Common control by compound samples in conditional discriminations

We tested whether teaching control by single stimulus samples in conditional discriminations would result in common control of two-stimuli compound samples, and vice versa. In Experiment 1, 5 participants were first taught four single-sample conditional discriminations. The first conditional discrimination was as follows: given sample stimulus P1, select comparison stimulus A1 and not A2; given sample P2 select comparison A2 and not A1. The second conditional discrimination was as follows: given sample P1 select comparison B1 and not B2; given sample P2 select B2 and not B1. Different sample stimuli (Q1 and Q2) were used in the third and fourth conditional discriminations. Moreover, A1 and B1 were presented together as comparisons, such that, if Q1 was presented as the sample, A1 was correct and B1 was incorrect; and if Q2 was presented as the sample, B1 was correct and A1 was incorrect. A2 and B2 were also presented as comparisons. When Q1 was presented, A2 was correct and when Q2 was presented B2 was correct. After training with these four single stimulus sample discriminations, participants were tested with compound PQ samples presented with A1, A2, B1, and B2 as comparisons. If common control were established by the PQ stimuli, a participant would select A1 when P1Q1 was presented, A2 when P2Q1 was presented, B1 when P1Q2 was presented, and B2 when P2Q2 was presented. Such common control by PQ samples occurred in 4 of 5 participants. In Experiment 2, 4 participants were given reverse training. They were first taught to select the A1, A2, B1, and B2 stimuli in response to the appropriate PQ combinations and then probed on the single stimulus sample discriminations. All 4 participants were successful on this probe. Experiments 3 and 4 investigated the effects of teaching additional conditional discriminations with novel stimuli on subsequent transfer from the single-sample discriminations to performance on the compound-sample conditional discrimination.     

The Scandal of Deduction

This article provides the first comprehensive reconstruction and analysis of Hintikka’s attempt to obtain a measure of the information yield of deductive inferences. The reconstruction is detailed by necessity due to the originality of Hintikka’s contribution. The analysis will turn out to be destructive. It dismisses Hintikka’s distinction between surface information and depth information as being of any utility towards obtaining a measure of the information yield of deductive inferences. Hintikka is right to identify the failure of canonical information theory to give an account of the information yield of deductions as a scandal, however this article demonstrates that his attempt to provide such an account fails. It fails primarily because it applies to only a restricted set of deductions in the polyadic predicate calculus, and fails to apply at all to the deductions in the monadic predicate calculus and the propositional calculus. Some corollaries of these facts are a number of undesirable and counterintuitive results concerning the proposed relation of linguistic meaning (and hence synonymy) with surface information. Some of these results will be seen to contradict Hintikka’s stated aims, whilst others are seen to be false. The consequence is that the problem of obtaining a measure of the information yield of deductive inferences remains an open one. The failure of Hintikka’s proposal will suggest that a purely syntactic approach to the problem be abandoned in favour of an intrinsically semantic one.     

ASSOCIATIVE SYMMETRY,ANTISYMMETRY, AND A THEORY OF PIGEONS' EQUIVALENCE‐CLASS FORMATION

Five experiments assessed associative symmetry in pigeons. In Experiments 1A, 1B and 2, pigeons learned two‐alternative symbolic matching with identical sample‐ and comparison‐response requirements and with matching stimuli appearing in all possible locations. Despite controlling for the nature of the functional stimuli and insuring all requisite discriminations, there was little or no evidence for symmetry. By contrast, Experiment 3 demonstrated symmetry in successive (go/no‐go) matching, replicating the findings of Frank and Wasserman (2005). In view of these results, I propose that in successive matching, (1) the functional stimuli are stimulus‐temporal location compounds, (2) continual nonreinforcement of some sample‐comparison combinations juxtaposed with reinforcement of other combinations throughout training facilitates stimulus class formation, (3) classes consist of the elements of the reinforced combinations, and (4) common elements produce class merger. The theory predicts that particular sets of training relations should yield “antisymmetry”: Pigeons should respond more to a reversal of the nonreinforced symbolic baseline relations than to a reversal of the reinforced relations. Experiment 4 confirmed this counterintuitive prediction. These results and other theoretical implications support the idea that equivalence relations are a natural consequence of reinforcement contingencies.     

The bundle theory and the substratum theory: deadly enemies or twin brothers?

In this paper, I explore several versions of the bundle theory and the substratum theory and compare them, with the surprising result that it seems to be true that they are equivalent (in a sense of ‘equivalent’ to be specified). In order to see whether this is correct or not, I go through several steps: first, I examine different versions of the bundle theory with tropes and compare them to the substratum theory with tropes by going through various standard objections and arguing for a tu quoque in all cases. Emphasizing the theoretical role of the substratum and of the relation of compresence, I defend the claim that these views are equivalent for all theoretical purposes. I then examine two different versions of the bundle theory with universals, and show that one of them is, here again, equivalent to the substratum theory with universals, by examining how both views face the famous objection from Identity of Indiscernibles in a completely parallel way. It is only the second, quite extreme and puzzling, version of the bundle theory with universals that is not equivalent to any other view; and the diagnosis of why this is so will show just how unpalatable the view is. Similarly, only a not-so-palatable version of the substratum theory is genuinely different from the other views; and here again it’s precisely what makes it different that makes it less appealing.

SOME CORRELATIONS BETWEEN METHODS OF KNOWING AND THEOLOGICAL CONCEPTS IN ARTHUR PEACOCKE'S PERSONALISTIC PANENTHEISM AND NONPERSONAL NATURALISTIC THEISM

Differences in methods of knowing correlate with differences in concepts about what is known. This is an underlying issue in science and religion. It is seen, first, in Arthur Peacocke's reasoning about God as transcendent and personal, is based on an assumption of correlative thinking that like causes like. This contrasts with a notion of causation in empirical science, which explains the emergence of new phenomena as originating from temporally prior phenomena quite unlike that which emerges. The scientific understanding of causation is compatible with a naturalistic theism that holds a nonpersonal model of God as the creative process. However, focusing on the immanence of God, there is a second correlation between methods of knowing and concepts of God. Classical empiricism, used by science, correlates with God understood nonpersonally as the creative process. Radical empiricism, in which feelings and not only sense perceptions have cognitive import, opens up the possibility that one can experience Peacocke's personal, panentheistic God as pattern‐forming influence. I illustrate this second method‐concept correlation with a personal experience.     

Equivalence of serufuesutei‐mu (self‐esteem) and jisonshin in Japan

Most studies of Japanese self‐esteem have implicitly assumed that the concept of self‐esteem (SE) is indigenously meaningful. However, this has not been shown to be true. The present research investigated whether the indigenous Japanese word jisonshin is semantically equivalent to the English expression SE and, by implication, whether it denotes the same concept as originally delineated by Rosenberg, that of having a positive attitude toward oneself. Japanese participants (N = 234) responded to 11 pairs of statements about SE and several other items. Half of the statements contained the expression serufuesutei‐mu (self‐esteem), the other half the expression jisonshin. Participants independently judged the two expressions to be ‘basically’ synonymous, but endorsed some otherwise identical statements significantly more often when they contained the expression serufuesutei‐mu, suggesting that the differences were due to the foreign connotations of the expression serufuesutei‐mu.     

组织咨询心理学的三种取向及其比较研究

基于不同的理论预设和方法学路线,组织咨询心理学领域形成了三种代表性的研究取向,即经验实证取向、临床治疗学取向以及实践-知识创生取向.文章在系统阐述三种取向基本观点的基础上,就组织观、研究方法、实践特征等同题对三者加以分析比较,并指出了各取向所面I临的挑战.     

精神分析主要概念的经验实证状况

100多年来,精神分析理论所阐述的观念已渗透到心理学、文学、艺术和文化等广泛领域。尽管精神分析享有广泛声誉,但直到最近,它才得到经验实证的支持。通过对支持精神分析理论（无意识、驱力、防御机制、客体关系、恋母情结）和心理动力治疗（移情、反移情、解释、阻抗）几个主要概念的信度和效度的经验实证研究进行了回顾,也探讨了这些实证研究对心理治疗以及心理学未来的影响。     

The Contribution of Empathy to Ethics

ABSTRACT

Empathy has been taken to play a crucial role in ethics at least since the Scottish Enlightenment. More recently, a revival of moral sentimentalism and empirical research on moral behavior has prompted a renewed interest in empathy and related concepts and on their contribution to moral reasoning and to moral behavior. Furthermore, empathy has recently entered our public discourse as having the power to ameliorate our social and political interactions with others.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which such a role can be actually granted. Before focusing on a positive assessment, I will delve into a few problems our ordinary concept of empathy and our commonsensical way of conceiving its connection to ethics will need to face. Specifically, I will show how an exaggerated reliance on the ordinary concept of empathy could lead to an underestimation of its biases and potential limitations (§ 2), how a naïve conception of its connection to morality can overlook relevant counterexamples (§ 3) and lead to forms of reductionism (§ 4). Overcoming this possible shortsightedness would pave the way for arguing in favor of an important – though not sufficient and possible neither necessary – role for empathy in ethics (§ 5).