙万物中之地位与意义的一种自觉精神;又把<易传>"人文化成"的思想观念发展为一种"人文宇宙观",从宇宙观高度审视人类文化,又从人类文化角度看待宇宙,观与文化观合二为一,表明了宇宙是人类文化创造的本源和基础,而人类文化是宇宙的发展和完善.这就从宇宙观的高度肯定、突出了人文价值的崇高意义.     

Logic and Philosophy of Logic in Wittgenstein

This essay discusses Wittgenstein's conception of logic, early and late, and some of the types of logical system that he constructed. The essay shows that the common view according to which Wittgenstein had stopped engaging in logic as a philosophical discipline by the time of writing Philosophical Investigations is mistaken. It is argued that, on the contrary, logic continued to figure at the very heart of later Wittgenstein's philosophy; and that Wittgenstein's mature philosophy of logic contains many interesting thoughts that have gone widely unnoticed.     

What Is Legal Philosophy?

This article delineates some of the main issues that are debated by philosophers of law. It explores the connections between legal philosophy and other areas of philosophy, while also seeking to specify the distinctiveness of many of the concerns that have preoccupied philosophers of law. It illustrates its abstract points with examples focused on the separability of law and morality, the nature of the rule of law, the nature of rights, justifications for the imposition of punishment, and the identification of basic legal entitlements.     

Modeling,Truth, and Philosophy

Knowledge requires truth, and truth, we suppose, involves unflawed representation. Science does not provide knowledge in this sense but rather provides models, representations that are limited in their accuracy, precision, or, most often, both. Truth as we usually think of it is an idealization, one that serves wonderfully in most ordinary applications, but one that can terribly mislead for certain issues in philosophy. This article sketches how this happens for five important issues, thereby showing how philosophical method must take into account the idealized nature of our familiar conception of truth.