Implications of an initial empirical victory for the truth of the theory and additional empirical victories

Psychologists take two propositions for granted. Specifically, empirical verification of predictions derived from a theory (a) support that the theory is more likely to be true and (b) support that additional predictions derived from the theory have an increased probability of being sustained if subjected to empirical testing. In contrast, I argue that both propositions depend strongly on whether auxiliary assumptions are taken into account. When auxiliary assumptions are not taken into account, the first proposition is valid but the second is not. When auxiliary assumptions are taken into account, the first proposition is not valid, and the second proposition encounters additional problems. I use Venn diagrams and Bayesian principles to demonstrate these conclusions.     

Empirical Propositions and the Change of Language-Games

People unavoidably provide reasons for their words and deeds when reasoning in a language-game.Wittgenstein thinks that when people in different language-games argue with one other,they insist on adopting a doubtful attitude toward the reasons provided by the other side.His use of the term "language-game" here is a metaphor,and implies that people in different cultures can scarcely reason with one another.Indeed,according to Wittgenstein's consideration of concepts of logic in On Certainty,language-games are incompatible with one another because their internal logic and reasons are different from each other.However,in his discussion of empirical propositions Wittgenstein has also shown us the possibility that the intemal reasons of one language-game can transmit beyond its own borders and be valid in another language-game.     

Measurement invariance in mentoring research: A cross-cultural examination across Taiwan and the U.S.

Workplace mentoring in the international context is an emerging research area with significant potential for global integration. However, although measurement equivalence is a prerequisite for examining cross-cultural differences, this assumption has yet to be examined in mentoring research. This study contributes to the mentoring literature by assessing the measurement equivalence of the Mentoring Functions Questionnaire (MFQ-9) across two diverse cultural settings, the U.S. and Taiwan. Results of a series of multi-group confirmatory factor analyses supported full configural invariance, full metric invariance, and partial scalar invariance across the two groups. These findings suggest MFQ-9 may provide acceptable comparisons and meaningful interpretations across cultures. Implications for future international mentoring research and managerial practice are discussed.     

Comparison of a stimulus equivalence protocol and traditional lecture for teaching single-subject designs

This study compared the effects of a computer-based stimulus equivalence protocol to a traditional lecture format in teaching single-subject experimental design concepts to undergraduate students. Participants were assigned to either an equivalence or a lecture group, and performance on a paper-and-pencil test that targeted relations among the names of experimental designs, design definitions, design graphs, and clinical vignettes was compared. Generalization of responding to novel graphs and novel clinical vignettes, as well as the emergence of a topography-based tact response after selection-based training, were evaluated for the equivalence group. Performance on the paper-and-pencil test following teaching was comparable for participants in the equivalence and lecture groups. All participants in the equivalence group showed generalization to novel graphs, and 6 participants showed generalization to novel clinical vignettes. Three of the 4 participants demonstrated the emergence of a topography-based tact response following training on the stimulus equivalence protocol.     

Transportability of equivalence-based programmed instruction: efficacy and efficiency in a college classroom

College students in a psychology research-methods course learned concepts related to inferential statistics and hypothesis decision making. One group received equivalence-based instruction on conditional discriminations that were expected to promote the emergence of many untaught, academically useful abilities (i.e., stimulus equivalence group). A negative control group received no instruction, and a positive (complete instruction) control group received instruction on all possible relations (those taught to, and emerging untaught in, the stimulus equivalence group). On posttests, the stimulus equivalence group performed as well as the positive control group (and both outperformed the negative control group), but those in the equivalence-based instruction condition achieved this outcome with significantly less training, thereby demonstrating the efficiency of equivalence-based instruction. Social validity measures indicated that participants found the instruction to be beneficial and as enjoyable as traditional teaching methods.     

What Can Artificial Intelligence Learn from Wittgenstein＇s On Certainty？.

Meta-philosophically speaking, the philosophy of artificial intelligence （AI） is intended not only to explore the theoretical possibility of building ＂thinking machines,＂ but also to reveal philosophical implications of specific AI approaches. Wittgenstein＇s comments on the analytic/empirical dichotomy may offer inspirations for AI in the second sense. According to his ＂river metaphor＂ in On Certainty, the analytic/empirical boundary should be delimited in a way sensitive to specific contexts of practical reasoning. His proposal seems to suggest that any cognitive modeling project needs to render the system context-sensitive by avoiding representing large amounts of truisms in its cognitive processes, otherwise neither representational compactness nor computational efficiency can be achieved. In this article, different AI approaches （like the Common Sense Law of Inertia approach, the Bayesian approach and the connectionist approach） will be critically evaluated under the afore-mentioned Wittgensteinian criteria, followed by the author＇s own constructive suggestion on what AI needs to try to do in the near future.     

试论康德心理学思想及其对当代的影响

康德著作中蕴含着丰富的心理学思想,其在继承沃尔夫理性心理学与经验心理学二分的基础上,通过批评理性心理学,消解了我思的主体地位,为解决二元论问题做出了重要努力;通过批评经验心理学,指明了心理学在成长为一门科学过程中必须面对的诸多问题。新康德主义在继承并改造康德思想的过程中,发展出一系列影响深远的心理学理论;认知心理学的重要代表人物皮亚杰基于对康德思想独具特色的把握,提出了发生认识论;而当代认知科学的图式理论,则完全是建基于对康德经验图式理论框架的全面继承上。     

经验基础与知识确证

Whether empirical givenness has the reliability that foundationalists expect is a point about which some philosophers are highly skeptical. Sellars took the doctrine of givenness as a “myth,” denying the existence of immediate perceptual experience. The arguments in contemporary Western epistemology are concentrated on whether sensory experience has conceptual contents, and whether there is any logical relationship between perceptions and beliefs. In fact, once the elements of words and conceptions in empirical perception are affirmed, the logical relationship between perceptual experience and empirical belief is also affirmed. This relationship takes place through perceptual experience acting as evidence for beliefs. The real problem lies in how one should distinguish between the different relationships with perception of singular beliefs and of universal beliefs, and in how singular beliefs can provide justification for universal beliefs. __________ Translated from Zhongguo Shehui Kexue 中国社会科学 (Social Sciences in China), 2007, (1): 65–75     

Comparative Evaluations

My response to Engelmann (2008) will be based on several questions that will allow both its author and the general reader to determine whether the assumptions I make as an interpreter of this complex paper are congruent or incongruent with their own interpretations of the text. The interpretations by the writer, by any commentator, and the diverse interpretations of a general audience together with my own interpretations will, I hope, facilitate some fruitful ‘comparative evaluations.’ I articulate my inferences of the most dense part of the paper, namely the ‘concrete immediate Consciousness and the developing absent outside.’ My hope is to address Engelmann’s question: “Am I in a better disposition to judge modern theories of consciousness?” The last section of my response spells out more personal comments to my all too brief and single encounter with Arno Engelmann. It is there that Arno Engelmann’s fascinating statement “I am a citizen of the world” is addressed through its counterparts in my life.     

The Basic Constructive Logic for a Weak Sense of Consistency defined with a Propositional Falsity Constant

The logic B_Kc1 is the basic constructive logic in the ternaryrelational semantics (without a set of designated points) adequateto consistency understood as the absence of the negation ofany theorem. Negation is introduced in B_Kc1 with a negationconnective. The aim of this paper is to define the logic B_Kc1F.In this logic negation is introduced via a propositional falsityconstant. We prove that B_Kc1 and B_Kc1F are definitionally equivalent.