Two Books for Teachers

Murphy, Nancey and Ellis, George F. R. On the Moral Nature of the Universe: Theology, Cosmology, and Ethics
Haught, John F. Science and Religion: From Conflict to Conversation     

General education,cultural diversity,and identity

The issue of this paper is cultural plurality as a problem for public, general education and for (personal) identity. In order to examine this question, one needs to be clear about the meaning of the concepts of general education, on the one hand, and cultural diversity on the other. In the first section, we will fix the meaning of these concepts. A conceptual distinction between cultural diversity and cultural pluralism will be introduced. In the second section, it will be argued that open pluralism can only be maintained if there is a basic common culture apart from the cultural diversity that pluralism affirms. Therefore, there is yet an indispensable role for general education in an open, pluralistic society. In the third section we will look at two metaphors that give an opposite significance to the relation between identity and diversity: the conversational metaphor and the food metaphor mishmash. The final section expands on the conversational metaphor by way of an exposition of Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the self. It supplies us with a promising concept of identity that is not in complete opposition to diversity.     

RESPONSE TO CRITIQUES OF ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TECHNOLOGY

Abstract. Both Roger Shinn and Robert Stivers ask whether technology has a momentum of its own that is difficult if not impossible to control (“autonomous technology” or “technological inevitability”). I reply that the difficulty in controlling technology is a product of economic and political institutions (such as corporate lobbying and campaign contributions) rather than of any inherent characteristics of technology. Against Stivers's assertion that the ecosystem should be the center of value in environmental ethics, I defend the process view that all beings are valuable, but they are not equally valuable in their richness of experience or their contribution to the experience of others. I also consider his caveats about ambiguities in the concept of sustainability. Two questions raised by Mary Gerhart are taken up: the difficulties of interdisciplinary writing and the role of theological ethics in discussions of public policy. In dialogue with Frederick Ferre I explore the role of alternative visions of the good life as a source of social change. In the face of diminished concern about social justice and environmental sustainability among citizens and in Congress since the book was written, I express long-range hope, but not optimism about the short-term prospects for change.     

Characteristics and consequences of help-giving practices in contrasting human services programs

Relationships between human services program models and help-giving practices, and between both program models and help-giving practices and help-seeker control appraisals were examined in a study of 107 low socioeconomic background families. Three kinds of human services agencies were included in the study, each of which differed in terms of their implicit and explicit assumptions about the families they served and the roles professionals and families played as part of helping relationships. Results support the hypotheses that (a) a program philosophy that was family centered would be associated with more empowering help-giving practices compared to more professionally centered philosophies and (b) a family-centered program philosophy and empowering help-giving practices would be related to an enhanced sense of personal control over needed supports and resources from a target help-giver.     

A. F. Losevs personalistische ontologie

A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century, develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in man’s epistemic relation to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes, the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”.

     

Parameter estimation in latent trait models

Latent trait models for binary responses to a set of test items are considered from the point of view of estimating latent trait parameters=( ₁, , _n ) and item parameters=( ₁, , _k ), where _j may be vector valued. With considered a random sample from a prior distribution with parameter, the estimation of (, ) is studied under the theory of the EM algorithm. An example and computational details are presented for the Rasch model.This work was supported by Contract No. N00014-81-K-0265, Modification No. P00002, from Personnel and Training Research Programs, Psychological Sciences Division, Office of Naval Research. The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for several valuable suggestions.     

Thoughts and feelings and things: A new psychiatric epistemology

Epistemology — the study of knowledge — is a philosophical discipline with close ties to psychiatry. When epistemologists address specific questions about how knowledge is actually realized by human beings, their philosophy must be informed by empirical studies of the sort psychiatrists now take up in a variety of forms. As this paper describes, psychiatrists can likewise improve their understanding of human psychology through a deeper appreciation of philosophical analysis in epistemology.The aim of this article is to introduce a unifying framework within which the experience from different approaches to psychiatry — (1) the conceptual schemas of cognitive psychiatry, (2) the mental structures of psychoanalytic psychiatry, (3) the categorical forms of existential psychiatry, and (4) the neural pathways of biological psychiatry — can all be applied productively to the central question of epistemology. By establishing a broad understanding of the problem of knowledge, this new view of epistemology is developed within the idiom of each psychiatric approach. In addressing themselves to a unitary problem, these diverse psychiatric approaches are themselves revealed, not as competing points of view, but as complementary views of a single subject. The result is a new epistemology that can not only bring the insights of psychiatry to philosophy, but can also contribute to the care of patients when psychiatrists bring this broader view to their clinical work.     

Joseph Margolis on Pragmatism

This paper begins with a memoir of the author’s interactions with Joseph Margolis that delineates both Margolis’s importance as a teacher and their disagreements on aspects of American philosophy. It then turns to Margolis’s discussions of pragmatism as a philosophical movement, with an emphasis on his understanding of John Dewey. The paper considers, third, Margolis’s account of the decline and rebirth of pragmatism, the latter process attributed largely to the work of Richard Rorty. The paper concludes with an examination of what it sees as Margolis’s most valuable work: his explorations of the nature of the self and of human society.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.